A senior emergency services official confirms that concern over the Forata reservoir led to the Poio ravine being forgotten.

ValenciaThe potential collapse of the Forata reservoir—which regulates the Magro River and overflowed on the day of the DANA storm—prevented the necessary attention from being given to the situation in the Poio ravine—the cause of most of the deaths—even though a hydrological alert had been issued for this ravine at noon. This was stated on Wednesday by the Deputy Director General of Emergencies for the Valencian Regional Government, Jorge Suárez, on the second day of his testimony as a witness, according to sources present at the questioning who spoke to ARA. To justify the neglect of the ravine, Suárez argued that by early afternoon the water level in the ravine had dropped compared to the morning and that the potential collapse of the reservoir endangered thousands of people, a circumstance that led to the neglect of other dangers, such as the Poio ravine. The senior official insisted that they had learned of incidents in the ravine since 5:30 p.m., but reiterated that attention was focused on the Forata dam. He also explained that, once the Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center) was established at 5:00 p.m., he had no concrete information about cases of people in danger, beyond a map showing the most affected areas. However, he pointed out that the emergency committee was not isolated, but rather communicated with the 112 emergency call center, where calls for help are received. Regarding the measures considered to protect the population, he explained that evacuation was initially considered, but upon realizing that it was not feasible due to lack of time, a lockdown was considered.

The senior official's account coincides with what other witnesses have said so far and would confirm that the Emergency Department made several mistakes, among which the fact that the technicians stand out.They did not warn the senior officials of the regional ministry about the overflowing of the Poio ravinebecause"They were not authorized to interrupt""The Cecopio, and because five members of the Júcar River Basin Authority were already participating remotely. Also, because the workers were overwhelmed by a flood of alerts and rescue requests. This overload is explained by the fact that on the day of the DANA storm, only47.5% of the planned workforce existed, which is 59 people, and for controversial measures such asThe withdrawal at 2:30 p.m. of the firefighters who were monitoring the main boulevardsThe oversight occurred despite the fact that, between 5 and 6 p.m. alone, the 112 emergency service received 2,438 calls alerting them to the situation, and the rainfall data was also not properly assessed. The question raised by the testimonies presented so far in the case is whether a Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center) meeting at 2 p.m., or a prior coordination meeting early in the morning, would have prevented the haste, nerves, and numerous fronts to attend to from causing the situation in the Poio ravine to be forgotten. This decision was influenced by the decision of the former Minister of Justice and the Interior, Salomé Pradas, to travel to the municipality of Carlet—a town on the banks of the Magro River—at almost 2 p.m.