On Friday, May 8, in the midst of the commemoration of the 81st anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe, it was evident that Germany will soon be the main European military power again. Next year its defense spending will be equivalent to that of France and Great Britain combined, and the plan is for it to be considerably higher by 2030. The declared objective of the German government is to have "the most powerful conventional army in Europe." It is true that France and Great Britain have nuclear weapons, but this means less money for other defense materials. Therefore, the question is not "will this come true?"; if there are no unforeseen events, it will come true. The question, especially on this solemn anniversary, is: "How can we ensure that, this time, the growth of German military power is positive for all of Europe?"
There are two reasons that have led Germany to distance itself so radically from the (increasingly mistaken) position it adopted from the hopeful nineties until the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, unleashed by Vladimir Putin on February 24, 2022. The first reason is precisely Russian aggression. In Berlin, there is a growing consensus that Putin will not stop at Ukraine. The second is that the President of the United States, Donald Trump, is now questioning the American commitment to the defense of Europe in the terms in which it has developed through NATO since 1949. The recently announced withdrawal of 5,000 (and perhaps more) American soldiers from Germany is another indication in this regard. The announcement, rather than the measure itself, is a consequence of Trump's personal resentment towards the criticisms of the German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, for the catastrophic war in Iran.
All this presents Europe with an obvious challenge: will we be able to stop an aggressive and nuclear-armed Russia on our own? (Here, "our" must include Ukraine, which has the largest and most seasoned army in Europe.) There is another challenge that is not so obvious but also quite important: how will we prevent the reappearance of those serious tensions over the distribution of military power among European countries that constituted the normality and at the same time the curse of Europe until 1945? The US, through a largely benign military hegemony, has protected us from both problems.
Germany is fundamental to answering the two questions. Its new military strategy, the first in the history of the Federal Republic, is called "Responsibility with Europe". But this, "with Europe", is just words. And everyone in Europe (except the British) says them referring to their national policy. The real problem is whether this strategy will truly be European.
The main areas where European answers must be found are the defense industry and our real combat capabilities. Defense technology and production are the nerves and muscles of military power. Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor of the 19th century, is always misquoted when in 1862 he asked the Prussian budget committee to increase military spending: it is said that he recommended "blood and iron", but historian Peter Wilson reminds us that he actually said "iron and blood". First iron, then blood. Wilson also points out that, even before 2022, even though Germany had dismantled its army and still staunchly defended the policy of appeasing Russia, it was already one of the world's leading arms exporters.
If Germany continues to invest military spending – which has already seen a huge increase – in its own national defense industry (while gradually reducing purchases from the US), it could end up surpassing France, which is the second largest global arms exporter after the United States. France is very concerned about this. With exquisite Cartesian logic, Paris interprets "European sovereignty" to mean "don't buy from Americans, or the British, or the Germans; buy from the French!". Or at least, from Franco-German initiatives; but now the largest joint Franco-German project, the Future Combat Air System, is collapsing.
Now, the French are not the only ones worried about the prospect of Germans dominating the defense industry. The Polish right is hysterical. Other Europeans are also starting to feel uncomfortable. Their unease is amplified by the possibility that the nationalist populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD), which currently leads the opinion polls, could control a rather powerful army. In reality, however, it is very likely that the AfD will return to the strategy of appeasing Moscow. Furthermore, who knows what German politics will be like in 2035, at the end of the medium-term planning period for military strategy? After all, no one would have imagined a decade ago that by 2026 Alternative for Germany would be the most popular party in the country.
There are powerful forces pressing the German government to spend the billions it has at home. The country's entire export-based business model is in crisis, and this is one of the few available solutions. Some of its famous car factories are already being converted to arms production. Moreover, any purchase of defense material exceeding 25 million euros must be authorized by the Bundestag's budget committee. It is the perfect formula for political clientelism, as deputies and parties insist on investing expenses in regions that carry significant electoral weight for them.
When it comes to combat capabilities, the hard reality is that the defense of current Europe depends on a US-led NATO. Its military action plans stipulate that if Russia attacks any point on NATO's eastern flank, an enormous machinery must be set in motion: the other members of the alliance must immediately reinforce the multinational brigades stationed in frontline states. But this response depends at all levels on the United States, from satellite intelligence and heavy transport aircraft to nuclear deterrence, through integrated air defense and command and control. Achieving a reasonably credible Europeanization of this formidable machinery is a fundamental and at the same time overwhelming task.
Where should we begin, then? This summer, Chancellor Merz should share an informal working dinner with French President Emmanuel Macron; British Prime Minister Keir Starmer (or his successor); and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. They should discuss, frankly and from a practical point of view, the fundamental issues: how defense industry should be Europeanized and how Europe's combat capabilities can be improved. Regarding the first point, it is utterly ridiculous that while the US has 33 weapons systems, Europe has about 174, with 12 different types of tanks and 14 combat aircraft. Regarding improving combat capabilities, the first step would be simply to decide where and how this conversation should take place, which must include the question of the eastward expansion of British and French nuclear deterrence.
In the 1990s, Merz's great predecessor, Helmut Kohl, integrated a newly unified Germany into a single European market and a monetary union. The country that benefited most was Germany itself. Merz should strive to do the same with European security. The solutions will be far from as neat as the single market and single currency, and they won't even be found mainly within the EU. In the end, there will be two ultimate questions: do Germany's neighbors have a genuinely integrated European defense industry in mind, or just, as before, rival national industries? And will our military assets in Europe, however messy and imperfect, be a sufficient deterrent in the eyes of Vladimir Putin?
If Merz, in collaboration with other European leaders, can find convincing answers to these two questions, he will surely earn a place in the history books.
