The other war in Iran: the Houthis and the battle for maritime routes

BeirutThe Houthis have once again opened a new front in the war between the United States and Iran. The Yemeni group has claimed a missile and drone attack against two Saudi oil tankers sailing in the Red Sea, in compliance with the threat issued days earlier to impose a maritime blockade against ships linked to Saudi Arabia crossing the Bab el-Mandeb strait. The attack has caused several oil tankers to alter their route, shipping companies to review their plans, and increased concern about a new disruption of world trade on one of the planet's most strategic maritime routes.

The reaction was not long in coming. The Yemeni government has expressed its concern about the escalation in the Red Sea and assures that it is working together with Saudi Arabia, the Yemeni parties and the United Nations to prevent regional tension from dragging the country into a new conflict. Riyadh has rejected the Houthis' accusations and has warned that it will respond to any attack against commercial navigation.

From Washington, Donald Trump has directly blamed Tehran. The US president recalled that a year ago the United States launched a campaign against the Houthis for their attacks on maritime trade. He also assured that, if the aggressions continue, Washington will consider Iran responsible for its support of the group and will respond militarily with a "severe military punishment" against both.

But the real scope of these attacks goes far beyond Yemen. While the United States concentrates its bombings on Iran, Tehran once again demonstrates that it retains a capability that no air attack has managed to destroy: that of opening new fronts far from its own territory. The Houthis are today the most visible proof of this strategy.

It is not the first time that the Yemeni group has turned the Red Sea into a stage for international pressure. Between 2023 and 2025, their attacks on merchant ships forced many shipping companies to avoid the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and divert their routes around Africa. They did not manage to completely close this maritime route, but they demonstrated something important: in a global economy based on fast supply chains, it is not necessary to block a route. It is enough to make it too dangerous.

Now the context is different. The war between Washington and Tehran has raised the strategic importance of this corridor. With the Strait of Hormuz under enormous pressure, Bab el-Mandeb becomes a second exit gate for the Gulf's oil to international markets. For Saudi Arabia, the risk is particularly sensitive. Its East-West pipeline allows crude oil to be transported from the Gulf coast to the port of Yanbu, on the Red Sea, avoiding Hormuz. But if this new route also becomes threatened, a significant part of its exports will be exposed again.

The strategy of uncertainty and the role of Tehran

The Houthis' strategy does not necessarily consist of closing the strait. They probably know they do not have the capacity to maintain a permanent blockade. Their strength lies in something simpler and, at the same time, more difficult to combat: uncertainty. Behind this capability lies their relationship with Iran. For years, Tehran has built a network of allies and armed groups in the Middle East that allows it to expand its influence without always having to intervene directly. The Houthis receive Iranian military, technological, and political support, especially in the development of drones and missiles, but reducing them to a mere tool of Iran would be an incomplete explanation.

The movement was born long before it became a strategic ally of Tehran. It emerged in northern Yemen during the 1990s as a religious and political movement, first opposed to the government and later to the intervention led by Saudi Arabia. The war transformed the group, allowed it to consolidate its control over large areas of the country, and made it one of the most powerful armed actors in the region. This explains why the Houthis maintain their own objectives. The threat against Saudi Arabia is not solely a response to the war between the United States and Iran. It is also part of their own dispute with Riyadh and their attempt to gain weight in negotiations about Yemen's future.

And precisely here lies the importance they have for Tehran. The Houthis do not need to receive a direct order to act for Iran's benefit. Their interests can coincide. Both have a common enemy in Saudi Arabia and the United States, and both understand that a small force capable of altering a global trade route can become a huge pressure tool.

Strength and limitations in a new phase of the conflict

The paradox is that the Houthis are at the same time stronger and more limited than before. They have demonstrated that they can attack ships and put markets on alert, but they do not have the capacity to completely control Bab el-Mandeb or impose a prolonged blockade. Furthermore, a major escalation could jeopardize the fragile negotiation process with Saudi Arabia and provoke a new military campaign against their positions.

The Houthis' entry into the war initiated by the United States and Israel on February 28 reveals one of the main characteristics of this new phase of the conflict. Iran does not need to win a conventional battle to maintain its response capacity. It can force its adversaries to fight on several scenarios at once. While the United States can attack infrastructure within Iran, Tehran retains allies capable of shifting pressure to the Red Sea, the Gulf, and international trade routes. In this war, distance no longer protects anyone.