Europe, today, has two pillars. An economic and political pillar, which is the European Union, and a political and military one, NATO. Both are headquartered in Brussels, but they have gone decades almost without speaking to each other. However, Europe's strength derives precisely from this double pillar. During the summit of the military alliance being held this Tuesday and Wednesday in Ankara, European leaders will have to recognize without mincing words that the second pillar of Europe must be urgently rebuilt.
Both organizations have grown spectacularly since their inception: NATO has gone from 12 members in 1949 to 32 today; the EU, from the six members of the original European Economic Community in 1957, to 27 today. No less than 23 countries, representing approximately two-thirds of Europe's total GDP, belong to both groupings.
However, while the EU has been characterized by constant changes, NATO has had extraordinary structural continuity. When it was created, it was a hegemonic alliance dominated by the United States and it continued to be so, in essence, until 2025, when it already had 32 members. But the start of the second term of US President Donald Trump cast doubt on its future.
In its history, the European Union has relied on the existence of the other pillar. In reality, almost all the countries on the front line of the eastern flank, now threatened, of this double Europe – from Estonia in the north to Bulgaria in the south – joined NATO before joining the EU. (Finland and Sweden, which were two non-aligned countries, are the only ones that followed the opposite order.) Currently, Montenegro and Albania are members of NATO and are confident of joining the EU.
Over the decades, the US-led military alliance protected the peaceful evolution of economic and political Europe against possible Soviet and, subsequently, Russian aggression. And, furthermore, it protected Europe from something less visible: the reappearance of old rivalries between Europeans for military power and leadership. Now the external threat has returned with redoubled force, but there are also clear indications that the old intra-European problem is resurfacing. Behind France's and Poland's concern that Germany's huge increase in defense spending is being dedicated exclusively to Germany, lies the ghost of historical fears of German military dominance.
increase in German spending on defense is being dedicated exclusively to Germany, lies the ghost of historical fears of German military dominance.
After a year and a half of Trump's presidency, it is clear that Europe cannot continue with its defense in the hands of the US. Could the situation change when a new president arrives in January 2029? It is possible. But taking it for granted would be imprudent. Furthermore, there is a considerable risk that, before this hypothetical happy day arrives, Russian President Vladimir Putin will attack some NATO territory. Knowing that Trump might not come to defend the continent and that Europe is beginning to rearm seriously, the besieged Russian dictator might think that this is the last and best opportunity to demonstrate that NATO is a paper tiger.
Therefore, the reconstruction of the European pillar is important and urgent. The EU must play a fundamental role in increasing and coordinating the financing of Europe's rearmament. This is demonstrated by the initiatives already undertaken in this regard, such as SAFE (Security Action for Europe) and the European Defence Fund. The more money it raises, the better it can exercise its catalytic function. But it would be a dangerous mirage to think that the EU can alone become the political and military pillar of Europe, and that Article 42.7 of the mutual defense treaty will play a role similar to NATO's Article 5. Rather, the two Brussels-based organizations must be aware of what they have been best at and what they must become again after this transformation: two deeply complementary pillars that reinforce each other.
For the military defense of Europe proper, the starting point must be the Europeanization of NATO, following two different timetables: one of 10 years and another of 10 months. Europe and Canada (that great honorary European country) should propose to themselves – in collaboration with the USA, as far as possible – the strategic objective of a Europe that has conventional forces – the so-called strategic enablers – and, in time, the nuclear deterrence means necessary to defend itself.
At the same time, NATO needs to immediately draw up contingency plans for Europe to lead its own defense and so that, in the worst-case scenario – that is, if Trump behaves in the worst possible way – it can defend itself alone against possible Russian aggression, whether it be a drastic escalation of hybrid attacks or an attempt at direct incursion into some territory, from Svalbard to the Black Sea. In the event that Europe were left alone, the rapid reaction capacity of minilateral groups such as the British-Nordic-Baltic Joint Expeditionary Force could be crucial. It is essential to maintain military and economic aid to Ukraine, which is already taking the war to the heart of Russia. Ukraine has shown us what the fighting spirit and heroic improvisation can achieve even against all odds. Such contingency plans, properly framed, should be well received by the Trump administration.
Defense strategists will have to square away all the details, if possible in secret. But what must be said in public and clearly, in Ankara and beyond, is that European leaders have the political will to address the situation in the long term, but also the more immediate problems. The demonstration that Europe is firmly determined to defend itself is the only thing that will truly achieve, deter Putin.
