The CNI warned Morocco and the Spanish government on July 29 of mass calls to enter Ceuta
The army and the Civil Guard point to a "passive attitude" of Morocco on the most critical day in Ceuta
MadridThere were indeed warnings: at the very least, the CNI alerted both Morocco and the Spanish government about mass calls on social media to enter Ceuta. It did so to the Moroccan intelligence services the day before the crisis through an informative note and also via WhatsApp to the executive's delegation in Ceuta and to Civil Guard commanders. This is what emerges from the reports and communications that the Council of Ministers agreed to declassify this Tuesday and which has been published through the Moncloa website. Warnings that, according to the Spanish government, were not sufficient to anticipate the mass entry of migrants.
After releasing all the information, Moncloa sources reaffirmed that the CNI "did not issue any formal alert and limited itself to transferring information by message and a brief phone call to the government delegation of Ceuta and the Civil Guard." Adding: "At no time did the CNI send a formal notice or alert to its chain of command or to any member of the executive by any means." Even from the Spanish government's assessment, an unusual criticism of the Spanish intelligence services emerges: "An agency that believes a mass entry will occur the next day does not limit itself to sending an ambiguous WhatsApp to a minor official: it elevates it." At the same time, from the Moncloa they also made CNI sources available to the media, an unusual move: the agency itself says that despite warning of the mass call on social networks, it did not anticipate the "magnitude" of what happened on the 30th.
Pedro Sánchez has also assessed this on X. He summarized that "the CNI informed the government delegation in Ceuta that a call was circulating in two Facebook groups" with more than 180,000 followers "to enter the city" coinciding with the Feast of the Throne; a campaign "monitored" by other institutions, but which "could not be interpreted as an indicator of the scale, nature, or probability of what happened later." "Not even the CNI did so," he retorted, noting that it only made one call to the cabinet of the state government delegation in Ceuta and "did not issue any greater alert" to the army, the police, or the Ministry of the Interior. An element he understands given that, according to Sánchez, "no one could have anticipated the migration crisis" that broke out, and he takes the opportunity to conclude that the Spanish government "acted as soon as the threat materialized, mobilizing all available resources."
The Spanish government's decision to publish all these declassified reports on Ceuta comes after the clash of versions within the executive regarding what was known and what was not before the massive entry of immigrants on July 30th, basically between Margarita Robles (Defense), who says that there were indeed warnings, and the rest of the ministries.
While Moncloa has reaffirmed that there were no warnings, the PP has not interpreted it the same way. The spokesperson, Ester Muñoz, believes that the reports reveal a "state lie" on the part of Sánchez and a "willful dereliction of duty": "He is responsible for the invasion". But the darts at the Spanish government have also come from its partners: for Sumar, more diligence was needed to prevent the massive entry of immigrants, and for Gabriel Rufián (ERC), the declassification proves that the "CNI is acting against the government".
The documents
There are a total of 40 declassified documents dating from July 1st to August 1st, including an informative note from the CNI dated July 29th, which warned of Facebook and WhatsApp groups calling to cross the border, by sea or by land, on July 30th, the Throne Day in Morocco, taking advantage of the fact that border security forces had to be relocated to other places. Furthermore, it was highlighted that these were social media groups with a great capacity for dissemination.
Check all the documents hereAccording to the Moncloa website, the CNI sent an informative note to the Moroccan intelligence services the day before the massive crossing of people at the border in Ceuta, in which they warned them of a "possible entry" of immigrants into the Spanish autonomous city. According to this document, titled Irregular immigration. Early warning. Possible entries into Ceuta during the week of Throne Day, the CNI warned that there were "especially active" profiles on social media that spoke of a window of opportunity to enter Spain: they referred to a WhatsApp group named "Assault on the Ceuta fence" that was preparing an entry attempt on July 30. The CNI specified that the administrator of this group has two phones, one Spanish and one Algerian, as well as a Facebook group with 60,000 followers and another with about 22,000 members named Hraga Ceuta.
The intelligence services highlighted some posts that were being made, such as: "Whoever wants to cross has one last opportunity on Throne Day at 8 p.m. The authorities will be distracted with celebrations and parades". Or also: "Castillejos-Ceuta. The whole week is good for those who want to pass, this is the opportunity. May God facilitate it".
On the same day, the National Center for Immigration and Borders (CENIF) warned of a "potential risk" of irregular immigrant entries, as a consequence derived from the Supreme Court ruling of July 8 that rejected hot returns if entering by swimming. Thus, it proposed the "need" to foresee three scenarios, defining as "high" the probability of an entry of people swimming; as "medium" an entry of people by sea and jumping the fence; and as "medium-low" a coordinated action. However, it warned that if this last scenario were to occur, the risk would be "extreme". "It cannot be guaranteed that [the entry of immigrants] will occur, but when this type of activity has been detected on social media, it has sometimes materialized," the report says.
WhatsApp conversations
The website published by Moncloa also reflects the conversations between organizations and ministries. In this regard, a conversation on July 29th between the executive's delegation in Ceuta and the CNI stands out, as well as another between the CNI and the Civil Guard, in which they inform them of the call for entry into Ceuta, especially highlighting the "scope of the dissemination" they could have. We reproduce the dialogue below:
CNI: "On social media, a call is being made for an assault by the fence and by sea tomorrow at 8 p.m.".
CNI: "Taking advantage of the Throne Day festival and the fact that their security forces will be busy".
CNI: "There are two different groups with a total of 180,000 people".
CNI: "To give you an idea of the scope of the dissemination".
Delegation: "Understood [and subsequently it is reflected that there is an eleven-minute call]"
One can also read another WhatsApp conversation from the CNI with the UCE-3 of the Civil Guard in which the intelligence services warn of the same thing: "We have information about an attempt to enter by swimming and jumping the fence tomorrow [July 30th], the holiday of Throne Day". The Civil Guard responded with the contacts that were on the ground on those dates, as the interlocutor from the armed institution who spoke with the CNI admitted that he had had to leave. Following this, a seven-minute call is reflected.
The role of Morocco
On July 30th, the situation was already one of overflow, as shown by various declassified documents from both the army and the Civil Guard. In fact, on the morning of July 30th, it was said that it was “highly likely” that an attempt at “massive entry of immigrants would occur, taking advantage of the Throne Day festivities in Morocco,” as reported by the ground army to the Armed Forces Intelligence Center (CIFAS). The situation was one of “migratory chaos” and “saturation” of the army. The Civil Guard expressed itself in the same direction.
Regarding the role of the Moroccan authorities, the army highlighted on the 30th that it was “likely” that they were not actively favoring the wave of entry, but it did point to “negligent and passive” action. They said it was likely that they would increase their presence at the border starting on the 1st, when the Throne Day celebration ended, since until then they had moved part of the army and police from the border to other points. This is why what the CNI says that same day is relevant: it describes that no “proactive reaction from the Moroccan authorities to the loss of control of the situation” had been detected, but it adds that Morocco's participation to restore control of the Ceuta border is “essential.” Thus, they add that the Alawite regime will accept returns of immigrants who have accessed irregularly through the border to try to “put an end to the crisis.” A cooperative face of Morocco that the Moncloa has striven to underline from the first day.