How to make the minimum living income work
The worst thing that can happen with public aid is that it doesn't reach the right people and, for those that do, it doesn't have the desired results. The latest evaluation of the Airef on the minimum vital income (IMV) It is published with this double warning: the benefit doesn't reach those who need it most, and when it does, it can have unintended effects. Only half of the families who could receive the IMV receive it, and it reduces the likelihood of those who do. However, this isn't an inevitable failure, but rather an opportunity to rethink the design—and function—of the IMV policy. If we want it to be a useful tool against poverty, it needs to be redefined with greater intelligence and confidence in the public.
According to Airef, receiving the IMV reduces the likelihood of working by 12% on average, and more in single-parent families or those made up of young people. It's a moderate effect (not that receiving the IMV makes you lazy), but it's real. However, perhaps the problem isn't so much the aid itself, but the context. In a market with high unemployment, involuntary part-time work, and low wages, it's not surprising that a minimum benefit reduces the pressure to accept any job at any salary. The IMV shouldn't be a hidden employment policy. If we want people to work more and better, we need more decent job opportunities, not more punitive benefits.
The main problem with the IMV isn't who receives it, but who doesn't. More than half of eligible families don't apply for it—two out of three in Catalonia. And with the Child Support Supplement (CAPI), the figures are even more dramatic. Those who don't receive it don't just not need the IMV, It's that they don't know him, they don't know how to ask for it or they give up due to the complexity of the process.Demanding requirements, slow procedures, and reactive administration make access difficult. Therefore, proposals such as automatically activating the CAPI from birth, as Airef now suggests, point in the right direction: fewer barriers, more confidence.
When the obstacles are so numerous, mistakes are inevitable. And all too often, the most vulnerable pay the price: people who receive letters to return social benefits, families who must justify their income, beneficiaries of the guaranteed income persecuted for improper payments. The Department of Social Rights and the Ministry of the Presidency want to turn this model around. For example, with the right to error.A right for citizens to rectify if they make a mistake without being punished, and a more efficient administration that does not penalize poverty or bureaucracy.
In Catalonia, a window of opportunity is now opening: the joint management of guaranteed income and the IMV can allow for a more integrated systemSimple and fair. And at the same time, redefining labor incentives with realistic and progressive criteria can prevent aid from penalizing work, without demanding the impossible from those who only find precarious work.
The IMV hasn't failed. But we can't afford to keep it in such a fragile balance, between discouraging work and failing to fulfill its main objective: guaranteeing a minimum income. This isn't just about fine-tuning the budget or correcting a technical flaw. We need a decisive commitment to a social policy that relies on people, reduces obstacles, prevents losses, and complements, not replaces, a labor market that still doesn't guarantee dignity for all. Greater efficiency, yes. But also greater resilience.
