Experts answer the most difficult question: where is Iran's war headed?

Barcelona / London / Washington / JerusalemThis is a compass article. Like the magnetized needle instrument, the aim of these words is to try to show us where we are. Or, more precisely, where the Iran war is, a strident earthquake that has strained international politics and the economy.

On February 28, Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu launched a joint operation against the ayatollahsThe dilemma was voiced by Trump on Friday, at the White House,The magnetized needles don't know where to point: the two paths out – understanding or attack – are totally different. The dilemma was voiced by Trump on Friday, at the White House, before catching a plane to spend the weekend at his Florida mansion: "Do we want to go there and completely obliterate them once and for all? Or do we want to try to reach an agreement? These are the options." Amidst so much uncertainty and plot twists, the only thing that is clear is that the current stalemate is unsustainable in the long term.

Contacted by ARA, several experts have agreed to undertake a historically risky exercise, and even more so in times of trumpist chaos: to analyze where the war is heading.

There are three interpretations that are repeated among analysts. The first, that the war is "on hold," "atrophied," "without a way out," "at a standstill." The second, that this stalemate is the result of an initial miscalculation by the United States and a well-studied response from Tehran. The third, that at any moment everything could erupt again.

Trump's communicative chaos and Tehran's information blockade, which has turned the country into a black hole, add tension to the horizon. It is common for the White House hints at one thing one day, and another the next.Senior Pentagon officials advised Trump against launching the offensive.

to extract concessions at the diplomatic table.

to start concessions at the diplomatic table.

In the war equation, internal dynamics in each country occupy a relevant space. In Iran, resisting under pressure can strengthen the hardest sectors, but it can also fuel dissent if the economic situation worsens. Recently, moreover, there has been talk of rifts and division among the senior officials of the Ayatollah regime regarding the future of the conflict. In Israel, security demands and elections pressure to continue degrading Iranian capabilities, but a part of society is tired of the accumulation of war and having to hide in shelters every so often. And in the United States, the economic impact of the war leads to domestic pressures but also international pressures. Furthermore, from the outset, a significant portion of the Pentagon's senior officials advised Trump against launching the offensive. The street is also speaking: 61% of Americans consider it a mistake to have used force in Iran. This is a similar figure to that recorded regarding the Iraq War in 2006 (59%) and also comparable to the rejection that the Vietnam War already aroused in 1971.

"Trump did not expect this development of the war and now, undoubtedly, wants a quick end and seems interested in a negotiated settlement, even one that allows Iran to claim a partial victory," points out Iranian analyst Mehran Haghirian, an expert on the Persian Gulf and director of the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation. 

A lesson in war

The experts also agree on highlighting a clear conclusion from these two months of war: having military superiority is no longer a guarantee of strategic victory. Americans and Israelis bombed Iran for 40 days and achieved tactical successes, but they have not managed to bring down the regime, reopen the maritime passage, or subjugate the ayatollahs at the negotiating table. Tehran has seen how, by leveraging its geostrategic position, it can inflict economic damage with global impact equivalent to tons of bombs.

In Washington's eyes, retreating would be admitting the limits of its power. For Tehran, conceding would call into question its identity of resistance and would entail

From here Gray presents two possible scenarios: one agonizing, which ends when one of the two parties yields because they can no longer withstand more damage; and a more comfortable one where an agreement is reached through a third actor and "both sides save face". For example, Gray suggests that if the Chinese were capable of mediating an agreement, both the Iranians and the Americans could sell it as a victory. Or at least it would serve to camouflage the withdrawal.

On Thursday, the Iranian supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, broke his usual silence andsaid, in a statement: "A new chapter is being written for the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. By the power and might of God, the bright future of the Persian Gulf region will be a future without the United States and in service of the progress, well-being, and prosperity of its nations."

Beyond the war propaganda –very present on both sides–, who is winning? If it can be called winners.

Daniel Byman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, lowers expectations and argues that "it is difficult to say who is winning" because each actor is playing different games. According to Byman, for the United States the problem has transcended the battlefield, as "the effects on allies, oil, and foreign credibility weigh as much or more than the battlefield". In Washington's eyes, retreating would be admitting the limits of its power. For Tehran, yielding would call into question its resistance identity and would represent a dangerous precedent for its future role in the region, being reconverted at Netanyahu's pace.

. Oman, for obvious reasons –it is on the other side of the sea–, and China because it is beginning to see that the strangulation of the maritime passage also threatens the Asian market.

From the North American perspective, and especially the Israeli one, this reinforces a central conclusion: the Iranian problem cannot be solved in a single military campaign.Shadow movements

But despite the feeling of stagnation, there are movements under the water.

This week, the Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, traveled to Masqat to meet with the Omanis. Before Pakistan entered the scene as the main mediating country, Oman had been the main player in the negotiations. For years, the Omanis have acted as intermediaries and, for Gray, the fact that they have returned to negotiations is a "positive" sign.

This week, Araghchi also visited Moscow, where he met with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. The day after the meeting, on Wednesday, Trump and Putin spoke by phone for an hour and a half. Even so, Gray does not believe that the Russians have much weight in the mediations, but rather trusts more in the role of Oman and China. Both countries suffer the consequences of the blockade of Hormuz. Oman, for obvious reasons –it is on the other side of the sea–, and China because it is beginning to see that the choking of the maritime passage also threatens the Asian market.

But Morillas warns of another risk. "Political dialogue can advance, but if the economic situation does not improve with a real reopening of Hormuz, geoeconomics may have more importance than geopolitics in the steps to follow in this war". That is, if the blood of the world economy, oil, does not flow again, good diplomatic words will be of little use.

Certainly, the Strait of Hormuz has never reopened, the economy has been suffocated for weeks and global prospects threaten tragedy and hover over scenarios similar to 2020, when the pandemic confined the world. Trump, who has responded to the Iranian blockade with another blockade, hinted on Thursday that Washington is already preparing for a prolonged closure of Hormuz. For months, perhaps. Markets and the pockets of the global population are trembling.

Also trembling are the magnetized needles of compasses, utensils that began to be used two thousand years ago, precisely, in ancient China, a rival of the United States and, according to experts and analysts, Trump's true obsession that marks his foreign agenda.