What has become of the 1-O generation?
Nine years after the 1-O, the young people who also defended the ballot boxes have lowered their independence stance and mobilization
BarcelonaIn October 2017, thousands of young people who were then between 18 and 22 years old experienced their great vital and political baptism by defending the ballot boxes in the street. Today, the "1-O Generation", born between 1995 and 1999, is reaching their thirties, has left the shelter of student life and has begun to face the harshness of labor precariousness and the serious housing crisis. But, how has their perspective evolved in this decade?
We can see the summary barometer by barometer in the records of the Center for Opinion Studies (CEO). Over the years, this generation has experienced a profound shift: today they show less support for independence, they have demobilized with respect to the intensity of the demonstrations of some years ago, they have moved towards more conservative or pragmatic positions on the ideological axis, and they have redirected their priorities towards material problems such as housing, moving away from the initial sovereignist focus.
The desire for independence
During the autumn of 2017 and early 2018, the 1-O generation experienced its true sovereignist ecstasy, shooting support for independence up to bordering on a historic peak of nearly 58% in the Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió (CEO) barometer of April that year. The construction of a republic was the horizon of the majority, who believed that change was within reach. Today, the perspective of time shows deep and highly volatile erosion. Support from this cohort has fallen drastically with strong oscillations throughout the decade, hitting rock bottom at 32% —like in the summer of 2023— and even rebounding to the current 43.44%.
But this disenchantment with the independence project is not exclusive to those young people. Without as many shocks, the rest of the Catalans have also been reducing their support for the yes, which reached a maximum of 48.68% in October 2017 and March 2019 (with the no at 44%), and which now stands at 45%.
And what about the young people who today are between 18 and 22 years old? The latest CEO wave places them at 46.9% support for independence, an increase of more than 10 points compared to October of last year (36.09%), being the age group that is growing the most.
The tendency to demonstrate
Street mobilization was the great habitat where the 1-O generation became strong and visible. It formed the hard and tireless core of the protests, and showed a youth activism that at that time set a record: more than half were actively demonstrating in the years 2018 and 2019. Today, the data are more modest, and the attendance of that group at protest acts has fallen notably, down to 35.7% in 2025.
However, the data hides a resistance: the epic has decreased, but the demographic group continues to mobilize more than the rest. If we compare the decline with the average of the rest of Catalonia, we observe that the general demobilization has been, in fact, much more pronounced and vertical. While in 2018 the rest of the Catalans also turned out massively —47.6%—, their wear and tear has plummeted to 28% in the last year (it reached a low of 23%). One only needs to look at the Diada demonstrations, which for fifteen years have been the thermometer of the mobilization of the Catalans, to understand that the demobilization of the movement is more than relevant.
And today's youth, although far from the 1-O generation, are the most willing to demonstrate in the streets, breaking the myth of a disconnected youth: 31.6% state that they demonstrate, far from that 51% of a decade ago, but above the Catalan average.
The left-right axis
The ideological evolution of the 1-O generation has been a real roller coaster. It started in 2017 in clear left-wing positions—a 3.7 on a scale where 0 is extreme left and 10 is extreme right—and they radicalized to 2.98 in 2019, coinciding with the trial and the sentences of the Process. Now, bordering on their thirties, they lean more towards the center-left, around 4.
In contrast, the average for the rest of the Catalans has experienced a slow shift towards moderation: they started at 3.9 in 2017 and have been turning towards the center until closing today at 4.2, slightly further to the right than the youth of the 'Procés'. Even further to the right, at 4.37, are the youth of today located.
Ballot boxes and problems
The polls are where this disillusionment is definitively reflected. Nine years ago, the vote of the 1-O generation went almost en bloc to the pro-independence forces. Now, the shattering of expectations has atomized this bulk of support, and a good portion has moved toward left-wing formations far removed from the national agenda. A picture shared with the rest of the adult Catalan citizenry, which has also redistributed its preferences and punished the old politics. Likewise, the far-right options that have emerged in recent years have seen their support increase, especially among the 1-O generation and today's 18 to 22-year-olds, with support of nearly 25% in both groups.
The evolution of their main concerns also evidences a change of cycle. In 2017, the status of Catalonia completely dominated the anxieties of the 1-O generation. Today, the sovereignty axis has disappeared from priorities to give way to labor anxiety and the rental crisis, a concern also shared by the current youth aged 18 to 22. The trend is similar to that experienced by the average Catalan, who have abandoned sovereignty concerns to focus on housing and insecurity.
