The head of 112 admits that the Spanish government had already considered sending the alert for the DANA storm at 6:35 p.m.
When the alert was sent, at 8:11 p.m., it was already too late and most of the victims had already drowned.
ValenciaA year after the devastating storm, details continue to emerge highlighting the Valencian government's negligent handling of the ES-Alert, specifically the delayed dissemination of the alert on the day of the catastrophe. One of the new revelations came on Tuesday from Inmaculada Piles, head of the 112 emergency coordination service. She admitted to the judge presiding over the case that at 6:35 p.m. on October 29th of last year, Patricia García, head of Civil Protection for the Spanish government's delegation in the Valencian Community, had already indicated to her that it was "the message." In other words, the alert was considered more than an hour and a half before it was broadcast at 8:11 p.m., by which time most of the 229 victims had already died. In fact, The ARA explained a year ago that the Spanish government had already asked the Valencian Generalitat to send the alert a few minutes after six in the eveningPiles's statement, therefore, adds to other testimonies gathered by the magistrate that reveal the inaction of the Ministry of Emergencies, headed by the accused Salomé Pradas, but also the passivity of the Valencian president, Carlos Mazón, with his multiple absences, a four-hour meal with the journalist Maribel Vilaplana and a string of version changes about when it started to worry about the tragedy.
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According to Piles, the head of the Emergency Analysis Unit, Juan Ramón Cuevas, sent an email to the 112 call center with a proposed wording for this message, and she, "in parallel" and privately, discussed this possibility with a Civil Protection official from the Spanish Government Delegation. It was then that she indicated it was "necessary" to send the alert, which prompted Piles to escalate the proposal to the Deputy Director General of Emergencies, Jorge Suárez, who replied that they were already "handling" it.
In her statement, the head of 112 confirmed information provided by other witnesses such as The president of the Júcar River Basin Authority (CHX), Miguel PoloPiles stated that Pradas had doubts about the legality of imposing a lockdown. According to Piles, it was very difficult to predict what would happen, given that they were always reacting to events. He also said that he would have expected a special warning from the CHX (Ebro River Basin Authority) if they detected any dangerous situation, and that he didn't hear Polo mention anything about the Poio ravine, even though he was participating in the Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center) remotely.
Previous attempts to send the alert
Despite the words of the head of the 112 emergency services, the fact is that as early as 5:15 p.m., at the start of the Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center), its head, Jorge Suárez, had already proposed sending the SE-Alert (Emergency Alert System) to the Utiel-Requena Plain region, affected by the potential overflow of the Forata reservoir. This urgency was downplayed, as was the request made minutes before 6:00 p.m. by the president of the Ebro River Basin Authority, who also asked for the ES-Alert to be sent to the towns in the Magro River basin. Given the situation at the Forata reservoir, the initial plan was to confine the population. Then, to evacuate them. By 6:36 p.m., the decision was made to send the ES-Alert. The concern over the reservoir led to the neglect of the Poio ravine, which had been overflowing since 6:00 p.m. The oversight occurred despite the fact that, between 5 and 6 p.m. alone, the 112 emergency service received 2,438 calls alerting them to the situation. Overwhelmed, the technicians failed to notify their superiors of the catastrophic overflow of the dry riverbed, which the River Basin Authority had also warned them about via email at 6:43 p.m. – the information is also available online in real time – nor did they properly assess the rainfall data. At the Cecopi (Emergency Coordination Center), they were unaware of what was happening until after 7 p.m. when the first images and phone calls from mayors began to arrive. This forced them to postpone sending the alert because it was necessary to broaden its reach. Then came the time to choose the text, a moment in which they extensively debated with Jorge Suárez and the head of the Fire Consortium, José Miguel Basset, about the suitability, content, and geographical scope of the message. Then, the procedure had to be initiated, etc. Finally, the alert was broadcast at 8:11 p.m., but with incorrect content. It asked people to avoid travel, but not to stay at home and in higher areas, as a second message at 8:57 p.m. did. Be that as it may, it was already too late, and most of the victims had already drowned.
Despite the exhaustive investigation, a year later some questions remain. The main one is what role Mazón played and whether his absences influenced the late formation of the emergency committee and the equally untimely dispatch of the SE-Alert. Who better to answer these questions? questions is Pradaswho continues to exonerate her former boss and who, unlike his former second-in-command, has not shown her WhatsApp messages. It remains to be seen whether she will keep this card up her sleeve in case the legal strategy devised by her defense fails.
While awaiting the former councilor's next move, journalist Maribel Vilaplana will have to begin explaining herself to the judge. She will have to explain what she knows about Mazón's conversation with Pradas. She will also have to state whether she can confirm that the PP leader went home after the four-hour lunch and not to the Palau de la Generalitat, where he allegedly arrived at 8 p.m. The Consell maintains that after saying goodbye to Vilaplana, Mazón went to the public building, but they have not provided either the bodyguards' logs or the security camera footage from the Palau, which they deleted fifteen days after the tragedy.
The state funeral
Those most interested in learning all the hidden details about October 29th are the families of the victims, who will attend the state funeral in Valencia this Wednesday. Neither the president of the Madrid region, Isabel Díaz Ayuso, nor the president of Vox, Santiago Abascal, will be present. "I was already at the Valencia Cathedral a year ago with the victims and the King and Queen," Ayuso explained.
The state funeral will begin tomorrow at 6:00 PM and will be attended by the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez; the leader of the People's Party (PP), Alberto Núñez Feijóo; and the Prime Minister, Carlos Mazón. Institutional figures will also be present, such as the presidents of the Congress and the Senate, the Constitutional Court, and the Supreme Court. This attendance clashes somewhat with the wishes of the families, who, according to sources at La Moncloa (the Prime Minister's residence), have requested that the event be as apolitical as possible and that there be no politicians present other than family members.
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The Spanish government approved a new aid package on Tuesday for those affected by the recent severe weather event, known as the DANA storm. Specifically, it will mobilize €750 million in financing for businesses and €180 million in aid for SMEs. The government also approved the creation of a new €5 billion loan guarantee program, available until December 2040, which will provide immediate liquidity to households, businesses, and the self-employed. Furthermore, the package includes an extension of the extraordinary cessation of activity benefit for the self-employed, as well as the possibility for companies and the self-employed to request a deferral of their Social Security contributions.
Similarly, the Reinicia Auto+ Plan, which provides subsidies for vehicle purchases to affected citizens, has been extended until December 31 of this year. The plan has a budget of €465 million. Regarding housing, the new State Housing Entity is expected to allocate some of the resources earmarked for home purchases in the affected area to adapting existing homes or developing new housing on land designated by the affected municipalities. Funds are also included to facilitate the relocation of people from flood-prone areas to safer zones, and aid to local entities for infrastructure improvement, expansion, and adaptation projects has been expanded.
The scope and flexibility of the aid granted to the affected local entities is also expanded, allowing the repair, restoration or reconstruction of infrastructure, equipment or facilities and services owned by the municipality and province, including the repair, restoration or reconstruction of the road network, up to 100%.