The Iran war has given President Vladimir Putin a boost. At the very least, it has diverted United States military efforts from Ukraine to the Middle East, to the despair of a Europe (and especially Kyiv) that is struggling to accept the need to take charge of its own defense. But does this mean the Russian leader feels stronger and more at ease? The answer is no. The Russian leader's hand is not that strong. Let's see why.
There are increasingly reasonable doubts about Russia's military strength and its economic and social reality. Putin himself suffers from a certain state of paranoia about his life. Even if they are implausible, rumors of a coup are circulating. And, whatever their basis, the fact is that the Kremlin is using them to intensify internal repression and, in particular, to quell discontent among the elites.
, the security services. They have never failed him. They are a faithful refuge.
Faced with this underlying discontent, Putin's approach has been typical for him, a man trained in the old KGB: to rely on the secret services (today, the FSB) to shield himself and to be informed of what is happening around him and on the street. Without any real military triumphs, with Ukrainian drone attacks on Moscow, and with economic activity far less dynamic than has been made out to be, Putin continues to trust blindly in the "siloviki, the security services. They have never failed him. They are a loyal bastion.
If the idea of a hypothetical coup d'état carries little weight, the Russian economic fragility seems more evident by contrast. The Swedes, for example, by measuring the country's nocturnal luminosity, have estimated that activity contracted by 8% during the 2020-2024 period, instead of the 13% growth boasted by the Putinist regime. Calculations on inflation also do not correspond to what the state officially disseminates. Western economic boycott, with the sanctions policy, would have resulted in losses of 450 billion dollars for the Russian economy, although now, with the closure of Hormuz, it has had a respite in the energy sector.
Putin's visit to China, with the announcement of trade agreements, responds to the need to project, both internally and externally, an image of power and normality, about which, however, many doubts loom. This does not mean, by any means, that Europe should not continue to strengthen its defense commitment and its political, economic, and military complicity with Ukraine: the recent green light from the EU for the 90 billion euro loan goes in this direction.
The game of Russia's war against Ukraine is open. And European cards, despite internal doubts and weaknesses, are not so bad. Or, in other words, Putin's Russia's cards are not so good.
