The ravine that devastated Valencia was no longer monitored because the flow decreased and it was lunchtime.

BarcelonaThe commission of inquiry into the management of the DANA (Watershed Management District) in the Valencian Community, currently being conducted by the Valencia Provincial Council, has revealed revealing details. Not only about responsibility, but also about why there were so many shortcomings in controlling the flow of the Poio ravine on the day of the tragedy, October 29, 2024. José Miguel Basset, who was then chief inspector of the Valencia Provincial Firefighters Consortium, pointed out this Tuesday that the former Minister of Justice and the Interior, along with the Valencian president, Carlos Mazón. However, he also explained the reason for the laxity in controlling the flow, with the firefighters withdrawing at 3:00 p.m.: they detected a drop in the level and were eager to "eat," as it was lunchtime.

According to his account, around noon, by order of the same fire department, two units were sent to carry out an inspection in the Magro River area and the Poio ravine. Llavors, they will confirm the overflow of the Magre river, but it did not go beyond the Poio ravine: "In the Poio ravine, according to the one who is going to say the most technical ones at that moment [...] [that] they are going to observe the cabal, it was not worrying or even minor. They are transferred to an other point of the population to fer a measure and to the cap of a estona return to this point of the [barranc] of Poio and report that the level has dropped." From this conclusion comes the lack of control: "If you inform me, that you were the street unit, that the level has dropped, [that] I don't know what I'm doing here, [that] it's half past two, [that] I feel like eating; I'm going to say it this clearly, even if it's recorded, I don't care, what do I do? In any case, he claims that the 112 recordings should be requested because "everything is here" and "memory is short."

Pradas Blame

The accusation against former councilor Pradas, accused, clear from Basset: "She must give authorization so that everything stated in the plan is carried out from the pre-emergency to the state of emergency." He also made it clear that Pradas did not provide any information to the Cecopio that would impede decision-making. "We all know that the president of the Generalitat is not responsible for this plan," he emphasized, clarifying that "the minister has been responsible from the very beginning." Basset stated that before the meeting of the operations center, he had "no idea what they've been doing." He also exonerated the president of Valencia, Carlos Mazón, from sending the alert to the phones at 8:11 p.m., when there were already dozens of deaths: in the opinion of the former fire chief, whether or not Mazón was present "is not binding because it was not his responsibility to send this alert."

He stated that the responsibility lies with the "plan management" and further emphasized the fact that the emergency management fell to Pradas: "This is established, there is nothing else," he said, adding that Mazón's absence does not imply any connection with the a. He also explained that the ES-Alert alarm was caused by the Júcar Hydrographic Confederation's warning about the risk of collapse of the Forata dam, although he acknowledged that rescues had been carried out since early in the morning.