Roberta Pinotti: "In 2014 we were wrong: we did not know how to interpret Putin's intentions"

BarcelonaA few months ago, Roberta Pinotti (Genoa, 1961) assumed the presidency of the National Theatre of Genoa, founded in 1951, at a time when Italy, like half of Europe, was trying to rebuild its cultural life after the Second World War. The position might come as a surprise if one considers the most recent stage of her long political career: she was Italy's Minister of Defence from 2014 to 2018, the first woman to hold that portfolio. The setting has changed abruptly in the last decade and today's Europe, marked by war and the rift with the United States, bears little resemblance to the innocent Europe of when Pinotti was minister. It can also be framed another way: is today's Europe a consequence of that innocence? Pinotti is in Barcelona invited by the ARA to participate in the Enfoquem, the forum that will take place this Monday at the Recinte Modernista de Sant Pau in Barcelona.

What is the relationship between war and theatre?

— In my case, I have a degree in humanities and I wrote a thesis on theatre, therefore, from this point of view, there is a passion and a vocation prior to my experience at the head of the Ministry of Defence: for twenty years I dedicated myself to education and culture. But the question is interesting. Look, this year at the National Theatre [of Genoa] we have inaugurated the season with the play Orlando furioso, directed by Davide Livermore, which is also a reflection on the madness towards which the world is heading. And at a time when this world seems to have lost its compass, culture helps us to find our sanity again.

Has the world lost its mind?

— Some major players on the world stage are once again thinking that it must be the use of force that resolves international disputes.

Some European governments claim that Russia will attack a Baltic state in 2027.

— It is a more than understandable concern. The landscape that surrounds us is increasingly threatening: Europe is a victim of foreign incursions on a growing scale. And it is hard to think that this is accidental. But this forecast [that of a Russian attack against the Baltic states] must be linked above all to the evolution of the war in Ukraine. The future risks for Europe, in my opinion, are closely related to the possibility that Vladimir Putin's will prevails in Ukrainian territory. The more we yield to the Kremlin, the greater and more dangerous the risks for Europeans will be.

It has been one of the most difficult summers for Ukrainians. And the forecasts for the winter are the worst.

— The current moment is a very tough test for Ukraine. But, even now, I see a very strong capacity for resistance and response. For example, in the face of the rain of drones at the front, what have the Ukrainian soldiers done? Dig a tunnel to surprise the Russians and attack the enemy troops firing the drones from behind. I think the message from Kyiv is clear: they do not want to surrender, quite the contrary. They are fighting with all their might.

You were appointed Minister of Defense in 2014, the very year that Vladimir Putin occupied Crimea and fueled the war in the Donbas. Ukrainians often say that that is year 0 of the current invasion.

— I remember very well a NATO summit that year, in which the Ukrainian president [Petro] Poroshenko explained to us with great drama and urgency the gravity of what had happened in Crimea. But the Europeans' response did not measure up. We were wrong to underestimate its gravity, and we wanted to construct for ourselves a sweetened version of the Kremlin's action. We also failed to interpret that that, together with Georgia and the speech at the 2007 Munich conference, was a true turning point to understand Putin's imperialist stance and intentions and how he was determined to resort to the use of military force to recover, in his view, the greatness of Russia.

In February 2022, the days before the Russian army launched the full-scale invasion, most European chancelleries also did not quite believe that Putin was capable of doing so.

— We still had not fully understood Putin's reasoning. At that time, Russia had a very strong economic crisis, a series of weaknesses that made us think that the Kremlin could hardly benefit from attacking Ukraine. But, once again, it was not understood that, despite the misery and economic weakness, for Putin, the will to power and to demonstrate that he was capable of having a voice in the world made it worth waging war. Once again we underestimated the logic of the Russian president, closely linked to his own permanence in power. Only the United States and the United Kingdom were able to anticipate it.

Is Europe doing enough to help Ukraine?

— Europe must be credited with having remained united on the issue of Ukraine throughout all these years. Certainly, it does not always act quickly enough, for example, regarding military supplies... but this is also because there is a problem of slowness resulting from a lack of preparation in previous years, in which an open war scenario in the heart of the continent had not been foreseen in any way. But the willingness to impose sanctions on Russia, the readiness to help Kyiv, even in moments when the United States has seemed more fiercely inclined to put a brake on Zelensky, are positive and relevant elements.

By whom and why are we Europeans threatened?

— Look, I think the main threat is the convergence of the interests of autocracies to weaken liberal democracy and carve up Europe. There is an interest from China, which is interested in our technology and a part of our economy. There is an interest from Russia, which wants to reaffirm itself as an imperial power. And there is an interest from the United States, which is very interested in a dynamic and always very important market like the European one. It would suit them well to be able to divide up the spoils of Europe. Therefore, Ukraine is, in reality, the frontier of our liberal democracy. Then there are all the other threats derived from hybrid warfare, but the main reason for the threat, in my opinion, is this: that Europe is today the bulwark of the defense of the rule of law, which unfortunately is less and less defended in the world.

What strategy must Europe adopt to survive in this more aggressive, more unpredictable global landscape?

— Europe must rethink itself, and it must rethink itself by also placing the issue of defense and foreign policy at the center. How? For me, by moving towards a federal Europe, which guarantees enhanced cooperation in issues such as, for example, defense.

For that reason would it be a European army?

— Yes, but it needs to be nuanced, because the term European army is a bit ambiguous, in the sense that everyone imagines that perhaps one needs to dismantle one's own armies to create a joint one. And that is not the case. It is about building a common defense, pooling the different elements and making them capable of operating together, with common commands. But, I insist, this is not just a technical issue for those who deal with defense, it is also a political issue. Because defense is the most political element that exists.

There are those who maintain that this is an alarmist speech, that governments are fueling a climate of fear.

— The climate of fear is what Ukrainian citizens are living in, as they find themselves under bombs every day. Certainly, those who govern should not create alarmism, but prevention is the best functioning of defense. And, therefore, preparing oneself, building a deterrence, a capacity to defend oneself, does not mean becoming aggressive; it means having the capacity not to be attacked. These are two fundamental things, precisely, to have less fear.

You are a great defender of the Transatlantic Alliance. How did you feel when you heard Trump threatening to attack Greenland?

— I would rather define myself as a convinced Europeanist, firmly in favor of the need for the Atlantic Alliance. But yes, faced with Trump's statements, I felt great perplexity. At the base of NATO, which is a defensive military alliance, there is a Western solidarity founded on values. The real problem is that today it seems to me that these common values are fading and that Trump no longer manifests any will to seek and defend them, but rather expresses more and more often a policy of power and force, linked especially to interests of energy control, raw materials, and geopolitics.

Do you believe that Europe will be able to recover its relationship with the United States?

— We must take advantage of this occasion, first of all, to have more European autonomy in matters that, until today, we had delegated to Washington. I insist a lot on this idea. That said, the United States will not be Trump forever. And the bond with the USA is a very important bond. Therefore, it should not be us who cut the ties, I mean, and there must be hope that they can be woven again. In fact, it is very important for the destiny of the world that they can be woven again.