Barça and Real Madrid fight against the same monster

BarcelonaDoes Real Madrid maintain the invulnerable economic health that Florentino Pérez proclaims? What is the financial reality of the white club once the major works at the Bernabéu are completed? And how does it compare to a Barça that is trying to catch its breath with the partial return to the Camp Nou while dragging the burden of the levers? The balance sheets for the 2025-26 financial year and the budgets for the 2026-27 season allow us to update the economic X-ray of the two giants of national football. Between record turnover, the debt backpack, and accounting engineering, merengues and culers share uncertainties due to a corporate nature that prevents them from capitalizing freely. Madrid has a relative advantage because the new Santiago Bernabéu is much more advanced than the new Camp Nou, but both clubs are struggling, financially speaking, to control the same monster.

The stadium mortgage

The execution of the works on the coliseums conditions both clubs, but the solvency of their balance sheets depicts opposite scenarios. At Madrid, the remodeling of the Bernabéu has been financed with three loans totaling 1.170 billion. The operation, negotiated at an average interest rate of 3.2% and maturing in 2053, entails a sustained annual amortization quota. However, the Madrid club maintains a segregated structure: setting aside the stadium expenditure, it has reduced net debt to 9 million as of June 30, 2026, supported by a consolidated net equity of 624 million. This is the strongest point of Madrid's audited figures.

At Barça, the burden is much more complex. The Espai Barça, structured through a securitization fund with an initial ceiling of 1.500 billion, has reached a key stage with the partial return to the stadium (first and second tiers for 62,000 spectators). Although it is estimated that the finished venue will generate about 250 million more per year, the balance sheet reflects the severity of the accumulated crisis: on June 30, 2026, net equity remains in clearly negative territory of -168 million and working capital shows a deficit of -376.8 million. Likewise, the net debt under the control of La Liga (excluding the stadium) has climbed 29% in the last fiscal year, standing at 607 million. In parallel, the entity has required additional financing of 300 million to complete the main works, raising the total ceiling to 1.800 billion.

Revenues hitting the ceiling: the return home and commercial muscle

Madrid is the first football club to surpass the 1.2 billion euro turnover barrier. It has closed the 2025-26 financial year with 1.221 billion in operating revenue (before player sales), driven by commercial business (514 million) and a Bernabéu at full capacity (362 million). This allows closing the year with a net profit of 26.3 million. For the 2026-27 season, the approved budget foresees achieving 1.25 billion in ordinary revenue and a result of 14.2 million. If the forecast for player sales is included, the total revenue projected by Madrid climbs to 1.4 billion.

For its part, Barça has reached 1.06 billion in operating revenue without resorting to the sale of extraordinary assets. This growth has been based on the partial return to the Camp Nou, merchandising (208 million), and sponsorships (265 million). However, despite the positive ordinary result of 0.2 million, the closing was weighed down by extraordinary items, leading to losses of 18 million. For the 2026-27 season, the club foresees a recovery with 1.195 billion in revenue and a profit of 1 million, supported by the operation of the Camp Nou, despite the capacity limitation to 62,000 spectators. A meager surplus on the verge of a new exile to Montjuïc.

Barça will pay more money in salaries than Madrid

At Barça, the main driver of losses for the 2025-26 season has been the accounting impairment associated with the Barça Studios lever, with a devaluation of -23 million. Meanwhile, at Concha Espina, the extraordinary setback came through judicial and urban planning channels. On June 24, 2026, the Supreme Court confirmed the annulment of the municipal concession for the two underground parking lots at the Bernabéu. Faced with the final ruling, Madrid has initiated a compensation claim against the City Council to recover the 20 million invested.

Control of squad spending is the sustainability thermometer for La Liga and UEFA. Both institutions set 70% of revenue as the recommended maximum limit, a threshold that both clubs respect despite maintaining an upward trend. This will be the great monster they will have to fight against in the short term. Especially Barça, which has a less optimistic revenue outlook.

In the 2025-26 season, Madrid's total personnel expenses amounted to 561.9 million euros (466 million in sports salaries), placing the ratio at 46% of revenue. For the 2026-27 season, it expects to raise personnel spending to 617 million (525 million in sports salaries). If the amortization of signings is added, the total white sports expenditure rises to about 707 million, a historic ceiling.

Barça, which always adds amortizations in the calculation of sports spending, closed the 2025-26 season with 571 million (+6 deviation). For the 2026-27 season, it has approved an 11% increase to 636 million (+65 M€). This effort to protect the first men's team will keep the ratio of revenue at 53%, although the drop in revenue on the horizon (2027-28 season) due to a new exile in Montjuïc has the offices on alert.

This season, in fact, the 'blaugrana' club already foresees a direct sports salary expenditure higher than that of Madrid (nearly 550 million), but, in return, it has a lower list of amortizations (only 58.6 million euros) because it has bought cheaper in the market. Salary-wise, counting the men's football squads, Barça's is 15 million more expensive. The difference also widens because Barça has professional sections in this spending pool that Madrid does not have (handball, futsal, and roller hockey).