What can Felipe VI do without Pedro Sánchez's permission?

BarcelonaThe recent squabbles and tensions between the Minister of Transport, Óscar Puente, and King Felipe VI, have once again put the complex coexistence between the Head of State and the executive under the spotlight. This is not a new phenomenon. Historian Charles Powell recalled how the former President of the Spanish Government, José María Aznar, deliberately sidelined the emeritus King Juan Carlos I during state visits of great international relevance, generating enormous suspicion at the Zarzuela Palace. These frictions highlight an unavoidable reality of the Spanish political system: theoretically, the monarch and the President of the Government must get along by force, as practically no act of the King is valid without the executive's approval.

Endorsement is the mechanism designed by the Spanish Constitution so that "the acts attributed to the King have the support or ratification of a body that does have real power behind them," explains Maria Itziar Gómez Fernández, professor of constitutional law at Carlos III University of Madrid. "The King's power is non-existent, but he is given the capacity to appoint or ratify laws to maintain historical continuity," she adds.

Thus, according to the Magna Carta, any act with legal consequences requires the President of the Government or the competent ministers to endorse it, except in cases such as the investiture or dissolution of the Courts, which fall to the President of Congress. This makes the monarch "irresponsible in political terms," and means he exercises a function of "moderation, arbitration, and conciliation," as detailed by Joan Ridao, professor of constitutional law at the University of Barcelona. "The King reigns and does not govern," states Joan Lluís Pérez Francesch, professor of constitutional law at the Autonomous University of Barcelona.

What, then, can the King do on his own? The Constitution limits his margin of free action to appointing the civilian and military staff of his Royal Household and to the free disposal of his budget. Ridao points out that regarding the accounts, "there has been some debate," but in practice, it is his only area of discretion.

The Bourbon who 'Bourbons'

The slippery ground comes with speeches. Gómez clarifies that messages like the Ceuta declaration, which are "purely symbolic," do not require endorsement because they are not an exercise of executive power, but emphasizes that "out of pure courtesy and practice, it is usually agreed with Moncloa," as in the Christmas Eve speech. In fact, in the Ceuta case, it was the Spanish government itself that sounded out the monarch about the opportunity to call the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, as highlighted by El País, while United Left (IU) asked him directly this Friday.

When they are speeches in official acts, the line is thinner. Pérez Francesch is critical: "The problem with this king is that, from time to time, he likes to give his opinion and do certain things on his own". The great elephant in the room is the speech of October 3, 2017. Ridao points out that "we have never known what margin of discretion Rajoy attributed to him", but warns that the monarch "exceeded his strictly arbitral function", since instead of calling for dialogue to seek a solution, "he dedicated himself to scolding". Pérez Francesch summarizes it by recovering an old expression from the time of Alfonso XIII: "The king borboneja", that is to say, "goes beyond his explicit faculties".

And if the king refuses to do so?

Faced with an extreme scenario, could Felipe VI refuse to sign an approved law? Pérez Francesch is categorical: "No. His actions are dutiful and he has no reserve of personal power." In fact, there is only one contemporary international precedent that the experts consulted by ARA recall: that of King Baudouin of Belgium, who in April 1990 abdicated for 36 hours to avoid signing the abortion law.

In Spain, this has never happened, even though Ridao recalls the insistence of sectors of the media right for the king to refuse to sanction the amnesty law. Gómez admits, however, that there is "doctrinal division." Some authors argue that he could refuse due to a matter of conscience or if it conflicts with his constitutional duty to guarantee unity, but she is clear: since it is not foreseen in the Constitution, if he refuses to sign, "he loses the constitutional legitimacy he has."

In conclusion, regardless of whether there is good chemistry or not, the system imperatively demands "a certain institutional loyalty" between the government and the Crown, explains Pérez Francesch. "To maintain the gears of the State, it is simply necessary for everyone to limit themselves to doing their job," the expert states.