The fire chief during the DANA storm admits he raised doubts about sending the ES-Alert at 6 pm

ValenciaJosé Miguel Basset, the former chief inspector of the Valencia Provincial Fire Consortium – now retired – admitted to having raised doubts about the text of the ES-Alert message that the Deputy Director General of Emergencies, Jorge Suárez, proposed at 5:45 p.m. on the day of the DANA storm, but maintained that by 6:13 p.m. he had already sent the message indicating a delay in its transmission. He stated this on Wednesday in the Catarroja courthouse, which is investigating the case of the 230 deaths, according to sources present at his testimony, as reported by ARA. Basset confirmed that around 5:30 p.m., the Júcar River Basin Authority informed them that there was a serious risk at the Forata dam and that it could break or overflow – as ultimately happened. It was then that Suárez suggested sending an alert asking residents to move to higher ground. The proposal was neither evaluated nor amended by any other member of Cecopio except Basset, who expressed his fear that citizens would flee the municipalities and create a dangerous situation on the roads with "people trapped." He also argued that the wording should have been prepared by a specialist.

The former fire chief denied that his amendments delayed the drafting of the alert by "more than ten minutes" and explained that at 6:13 p.m. he proposed an alternative message. The text asked residents of the areas that could be affected by the collapse of the Forata reservoir to pay attention to the news and any new alerts, given the heavy rainfall occurring in the area. This wording, according to Basset, "sounded better or wasn't as alarmist." It was at that point, according to the former fire chief, that a consensus text already existed, and therefore he considers "the delay in sending the alert incomprehensible."

The former fire chief's statement largely coincides with the one Suárez made a month ago. At that time, the deputy director general of Emergencies—who remains in his position—stated that he had completed a proposed message at 5:45 p.m. The draft requested that the population stay in the upper floors of their homes, but the alert was not disseminated due to the doubts raised by Basset. Faced with the debate between the two high-ranking officials, at 6:00 p.m. the then Minister of Justice and the Interior, Salomé Pradas, decided to suspend the meeting, which was being held remotely—a format that allowed representatives of state agencies to participate. This suspension lasted for an hour.

According to Suárez's account, during the time the meeting was held entirely in person, he instructed the head of the 112 analysis unit, Juan Ramón Cuevas, to prepare the procedure and draft the text in a document. It was already 6:15 p.m. The message was ready at 6:38 p.m., and the technician entered it into the ES-Alert computer system. But it was at that moment that Pradas, the regional secretary for Emergencies, Emilio Argüeso, and the director general of Emergencies, Alberto Martín Moratilla, allegedly halted the process because they believed it was necessary to notify the mayors of the affected municipalities first. Another reason that may have delayed the dissemination of the alert was the former regional minister's doubts about her legal authority to decree a lockdown of the population. In fact, according to Suárez, Pradas requested that the message change the phrase "any travel is requested to be suspended" to "please avoid..." Similarly, the former regional minister and Vicent Mompó, president of the Valencia Provincial Council, also requested linguistic modifications, including removing the accent from the name of the province of Valencia and replacing "este" (east). The warning was broadcast at 8:11 p.m., but with incorrect content: it asked people to avoid travel, but not to stay home and in higher areas, as a second message sent at 8:57 p.m. did request.

Disagreements about the Poio

Another highlight of the former fire chief's testimony—which will continue next Monday—came when he contradicted the Spanish government delegate, Pilar Bernabé, who stated during her appearance that the Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center) only learned of the Poio ravine overflowing shortly after 7:00 p.m., when the first images began to arrive. Like Pradas, Basset denied having heard anything about the flooding. But according to Bernabé, She warned the former councilor that the situation in Paiporta was critical. And Pradas replied that the same thing was happening in other municipalities. The government delegate's version was corroborated by Suárez in December when he said that he didn't remember if Bernabé said "Picaña or Paiporta, but that he claimed to have received warnings from some mayors that a bridge [the Picanya footbridge] had already collapsed" and that he himself received messages from 'Assin' de Masin.

"I didn't hear about the firefighters' withdrawal"

Regarding the controversial withdrawal at 2:30 p.m. of the firefighters who were monitoring the Poio ravine and the Magro River, the former Fire Chief stated that he was not informed of the request made by the Emergency Department to deploy the team, and that the request was handled by the communications center. He also said that he was not notified when the personnel were withdrawn. "Not everything is under my control," he emphasized, before pointing out that it was the duty officer who managed the withdrawal. In fact, he asserted that he only learned of the operation days after the disaster at a meeting convened to manage the crisis caused by the floods. Regarding Salomé Pradas' actions on the day of the DANA storm and the fact that the former councilor's visit after 2 p.m. to the municipality of Carlet – located on the banks of the Magro River – delayed the formation of the emergency committee, Basset stressed that from a technical point of view, what is fundamental is being in charge of the management and that Pradas...