The EU's record in recent decades has been positive: it has guaranteed peace among its members in the post-World War II era, established an economic zone and a partially shared currency, and reinforced the idea of a distinct cultural reality and a specific collective actor both internally (institutions) and on the global stage. Some more specific aspects and policies (CAP, communications space, Erasmus, energy-ecology, etc.) are part of the Union's duty.
However, it is a fragmented organization that has been overwhelmed by global political, strategic, and technological challenges, especially if we factor in future variables. This "rhetorical will, not practical power" currently displayed by the EU is nothing new if we look at things with a certain historical perspective, an attitude that is almost always appropriate.
After the collapse of the Western Roman Empire—the Mediterranean was never again anyone's Madre Nostrum—we find no attempt at political unity until the Carolingian Empire (8th-9th centuries). In fact, it remains the period in which the largest territory in Western Europe was politically unified (with the British Isles always on the sidelines: there were still two and a half centuries to go before the Norman invasion of England in 1066, with the Battle of Hastings). But that Carolingian unity was short-lived. By the mid-9th century, it was falling apart, a result of territorial divisions and rivalries.
Later, the so-called Holy Roman Empire would emerge, which has been said to be neither an empire, nor a Holy Roman Empire, nor an empire. In fact, it never became an effective political unit, despite surviving until the time of Napoleon. Other attempts to establish European unification under a hegemonic monarch also failed. Fragmentation means that when one state wants to extend its sovereignty, the others prevent it (Philip I, the Habsburgs, Louis XIV, Napoleon). A fact that can be called the European syndrome.
It seemed that the post-World War II EU could become the core of a neo-Carolingian project. Two conditions were essential: a shared will to implement it and strong and respected leadership. But at this point, it seems clear that the strategy of expanding the Union, from six states (which, incidentally, recall the territory of Charlemagne) to the current twenty-seven, has been detrimental to its deepening and projection. Neither of these two conditions has existed in the EU since the time of Jacques Delors. And that was more than thirty years ago. Wrapped in the rhetoric of "European values," the states have shown no interest in establishing a federal or federalizing model that would transform the Union into a decisive global player.
Is it too late to consider a political project with a vision for the future? I think the answer is yes, if we follow the logic of the twenty-seven states. We should return to a reduced number of states, even if this means some defections. And we should act at two or more speeds for political integration driven by those who have always been central in continental Europe: France and Germany. In other words, returning to Charlemagne, but now trying to do it well in terms of strategy, integration, stability, and projection. Containing far-right parties in the states of that core promoter is a key element, but this is only instrumental. The challenge is how to proceed with the political integration of the states that clearly want it. The alternative is to live ensconced in the decline of a progressively shrinking EU.
Defense policy could be the first building block of the new edifice. It would involve establishing an alliance in which the United Kingdom could also participate, albeit asymmetrically. Currently observed from China, Russia, India, and the United States, the EU is today an often practically dispensable entity (which even encourages jokes about it).
No, it's not too late to rectify. But it must be based on realistic foundations driven by states and leaders who believe in the European project based on a shared initial model. Is this realistic when European states, inevitably nationalist, do not want to give up their own financial and fiscal policies, or their small foreign policies? The most reasonable response is skeptical. And it is here that the question of European leadership, which is currently severely damaged or simply nonexistent, comes to the forefront.
Without a far-reaching internal upheaval, the world of US-China hegemony in which we already live points to a deepening of the current supervening European decline. As happens in some couples in crisis, things can improve if there is a will. However, with 27 involved, this is metaphysically impossible. Too many internal dissonances at each of the three vertices of political legitimacy: values, interests, and identities. In practice, the EU of 27 is dead. It is not even capable of implementing the sensible recommendations of the Letta-Draghi duo. But the European syndrome It's not inevitable. We must act from a smaller core of states—we can call it the Charlemagne Way—to rethink Europe on a grand scale. And we must profoundly reform its institutions and future direction to transform it into a powerful and respected player on the international stage.
