Salomé Pradas and the Fire Chief stopped the ES-Alert dispatch at 6 pm

ValenciaThe Deputy Director General of Emergencies for the Valencian Regional Government, Jorge Suárez, confirmed this morning in statements to the investigating judge that on the day of the storm, he had already proposed the use of the ES-Alert system on two occasions before 6:00 PM. Specifically, between 5:10 PM and 5:15 PM, and again at 5:38 PM. This information was obtained by ARA from sources present during his testimony. This fact corroborates the information provided by other witnesses and by the videos that have been released piecemeal. have joined the causeIn fact, as Suárez recounted today, he had already finished drafting a message at 5:45 p.m. requesting that residents move to higher ground in their homes. This was a warning about the potential collapse of the Forata reservoir, which regulates the Magro River, but not about the situation in the Poio ravine, whose overflow was responsible for the vast majority of deaths. The alert was not disseminated at that time due to concerns raised by the head of the Fire Consortium, José Miguel Basset, who feared the message would cause widespread alarm and requested that the text be reviewed by communications experts. Faced with this debate, at 6:00 p.m., the Minister of Justice and the Interior, Salomé Pradas, decided to adjourn the online meeting—which included representatives from various state agencies—and continue with only the leaders present at the Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center) to consider whether or not to implement the measure. This process lasted for an hour.

During the in-person meeting, Suárez instructed the head of the 112 analysis unit, Juan Ramón Cuevas, to prepare the procedure and draft the text in a Word document. It was now 6:15 p.m. The text was finished at 6:38 p.m. and entered into the ES-Alert computer system. But it was at this moment that senior officials from the regional ministry detained the deputy director general because they believed it was necessary to notify the mayors of the affected municipalities beforehand.

Concern about the reservoir led to the Poio ravine being overlooked, whichIt was overflowing from 6 pm onwardsThe oversight occurred even though between 5 and 6 pm alone, 112 received 2,438 calls alerting them to the situation. Overwhelmed,The technicians did not warn their superiors about the fatal overflow of the rambla.which the Confederation had also warned them about at 6:43 p.m.an emailThe information can also be accessed online in real time. At the Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center), they weren't aware of what was happening until after 7:00 p.m., when the first images and phone calls from mayors began arriving. This forced them to postpone sending the alert—which they had already decided to broadcast—because it was necessary to expand its coverage area. Then came the time to choose the new text, implement the procedure... Finally, the alert was broadcast at 8:11 p.m., but with incorrect content. It asked people to avoid travel, but not to stay home and in higher areas, as a second message at 8:57 p.m. did. In any case, it was already too late, and many people had already drowned or were about to.

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