The fire chief during the DANA storm admits he had doubts about sending the ES-Alert at 6 pm

ValenciaJosé Miguel Basset, the former chief inspector of the Valencia Provincial Fire Consortium and the person in operational command during the devastating floods in the Valencian Community – now retired – admitted on Wednesday to having raised concerns about the deployment of the ES-Alert system proposed by the Deputy Director General of Emergencies, Jorge Suárez. He stated this in the Catarroja courthouse, which is investigating the deaths of 230 people during the disaster, according to sources present at his testimony, as reported by ARA. Basset recounted that around 5:30 p.m., the Júcar River Basin Authority informed them that there was a serious risk at the Forata Dam and that it could break or overflow – as ultimately occurred. It was then that Suárez suggested sending out an alert urging residents to move to higher ground. The proposal was not considered by any other member of the Cecopio except Basset, who explained that he objected, arguing that the wording should be prepared by a specialist. However, the former fire chief also submitted a proposed message at 6:13 p.m. The text asked residents of areas that could be affected by the collapse of the Forata reservoir to pay attention to news and any new alerts, given the heavy rainfall occurring in their area.

Basset's statement coincides with Suárez's a month ago, when he claimed to have completed a draft message at 5:45 p.m. The draft, reportedly written in a notebook, asked residents to move to the upper floors of their homes, but the alert was not disseminated at that time due to concerns raised by Basset, who feared the message would cause widespread alarm and lead residents to flee their homes. Basset also requested that the text be reviewed by communications experts. In response to this debate, at 6:00 p.m., the then Minister of Justice and the Interior, Salomé Pradas, decided to suspend the online meeting—a format that allowed representatives of state agencies to participate—and continue it in person only with the officials present at the Emergency Coordination Center in the town of El. This arrangement lasted for an hour.

According to Suárez's account, during the time the meeting was held entirely in person, he instructed the head of the 112 analysis unit, Juan Ramón Cuevas, to prepare the procedure and draft the text in a document. It was already 6:15 p.m. The message was ready at 6:38 p.m., and the technician entered it into the ES-Alert computer system. But it was at that moment that Pradas, the regional secretary of Emergencies, Emilio Argüeso, and the director general of Emergencies, Alberto Martín Moratilla, allegedly halted the process because they believed it was necessary to notify the mayors of the affected municipalities first. Another reason that may have delayed the dissemination of the alert was the former regional minister's doubts about her legal authority to decree the confinement of the population. In fact, according to Suárez, Pradas requested that the phrase "any travel is requested to be suspended" be changed to "please avoid..." Similarly, the former regional minister and Vicent Mompó, president of the Valencia Provincial Council, also requested linguistic modifications, including removing the accent from the name of the province of Valencia and replacing "este" (east). Concern over the Forata reservoir and the debates surrounding the ES-Alert text led to the situation in the Poio ravine, which had already been overflowing since 6:00 p.m., being overlooked. The Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center) was unaware of what was happening until after 7:00 p.m., when the first images and calls from mayors began to arrive. All of this forced the postponement of sending the alert, as it was necessary to expand its coverage area. The warning was issued at 8:11 p.m., but with incorrect information: it asked people to avoid travel but not to stay home and in higher areas, as a second message sent at 8:57 p.m. did request.

"I didn't hear about the firefighters withdrawing"

Another key moment in Basset's testimony—which is expected to be lengthy and for which the judge has already scheduled next Monday, in case there isn't enough time today—concerned the withdrawal at 2:30 p.m. of the firefighters who were monitoring the Poio ravine and the Magro River. Basset stated that he was not informed of the request made by the Emergency Department and that it was handled from the communications center. He also said that he wasn't notified when the personnel were withdrawn. "Not everything is under my control," he emphasized, before pointing out that it was the duty officer who managed the withdrawal. In fact, he said he only learned about the deployment days after the disaster through the press, at a meeting convened to manage the crisis.