Everything we still don't know about February 23rd

What was Juan Carlos I's role? Who knew the coup was being planned? Who financed it?

Juan Carlos I in a file image.
24/02/2026
5 min

BarcelonaOn February 23, 1981, General Alfonso Armada entered Congress with the idea of ​​a "government of national salvation" and left under arrest, after the coup d'état failed, due to disputes among the coup plotters, among other reasons. According to what has been published since then, that government would have had Armada himself as president, along with the socialists Felipe González (economic vice president), Gregorio Peces-Barba (Justice), Javier Solana (Transport), and Enrique Múgica (Health); the communist deputies Jordi Solé Tura (Labor) and Ramón Tamames (Economy); the UCD deputies Pío Cabanillas (Finance), José Luis Álvarez (Public Works), Miguel Herrero Rodríguez de Miñón (Education and Science), and Agustín Rodríguez (Industry); and the representatives of the People's Alliance, Manuel Fraga (Defense) and Manuel Saavedra (Interior). Other military figures included José Antonio Sáenz de Santamaría (Minister of Autonomy and Regions) and representatives of civil society, such as the former Francoist minister José María López de Letona (Deputy Minister for Economic Affairs), Carlos Ferrer Salat (Minister of Commerce), Antonio Garrigues Walker (Minister of Culture), and Luis María Ansón (Minister of Information).

This was the list—which Armada denied when he was tried—that he noted in his diary while arguing with an enraged Antonio Tejero, who was agitated because he had joined the coup to restore a military dictatorship, not to change the names of the ministers. The Civil Guard lieutenant colonel had been holding the Spanish government, members of parliament, and staff of the lower house hostage for more than five hours. Among them was the Congress doctor, Carmen Echave, who overheard them speaking and was one of the first to realize that Armada had not come to reason with Tejero. How many of those whose names appeared in the general's diary knew what was brewing? This is one of the enigmas that remain to be solved from that attempted coup that shook Spain's young democracy 45 years ago. But there are many more.

The involvement of Juan Carlos I

This Wednesday, The Spanish government will declassify the documents that have been kept secret all these years, and everyone will be looking first and foremost at what they say about the role of Juan Carlos I. Armada, who had been very close to the then-king during his years as head of the General Secretariat of the Royal Household, was unable to speak with the monarch on February 23 because Sabino Fernández Campo, his successor, prevented him. The general intended for Juan Carlos to approve the operation that would end the UCD government in one fell swoop and install a military officer at the head of the Spanish executive.

His two main partners, Lieutenant Colonel Tejero and Lieutenant General Jaime Milans del Bosch, were convinced that the king supported the coup because Armada himself had told them so. "Of course he was in favor of occupying Congress, because he thought the king supported it," Milans replied. during the military trial held a few months later at the Army Geographic Service in MadridAs head of the Valencia military region, he deployed tanks to the streets and ultimately withdrew them when Juan Carlos ordered him to do so by telephone. "I thought he had backed out," he said. Milans refused to explain who else was involved in the attempted coup. During the trial, Armada dodged the question when questioned about the king's involvement. In fact, he even denied knowing the details of what Tejero and Milans had supposedly organized. The strategy, which led Tejero and Milans to turn against him, calling him a "traitor," initially worked, as it saved him from a conviction for rebellion. However, a year later, the Supreme Court equated his sentence to that of his colleagues—who would ultimately receive 26 years in prison, of which Tejero served more, a total of 15 years. Armada died in 2013, never having heard of the King's involvement. the audio recordings of Juan Carlos I that OK Daily published last year"Word of honor, I laugh, my darling, at Alfonso Armada. He spent seven years in jail, he went to his manor "From Galicia, and the guy didn't say a word. Never! But this other one is just chattering away..." he told his lover, Bárbara Rey, comparing Armada's silence to the supposed verbal incontinence of his successor as head of the Royal Household Secretariat, Fernández Campo. In the emeritus king's recently published memoirs, however, the version is different: Juan Carlos believes that Armada betrayed him by organizing a coup behind his back.

Armada's meeting with socialists in Lleida

In that trial, several Socialist leaders were called to testify: the then-mayor of Lleida, Antoni Ciurana, and the PSOE's number three, Enrique Múgica, among others. They were summoned to explain the content of the meeting that the general had with General Armada, then military governor of the Lleida region, in November 1980. Múgica, who ended up being one of the names Armada wrote in his notebook of potential ministers during the 23-F coup attempt, acknowledged that the general had asked them to get involved to help improve the political climate, and alluded to a possible government between the PSOE and the UCD, headed by an independent. "At no point did he propose himself as president of that government, nor was the possibility of forming that cabinet outside of constitutional channels part of his plan," explained Múgica, who prepared a report on that meeting to send to the party. For many years, that report was used by the right wing to try to link Felipe González, then secretary general of the PSOE, to the preparations for the coup.

In an interview a few years ago in "The Vanguard“Joan Reventós—the first secretary of the PSC at the time—called me and told me that Múgica would be coming to Lleida the next day and that he would like to meet the military governor. Obviously, I knew him; I was the mayor, and Armada was a very sociable fellow. Reventós suggested we go somewhere discreet, and I ventured to say that the most discreet place in Lleida was my house.” Ciurana personally picked up Armada to take him to lunch, and the mayor’s wife also ate with them. Ciurana left that meeting convinced that Armada was “a very pleasant man,” but looking back, he explained in the interview, he did notice that “he was gauging our opinions.” “But at no point did he give us the impression that he was looking for us as accomplices.” "I categorically deny that we had any feeling of doing anything unconstitutional or conspiratorial." In fact, Ciurana recalled that Armada had also had lunch with Jordi Pujol and Josep Tarradellas.

Tarradellas's prophecy

In addition to meeting with Armada on occasion, Jordi Pujol also met with Enrique Múgica in August 1980. The former president of the Generalitat recalled this in the second volume of his memoirs, remembering how the then-socialist leader had raised the possibility of forcing Adolfo Suárez (UCD) to resign and placing a military officer "with a democratic mindset" at the head of the Spanish government. A revelation that Múgica did not appreciate at all and which he dismissed as a mere "idea." But beyond any intuition Pujol might have had after that meeting, what President Josep Tarradellas had could be described, at the very least, as prophetic. In July 1980, when he had already handed over the presidency of the Generalitat to Pujol, Tarradellas was already speaking of the need for a "scalpel cut" in Spanish democracy, and in November he insisted on the necessary "change of course." He completely ruled out a coup, although it was never known for certain whether he knew anything about it. He met with Armada on February 10, 1981, when the general said goodbye to him because he was leaving Catalonia to return to Madrid as Deputy Chief of the Army Staff.

Who paid for the attempted coup? Were there any banks that supported it? What was the position of European and international governments and organizations? How many calls did the Zarzuela Palace receive that day? What stance did the other army generals take privately? What role did the state secret services play? Questions we will find out if they have answers this Wednesday.

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