Social movements

Vincent Bevins: "The problem is that when mass protests succeed, nobody knows what to do with the victory."

Journalist and writer, author of 'If We Burn'

Journalist and writer Vincent Bevins during an interview.
06/12/2025
4 min

BarcelonaThe American writer and journalist Vincent Bevins, author of If we burn (Captain Swing, 2025), has investigated the global cycle of protests of the 2010s, many of which he covered for Financial Times either Los Angeles TimesNow he has interviewed 200 activists in twelve countries to understand why that wave of change crashed against a wall. His diagnosis challenges the idea that massive, spontaneous, and leaderless mobilizations are enough to transform political systems. He warns that the pattern that derailed the great revolts of the last decade is also at work in Europe: mobilizations that destabilize governments but leave the future in the hands of elites or foreign powers because they are incapable of building an alternative to the established power.

The revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Ukraine, and Greece, the uprising following the murder of George Floyd in the United States, and also the Catalan independence movement, marked a global wave of hope, but they did not achieve their objectives. How does he explain this?

— What happened was that a very specific form of resistance became hegemonic during the 2010s: seemingly spontaneous, leaderless, digitally coordinated, and horizontally structured mass protests. This repertoire was far more effective than anyone imagined at bringing large numbers of people into the streets, but not at seizing the political opportunities that arose. These mobilizations generated real opportunities, but in no case was it the street movement that was able to capitalize on them. There was always another actor involved: pre-existing groups linked to the elites, or foreign powers that saw in the chaos a moment to impose their order. The problem is that when mass protests succeed, no one knows what to do with the victory.

Was the lack of leadership, or its incapacity, decisive?

— Yes, but not only that. Many of us believed that if large numbers of people took to the streets for a just cause, it could only end well. But radically horizontal movements, where everyone brings their own vision of the future, can grow spectacularly and, at the same time, become completely incapacitated when the critical moment arrives. When a government falls, historically it is an organized minority that fills the power vacuum. Mass movements without clear structures cannot react with the necessary cohesion and speed. Egypt is the clearest example: the protesters watched in horror as the army capitalized on the victory they had achieved in the streets.

The riots were stolen from those who had led them.

— A very specific form of resistance became hegemonic during the 2010s: a concrete way of responding to injustice or the abuses of the elites. It's not that this repertoire of protest didn't work. If it simply hadn't worked, things would be much simpler and less unsettling. In fact, history is full of attempts to confront the elites, and usually nothing happens: the elites ignore the protests, and that's the end of it. What happened in this case, based on seemingly spontaneous, leaderless, digitally coordinated, and horizontally structured mass protests in public spaces, was far more effective than anyone had imagined in generating massive increases in participation, in filling the streets. The problem is that they were unable to capitalize on the opportunities they had created.

But why do people keep going out into the streets despite so many failures?

— In some countries, there is a real trauma. In Brazil, after 2013, many on the left feared that protests could once again pave the way for the far right. In the United States, there were also doubts after the uprising following George Floyd's death. But in many other places, this is not the case. In recent months, we have seen new, explosive mobilizations in Morocco, Indonesia, Nepal, Madagascar, and Serbia. People have not stopped trying to transform the global system. Moreover, history is not over: whether the 2011 uprising in Egypt or the 2019 uprising in Chile end up being definitive defeats or the beginning of something bigger will depend on what happens in the coming years. Many apparent defeats have, over time, become victories.

What he explains makes sense in the context of dictatorship, but what happens in Europe?

— One of the key lessons is that the European political system is not immune to this pattern, despite having stronger institutions. The forms of protest that dominated the 2010s were also seen in Spain and Greece. These movements were capable of destabilizing, but they did not generate an institutional project prepared to govern.

He states that the war in Ukraine can only be understood in light of Maidan.

— The Maidan protests began with a concrete demand; then came the repression, and a moment opened up in which any future project seemed possible. But this chaos of possibilities always culminates in a result, and the February 2014 transition was challenged by a significant part of the country. In eastern Ukraine, protests emerged that did not begin as a Russian operation, but were quickly infiltrated by Russian actors. This led to a limited civil war, then to a broader conflict, and finally, eight years later, to the full-scale Russian invasion. It is a clear example of how a protest that fails to resolve its internal conflicts can open fissures that become enormous geopolitical fractures.

He also says that the genocide in Gaza is related to the failure of the revolution against Mubarak in Egypt.

— The 2013 Egyptian counter-revolution is pivotal. Egypt is the largest Arab country and controls the border with Gaza. Its stance toward Israel has been a cornerstone of Western strategy in the region. A truly democratic Egypt would inevitably challenge Israeli behavior. And while the US proclaims its desire for democracy in the Middle East, it also seeks to maintain its allies.

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