Europe, if it so desires, can

Until 1914, without the UN or the League of Nations, the world was governed by spheres of influence. There was one, Europe, and a single influential state, the United Kingdom, which based its control of trade on its colonial empire.

The Industrial Revolution, the victories in the wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, and Bismarck's efficient Prussian administration with its universally paid taxes and social security system—the first of its kind in the world—led to the unification of Germany under the Second Reich. The United Kingdom saw a competitor emerge as a European leader, and war became inevitable: on one side, the Reich and the Austro-Hungarian Empire; on the other, the United Kingdom and France.

The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 left behind grievances that included economic inflation and a growing desire for revenge among the losers of the conflict, who were more humiliated than militarily defeated. No Allied army had entered Germany when it surrendered in 1918.

This led to war in 1939. A second sphere of influence—geographically distant from Europe—had emerged as a result of Japan's modernization and growth, with a significant GDP and population. Japan, crippled by a lack of raw materials and engaged in a war of conquest in China, declared war on the United States, a war it could not possibly win. The United States emerged victorious in Europe and the Pacific, becoming the world's leading power.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the Reich's strategic error in declaring war on the USSR allowed the US to gain a temporary ally. The Soviets shouldered the brunt of the war in Europe and exhausted the Reich's power. The USSR suffered the deaths and destruction.

After 1945, the world became a single sphere of influence with supranational institutions, the UN and Bretton Woods, which modulated world politics, economics, and trade, led by the US. As a consequence of the victory in Europe, the USSR became a counterpower on the continent, but the fragility and inefficiency of its economy led to its implosion in 1990.

From 1990 to 2000, the political collapse of the USSR led the US to believe it was the world's sole superpower. The only exception was Islamic radicalism, which sparked two wars, Iraq and Afghanistan, which the US won militarily but lost socially and economically.

Today, the world is configured into three areas of influence: America and the Gulf, led by the US; Asia, led by China; and Europe, where there is a conflict between Russia and the EU.

This new situation is what has brought conflict to Venezuela. The US has sought to demonstrate its dominance and control Venezuelan oil—until now sold mostly to China at low prices—and access to strategic minerals—a market globally dominated by China. Once the irrelevance of the UN was demonstrated—through events—a conflict erupted between Taiwan and China that the US will be unable to prevent due to its similarities with Venezuela. This conflict will cause serious problems for Europe in chip manufacturing, the digital industry, and AI. It can be resolved in the medium term, but not in the short term.

The US's delay in gaining control of strategic minerals compared to China makes a US invasion of Greenland, now Danish, likely, under the logic of "in my own house I do what I want".

The problem of leadership in the third area of influence, Europe, remains unresolved. If the war in Ukraine is resolved in Russia's favor, the EU will become less relevant on the European continent due to its confrontation with Russia. Two issues point in this direction. On the one hand, there is the US interest in supporting an undefeated Russia, in order to prevent its strategic convergence with China in the inevitable conflict between Washington and Beijing this century. On the other hand, there is European ineffectiveness, which is difficult to resolve in the medium term through closer political union, which—due to its complexity—requires time and which Russia will actively try to prevent.

This situation can be reversed, but the will to do so is essential. The idea that a common European defense will give the EU a military force that will allow it to have a greater presence in the world is a long-term alternative. By the time it arrives, current conflicts will have been resolved against European interests.

The only independent nuclear military force in Europe is France's, created from the Frappe Force in 1958 at the initiative of Charles de Gaulle. This independent nuclear force includes the vehicles to operate it: ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, missile launchers capable of operating without being able to be located, and a strategic air force.

If the EU were to delegate its defense policy to France, there would be a credible, immediate, and capable alternative to US support for Ukraine, which could bring Russia to the negotiating table with concessions that would not exist if the war ends without serious US involvement.

This initiative requires the acceptance of the United Kingdom and Germany. It's difficult. For France, it would mean greater relevance in Europe and the world, and the strengthening of its Jacobin policy, which has brought it greater influence and political success throughout history. A significant development for France.

For the EU it would represent an explicit political strengthening, and for French domestic politics, an alternative that would reinforce Macronism in the short term and, therefore, imply a weakening of the far right in the next presidential elections.

This policy could be useful for a future in Russia without Putin. A peace without a victory in Ukraine would politically weaken Russia. A rapprochement between the EU and Russia would benefit both sides due to the complementarity of their economies and societies, currently separated by President Putin's imperialistic will, without any historical logic or strategic justification. With this obstacle removed, collaboration is possible.