A senior emergency services official explains that concern over the Forata reservoir led to the Poio ravine being forgotten.

ValenciaThe potential collapse of the Forata reservoir – which regulates the Magro River and overflowed during the DANA storm – became the focus of emergency services, who neglected to adequately monitor the situation in the Poio ravine – the cause of most of the deaths during last year's DANA storm in the Valencian Community. This was explained on Wednesday by the Deputy Director General of Emergencies for the Valencian Government, Jorge Suárez, on the second day of his testimony as a witness, according to sources present at the questioning who spoke to ARA. To justify the neglect of the ravine – even though a hydrological alert had been issued for this waterway at noon – Suárez argued that the water level had dropped by early afternoon compared to the morning, while the potential collapse of the reservoir was a concern. The senior official insisted that the Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center) learned of the incidents in the ravine starting at 5:30 p.m., but reiterated that they did not prioritize them because the focus was on the Forata dam. He also explained that, once the Cecopio was established at 5:00 p.m., he had no specific information about cases of people in danger and that it was at 7:30 p.m. when it was confirmed that the problem was no longer just Forata, "but a generalization of problems in other areas such as Paiporta, Picanya, Chiva…", and that they considered it an incident. Poio.

Regarding the measures that were studied to protect the population, he detailed that initially the possibility of evacuation was considered, but that upon realizing that it was not feasible due to the lack of time, confinement was considered. It was then that the former Minister of Justice and the Interior doubted whether she could adopt this measure and made several legal inquiries. The then-head of the Fire Consortium, José Miguel Basset, now retired, also reportedly delayed the alert, fearing that the message would cause widespread alarm and lead to residents fleeing their towns. Similarly, the former regional minister and Vicent Mompó, president of the Valencia Provincial Council, requested that the mayors of the affected municipalities be notified earlier. "Clearly, the right decisions weren't made. The national system wasn't prepared for what happened. The debates dragged on far too long," he summarized.

In response to other questions, Jorge Suárez opined that the Fire Department's management should have been informed that their personnel deployed that morning to the Poio ravine They had withdrawn from the promenade Around 2:30 p.m. – on orders from a superior officer – because they had not received any information. Regarding why the Generalitat's environmental agents were not asked to monitor the ravines, the Deputy Director General of Emergencies explained that the request was initially denied because it had not been processed through the proper channels, and it was not reiterated because the forest firefighters had already been mobilized.

The senior official's account coincides with that expressed so far by other witnesses and would confirm that the Emergency Department made several mistakes, most notably the fact that the techniciansThey did not warn the senior officials of the regional ministry about the overflowing of the Poio ravinebecause"They were not authorized to interrupt"The Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center) was not called in because they considered it unnecessary, given that five members of the Júcar River Basin Authority were already participating remotely. Also, because the workers were "overwhelmed" by a flood of alerts and rescue requests and did not take into account the rainfall data or the 2,438 calls registered on the 8th. This was partly because on the day of the DANA (isolated high-level depression) there was only47.5% of the planned workforce existed, which is 59 people.

The question left by witnesses is whether a call to action from the Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center) or a prior coordination meeting early in the morning or at midday would have prevented the haste, nerves, and numerous incidents from causing the situation in the Poio ravine to be forgotten. In this regard, Suárez stated that at 11:00 AM they did not perceive that the situation could lead to the floods that occurred later. However, it is worth asking whether the Cecopio would have been formed earlier if the former Minister of Justice and the Interior, Salomé Pradas, had not traveled to the municipality of Carlet—a town on the banks of the Magro River—shortly before 2:00 PM. Pradas wanted that "I saw her" with the forest firefighterswith whom he was scheduled to sign an agreement the following day. Regarding this, Suárez said today that he was not "surprised" that the former councilor and her former deputy, Emilio Argüeso, wanted to be "seen on the ground."

Salomé Pradas: "The plan wasn't prepared for what happened"

The defense team for former councilor Salomé Pradas emphasized that Jorge Suárez's testimony corroborates her position, stating that "the plan didn't fail," but rather that "it simply wasn't prepared for what happened." According to Pradas's legal team, the deputy director general's testimony confirms that there was no "updated information about the Poio ravine" until 7:30 p.m. – the Spanish government delegate. He stated that it was a few minutes after 7 p.m.—and that, until then, those at Cecopio were not "aware that the situation affected more than just Utiel and Forata." Furthermore, they emphasized that it was confirmed that José Miguel Basset "did not report the withdrawal of firefighters from the Poio ravine."