Irene Fernández Molina: "The crisis surprises in Ceuta at a moment of honeymoon between Spain and Morocco"

BarcelonaThe researcher Irene Fernández Molina specializes in the Maghreb, the foreign policy of the European Union, and Euro-Mediterranean relations. Hours after the migratory crisis in Ceuta, we analyze with her what reasons may be behind it and the consequences it may have on a European scale.

What is the economic situation in Morocco, in order to understand why so many hundreds of young people decide to leave?

— It is profoundly unequal. The country has good macroeconomic figures, but what many call the Morocco of two speeds is maintained. There are two totally different realities in the rich areas of the cities, especially on the coast, and in the inland areas, where public services are in a very precarious situation and where a huge weight of the informal economy is maintained. The Rif region, in the north, continues to be very abandoned. There is cognitive dissonance: when the king gives a speech talking about a great moment of stability and economic development while we see so many people fleeing.

Why would I say this is happening now?

— I was the first surprise; I did not expect a situation of this type at all, at a time of honeymoon for the bilateral relations proclaimed time and again by both governments. The point of comparison is the May 2021 crisis, but in that case there had been months of increased tensions. The hospitalization in Spain of Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front, was the trigger or the excuse, but since the previous December, since Donald Trump proclaimed the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, Morocco had enormously increased pressure on several international partners, including Spain, to make a declaration in a similar direction. At that time, the political motivation for the instrumentalization of migratory control was more or less clear. Now it is difficult to understand, because the bilateral relationship seemed to be unable to be better and nothing has happened, as far as we know, that threatens Morocco's interests.

Do you think Pedro Sánchez's visit to Algeria ten days ago has anything to do with it?

— It could be an explanation, although it is a very symbolic reason. It is true that the visit culminates the re-establishment of normality in the bilateral Spain-Algeria relationship, but it was no surprise. Precisely, Algeria broke off relations in 2022 in response to Spain's change in formal position on Western Sahara. But now it no longer had an interest in maintaining the rupture situation, it harmed Algeria from an economic point of view. Also at a political level there has been a long process of rapprochement and in Algiers the Spanish government's position on the Palestinian issue has been greatly appreciated. But as for Moroccan interests and their great priority, Western Sahara, there has been no change, as far as is known.

There are voices that attribute it to the Supreme Court ruling that prohibits pushbacks.

— I do not believe, at all, that it is the cause, but it may have had some echo on social networks. Perhaps there have been actors who have instrumentalized it, and this would explain why a larger than usual number of people have concentrated in the border area of Ceuta and Melilla. And what the Moroccan authorities have done, as on other occasions, is to act opportunistically. I don't think the crisis was planned from the beginning, but rather that when it started to happen, they used it. What is clear is that there is intentionality. It is not possible to believe that such an enormous number of people entering, and sustained for so long, is due to lack of capacity or negligence. There is an intentional passivity from the Moroccan security forces. But we do not know the motive, and ambiguity is part of these types of situations. In 2021 there was also no official acceptance by the Moroccan authorities that what happened in Ceuta responded to Ghali's hospitalization.

Among the possible motives for Rabat, there are analysts who point to the law promoted by the Spanish government to nationalize Sahrawis or the claim of Moroccan sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla.

— I don't think any of these things are an immediate objective. Regarding Spanish nationality for Sahrawis, I don't see how it could harm Morocco's interests. And the Moroccan claim over Ceuta and Melilla has always existed, since the country's decolonization, and it will never be abandoned. At the beginning of Mohammed VI's reign, there was a tacit agreement that this was not a priority for Morocco's foreign policy. It may be that when Rabat achieves the annexation of Western Sahara, the next objective will be to continue with the struggle for what they consider their territorial integrity with Ceuta and Melilla. But the issue of the Sahara is a long way from being closed. Perhaps Morocco is concerned that the latest negotiations have stalled. Early in the year, the Trump administration got involved and convened meetings with a lot of energy, and it seemed that the issue could be resolved, in favor of Moroccan interests, in a matter of months, and it hasn't happened, especially because the US has its attention on Iran. But Spain's role here is very secondary.

There is also the hypothesis that the US has a role in the Ceuta crisis, to destabilize Sánchez's government.

— It seems like a far-fetched hypothesis to me. This would also require the US to pay a lot of attention to the Maghreb, which is usually the least important thing in the world. And for Morocco to try to destabilize Sánchez's government, I don't see that clearly either, because it has been the most favorable government in the world to their interests.

Several European countries are pushing to exclude Spain from the Schengen area. Could this end up leading to a European crisis?

— Yes, what is happening is interesting, compared to what happened in 2021, because back then the Spanish government's strategy was to Europeanize the crisis and from the outset one of the messages they repeated was that it was a crisis affecting the entire EU. It was a very successful strategy on the part of the Spanish government and all the tweets, from European institutions and member states, were supportive. Perhaps now the EU is more divided and the response is being more of internal confrontation and blaming the Spanish government, especially by right-wing governments, for the regularization of migrants, establishing a link that I don't think has any role in it.

Do you think this shows how the weight of the far-right has grown in the EU?

— Yes, it could be that politically Spain is now more isolated on this issue than it was in 2021.