However much those who read politics and history from outdated textbooks may find it hard to admit, the last popular front in Catalonia wasn't ninety years ago, in 1936, but eleven years ago, in 2015. And it wasn't called the Left Front, as in '36, but Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes). This electoral coalition, formed by ERC, CDC, and independent figures, swept the elections of September 27, 2015, with a radical and clearly progressive platform, becoming the leading force in every single region of the country—including the capital, Barcelona—and more than doubling the result of its closest competitor.
After winning the elections, the Junts pel Sí government led a historic bloc of rupture that included mass organizations – ANC and Òmnium –, an anti-capitalist left-wing parliamentary group – the CUP –, an organization of more than 700 mayors and thousands of councilors from A', and AMI – and AMI –; although not political in nature, they spontaneously acted as transmitters, in neighborhoods and towns, of the project being promoted by the Government and Parliament.
The progressive character of that historic bloc is evidenced by the social laws passed in the Parliament between 2015 and 2017. Its popular character is evidenced by the massive mobilizations in the streets and the largest act of civil disobedience of the 21st century in Europe: the referendum of October 1st. And the revolutionary character of the historical bloc led by Junts pel Sí is evident in the reaction of the State and the powers that be: dirty war – Operation Catalonia –, police violence, relocation of companies, flight of bank deposits, threats of military intervention, arrests of leaders, imprisonments, and the suspension of self-government.
One of those who was part of that popular front is Gabriel Rufián, who now proposes a very different one. Different in its territorial framework, formerly Catalan and now Spanish. Different because it is not proactive (independence), but purely reactive and defensive (stopping the far right). Different also because it is not disruptive: in fact, if it materializes and succeeds, it will block the far right, but will prop up the most functional party of the 1978 regime, the PSOE, understood as a lesser evil worth paying for. And finally, it differs in its internal composition, because it aims to incorporate actors, such as Comuns and Podem, whose passivity and equidistance contributed to the victory of the powers that be in 2017.
If this were to go ahead, then, pro-independence voters would be asked to vote for an electoral front with the parties that remained equidistant from 2017 and with parties opposed to independence, in order to avoid a neo-Francoist government; an experiment that, if successful at the polls, would save Pedro Sánchez, who would most likely use the victory to once again break any agreements signed. Perhaps all this is very appealing to the democrats of Algeciras or Malasaña—especially those in the PSOE—but from a Catalan perspective, it is an extremely minimalist approach with a very stark, perhaps too harsh, element of concessions.
It is often said that the ERC spokesperson in Madrid has become disconnected from his party and from the Catalan national framework. Sometimes it seems so, but focusing the debate on him is to depoliticize the issue. Politics is not conducted in a vacuum, but rather within a context and with changing power dynamics. Therefore, the question isn't whether Rufián does this or that, but whether, in the current context—not the one from ten years ago—and with the upcoming Spanish elections in mind, the pro-independence movement has an independent proposal capable of inspiring its social base and getting them off the couch to vote. With Junts and ERC stuck in the most dismal form of regional autonomy, with the CUP having disappeared, with the ANC celebrating as a success the mobilization of 8,000 people to protest on commuter trains, with Òmnium prosaically focused on the linguistic emergency (lucky us), and with the same leaders as in 2017.
Rufián's proposal, then, is possible thanks to the strategic vacuum within the pro-independence movement. But this doesn't automatically make it good. To be taken seriously by the left-wing pro-independence movement, it lacks a Catalan mental and political framework. It is not part of any reflection on the need to rebuild a historical bloc of rupture, it does not address self-determination, it further demonizes Catalan independence in relation to the PSOE, it ignores the historical role of the Spanish left in relation to Catalonia, it has not been developed or presented with Catalan national support, and it has been launched from Madrid and through the Spanish media. These shortcomings are so glaring that it is difficult to understand how they can come from someone who represents the party of Macià and Companys.
