The migratory policy isolates Sánchez from his international partners

MadridInternational policy has been a battlefield that Pedro Sánchez has managed to capitalize on his favor throughout the legislature. He achieved a leadership position with the Gaza war, with the recognition of Palestine as a spearhead and with "No to war" after the attack by the United States and Israel on Iran, and he also dragged part of the European countries towards his narrative. However, where he has not achieved allies has been in migratory matters, despite the attempt to present regularization as the antithesis to Donald Trump's policy. A large part of the European Union partners did not welcome the measure, as they are immersed in a dynamic of tightening border control policies – one only needs to review the new Pact on Migration and Asylum – and the last thing they want is to give the impression that entering irregularly into the Schengen area can end up being legal. Within this framework, the crisis in Ceuta has only aggravated Pedro Sánchez's solitude in this matter.

The clearest example of this weakness was the letter that, on August 1st, was signed by up to 22 countries linking the recent regularization to the massive entry of immigrants into Ceuta, which, they interpreted, had generated a perception that "illegal entry into the EU is possible". They labeled Sánchez's government policies regarding irregular immigration as "attractive". "Europe did not take kindly to the regularization being done without coordination, even if it is a common practice in other member states," points out the director of Cidob, Pol Morillas, in a conversation with ARA.

A hypothesis supported by sources from the diplomatic career: they interpret that an explanation was lacking towards the rest of the EU countries, considering – they believe – that it has been interpreted as an entry gate to the Schengen area as well, even though Spain has insisted that the residence permit is valid only within the State's borders. Furthermore, they add that Sánchez's "moral superiority" stance – on defense or war issues – has taken its toll on relations with European partners. They also recall that Spain, when it has refused to increase its GDP in defense like the rest of the states, has also angered the Eastern European countries that feel threatened by Russia. "It has consequences," these sources assure, who affirm that the confrontation with Israel or the United States also has them, which some point to as one of the causes of Morocco's "passivity" at the border on July 30.

In fact, the former head of European diplomacy Josep Borrell also admitted this week that Spain's foreign policy had a "cost" within the EU. "Spain has won over the Global South with positions different from the majority in Europe, but this has a cost. It marginalizes Spain in the Union," he said at the closing of the course 'Quo vadis Europa' reported by El País at the Menéndez Pelayo University in Madrid. In any case, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs they do not see it the same way: José Manuel Albares reprimanded the rest of the European countries on Friday for the lack of solidarity from the outset, especially citing Italy and Denmark, when on other occasions, he said, Spain has indeed closed ranks with them.

The silences

Unlike what has happened in other international debates, Spain has not gained allies in an EU that is turning very to the right on migration matters, remarks Morillas. At most, it has had the support of countries that have not aligned themselves with the hard line of Italy or Denmark, as is the case with France, Luxembourg, Portugal, or Ireland. "The best that Spain has at its disposal [on this matter] is silence," confirms the director of Cidob. For Blanca Garcés, a researcher at the same institution and a specialist in migration, some European Union countries have taken advantage of the Ceuta crisis to attack the Spanish immigrant regularization policy, from the far-right government of Giorgia Meloni to the executive of the social-democratic Danish Mette Frederiksen.

The other progressive government with weight in the EU, which is the Danish one, is aligned with conservative positions on migration matters. And the social-democratic allies who have a more open policy are in opposition and have no influence in softening the position of the EU as a whole. The clear example has been the return regulation, which is part of the new European Migration and Asylum Pact and which allows for the creation of immigrant deportation centers in third countries. Spain is the only country that has opposed it and, within the framework of the European Parliament vote, a majority of socialist parties (not the Danish one) also did so, although it was not enough to stop its approval due to the alliance of the right and the far-right.

The great paradox

The situation, for the Spanish government, is dire. Blanca Garcés exemplifies this: no relationship has been detected between the regularization, announced at the beginning of the year, and an increase in irregular sea arrivals in recent months, but she admits that the measure combined with the Ceuta crisis is an explosive cocktail for the image of La Moncloa abroad. That is, the European perception is one of laxity on the part of the Spanish authorities regarding irregular immigration, even though Spain has maintained strict border control over the last few decades – the specialist emphasizes. Precisely, as a result of agreements with North African countries like Morocco, the Spanish government has managed to reduce sea arrivals in recent years. A policy of outsourcing border control that generates problems both from a human rights perspective and from the power that is given to third countries over the territory.

Sources close to the PSOE, with governmental experience, admit that the context has been terrible for the Spanish government and also believe that La Moncloa has lacked "narrative" in explaining itself to EU countries. They emphasize this, especially because the division in terms of immigration is not ideological, but rather between states that recognize they need immigration to cover labor, especially in the service sector, and those that also absorb immigrants but adopt a contrary discourse. This is why they argue that if the Spanish government had explained itself better regarding regularization to the EU and had taken a more forceful stance on irregular immigration during the Ceuta crisis, things would have been different.

To compensate for this situation, the Spanish government may now be tempted to toughen its border policy, according to Garcés. He points to a measure that was approved this very week: in the midst of the Ceuta crisis, the Spanish government has decided to push for a reform to adapt the asylum and immigration law to the new Pact on Migration and Asylum. This is a signal to the EU of firmness towards irregular immigration. Beyond management, this time the narrative, which is usually a strong point for La Moncloa, has become Pedro Sánchez's weak link.