The war hardens the Iranian regime

BeirutThe bombings between the United States and Iran continued this Monday for the fifth consecutive day, in an escalation that could lead to a regional confrontation. Washington has launched a new wave of attacks against Iranian military infrastructure, while Tehran hardens its rhetoric and warns Gulf countries that providing logistical support to American forces will be considered an act of war.

Tensions are rising beyond Iran. In Yemen, the internationally recognized government has announced that it has bombed the runway of Sana'a International Airport to prevent the landing of a plane arriving from Iran. The Houthi rebels, who have the support of Tehran, accuse Saudi Arabia of being behind the attack and claim that the operation has ended the ceasefire with the United States that has been in effect since May of last year. Meanwhile, the Iranian Foreign Ministry insists that it is keeping contacts open with Qatar, Oman, and Pakistan to try to contain the crisis, although it rejects reports of a supposed return to the negotiating table and called them "psychological warfare" driven by Washington.

Almost five months after the start of the campaign by the United States and Israel against Iran, the declared objective of weakening the Islamic Republic's regime has no clear outcome. The attacks, which on the first day killed the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and other senior officials, have destroyed military facilities, forced Tehran to reorganize part of its command chain, and increased economic pressure on a country subjected to a severe sanctions regime for years. Politically, however, things are pointing in another direction.

Far from showing signs of fracture, the war appears to have caused a closing of ranks around the regime. The feeling of external threat has reinforced the discourse of resistance that the Islamic Republic has used for decades to justify its permanence and mobilize its bases.

Challenges for the new supreme leader

This change coincides, moreover, with a particularly delicate moment for the regime. The death of Ali Khamenei has opened a new era under the leadership of his son, Mojtaba. Unlike his father, the current supreme leader (who has not been seen in public since the attack that killed his father, in which he himself was reportedly injured) does not govern from a position of consolidated authority, but from the need to build it. And, in a regime like the Iranian one, this legitimacy does not depend solely on religious rank. It is also measured by the ability to withstand external pressure.

For a leader who has just come to power, appearing as the man who yields to Washington could be much more dangerous than assuming the cost of prolonging the confrontation. Ali Khamenei made the so-called "strategic patience" one of the keys to his long tenure. For decades, he avoided open war with the United States and preferred to project Iranian power through regional allies and a calculated policy of deterrence. Mojtaba inherits a country at war and, at least until now, has shown a much less restrained attitude. His first decisions point to a greater willingness to assume the risk of direct confrontation. Indeed, this weekend he called to "avenge" his father's death, and has distanced himself from the ceasefire agreement of June 15, in which the United States and Iran agreed to a 60-day truce to negotiate the thorniest points of a lasting peace treaty.

The praetorian guard

This scenario also reinforces the role of the Revolutionary Guard corps. For years it has been the main military arm of the Islamic Republic, controls part of the economy and coordinates relations with Tehran's regional allies. But the war seems to have further strengthened its influence. It is its commanders who direct a large part of the military response and who have increasing weight in the country's strategic decisions.

More than a change of regime, what is beginning to be glimpsed is a transformation of the system itself. This does not mean that the military has taken control of the state or that the civilian government has disappeared. But the new internal balance seems to favor those who advocate a harder line and consider any concession to the West a vital risk for the country.

Herein lies one of the main paradoxes of this war. Washington's military pressure sought to weaken Iran's ability to project power within and outside its borders. But everything indicates that the attacks have ended up strengthening precisely the sectors least in favor of any rapprochement with the West.

The Memorandum of Understanding signed in June between Washington and Tehran illustrates this contradiction. The agreement did not end the conflict, but barely managed to freeze it for a few weeks. This time allowed the United States to temporarily contain the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, but it also gave Iran room to reorganize part of its military structure, replace commanders killed in bombings, and consolidate succession after the death of Ali Khamenei.

The resumption of attacks demonstrates how fragile that pause was. But it also allows for another reading. After several months of bombing, the Islamic Republic does not seem to be any closer to collapse. While the war is spreading to new scenarios and the Strait of Hormuz is once again at the center of the crisis, the main change may be happening far from the front, within the Iranian regime itself. If it consolidates, Washington will not only have to manage an escalation with consequences for energy markets, but also an Iranian leadership less willing to separate military pressure from political negotiation.