Irene Fernández Molina: "The Ceuta crisis surprises in a honeymoon moment between Spain and Morocco"

BarcelonaResearcher Irene Fernández Molina is a specialist in the Maghreb, the foreign policy of the European Union, and Euro-Mediterranean relations. Hours after the migratory crisis in Ceuta, we analyze with her what motives may be behind it and what consequences it may have on a European scale.

What is the economic situation in Morocco that explains why so many hundreds of young people decide to leave?

— It is deeply unequal. The country has good macroeconomic figures, but what many call the Morocco of two speeds persists. There are two totally different realities; one, in the wealthy areas of the cities, especially on the coast, and the other, in the interior areas, where public services are in a very precarious situation and where the informal economy continues to have an enormous weight. The Rif region, in the north, is still very abandoned. There is cognitive dissonance: the king gives a speech talking about a great moment of stability and economic development while we see so many people fleeing.

Why would I say this is happening now?

— I was the first surprise; I absolutely did not expect a situation of this type, in a honeymoon period of the bilateral relations proclaimed time and again by both governments. The point of comparison is the crisis of May 2021, but in that case there had been months of increased tensions. The hospitalization in Spain of Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front, was the trigger or the excuse. However, since December, since Donald Trump proclaimed the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, Morocco had enormously increased pressure on various international partners, including Spain, to make a declaration in a similar direction. At that time, the political motivation for the instrumentalization of migratory control was more or less clear. Now, it is difficult to understand, because the bilateral relationship seemed like it could not be better and nothing has happened, as far as we know, that threatens Morocco's interests.

Do you think Pedro Sánchez's visit to Algeria ten days ago has anything to do with it?

— It could be an explanation, although it is a very symbolic reason. It is true that the visit culminates the restoration of normality in the bilateral relationship between Spain and Algeria, but it was no surprise. Precisely, Algeria broke off relations with Spain in 2022 in response to the change in the Spanish government's formal position on Western Sahara. However, it no longer had an interest in maintaining the rupture situation, which also harmed its economic interests. There has also been a long process of rapprochement in the political sphere, and Algeria has very positively valued the Spanish government's position on the Palestinian issue. But as far as Moroccan interests and their great priority, Western Sahara, are concerned, there has been no change, as far as is known.

There are voices that attribute it to the Supreme Court ruling that prohibits pushbacks.

— I don't believe, at all, that it's the cause, but it may have had some impact on social media. Perhaps there have been actors who have instrumentalized it, and that would explain why a larger than usual number of people have gathered in the border area of Ceuta and Melilla. And what the Moroccan authorities have done, as on other occasions, has been to act opportunistically. I don't think they planned the crisis from the beginning, but rather, when it started to happen, they used it. What seems clear is that there is intentionality. It's not possible to believe that such a massive entry of people, sustained for so long, is due to a lack of capacity or negligence. There is an intentional passivity from the Moroccan security forces. But we don't know the reason, and ambiguity is part of these types of situations. In 2021, there was also no official acceptance by the Moroccan authorities that what happened in Ceuta was due to Ghali's hospitalization.

Among the possible motives for Rabat, there are analysts who point to the law promoted by the Spanish government to nationalize Sahrawis or the claim of Moroccan sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla.

— I do not believe that any of these factors is an immediate objective. Regarding Spanish nationality for Sahrawis, I do not see how it could harm Morocco's interests. And the Moroccan claim over Ceuta and Melilla has always existed, since the country's decolonization, and will never be abandoned. At the beginning of Mohammed VI's reign, there was a tacit agreement that this did not constitute a priority for Morocco's foreign policy. It may be that when Rabat achieves the annexation of Western Sahara, the next objective will be to continue the struggle for what they consider their territorial integrity with Ceuta and Melilla. But the issue of the Sahara is far from being closed. Perhaps Morocco is concerned that the latest negotiations have stalled. At the beginning of the year, the Trump administration got involved and convened meetings with a lot of energy, and it seemed that the issue could be resolved, in favor of Moroccan interests, in a matter of months, and it has not been so, especially because the US has its attention on Iran. But Spain's role here is very secondary.

There is also the hypothesis that the US has a role in the Ceuta crisis, to destabilize Sánchez's government.

— It seems like a far-fetched hypothesis to me. This would also require the US to pay a lot of attention to the Maghreb, which is usually of least importance in the world. And I don't see Morocco trying to destabilize Sánchez's government either, because it has been the most favorable government in the world to its interests.

Several European countries are pushing to exclude Spain from the Schengen area. Could this end up leading to a European crisis?

— Yes, what is happening is interesting, compared to what happened in 2021, because then the Spanish government's strategy was to Europeanize the crisis and from the very beginning one of the messages they repeated was that it was a crisis affecting the entire EU. It was a very successful strategy on the part of the Spanish government and all the tweets from European institutions and member states were supportive. Perhaps now the EU is more disunited and the response is more about internal confrontation and blaming the Spanish government, especially from right-wing governments, for the regularization of immigrants, establishing a link that I do not believe has any role in it.

Do you think this shows how the weight of the far-right has grown in the EU?

— Yes, it's possible that politically Spain is now more isolated on this issue than it was in 2021.