A NATO without the United States
Imagine NATO as a community of three villas with a swimming pool, gardens, sports courts, and an expensive security system. Three major owners pay the main dues: the United States, Europe, and Canada.
In any neighborhood association, expenses are divided by square meters. Applied to NATO, this would be based on surface area: the United States, Europe, and Canada have practically equal land areas. One-third of the square meters for each neighbor. Like the coefficients. The problem is that a large part of this Canadian surface area is tundra and ice (although now everyone is suddenly waking up to the Arctic and Greenland), which makes this criterion technically absurd.
The second criterion would be population: those with more people using the services pay more. Europe clearly comes out ahead here, with more than half the bloc's population, ahead of the United States and a demographically very small Canada. But defense isn't provided person to person, nor is it measured by population density, but rather by deterrent capacity, technology, industry, and logistics. Even this criterion isn't used in practice.
The third criterion, and the one actually applied in defense and the economy, is GDP. In other words, paying according to earnings. Under this criterion, the United States represents 58% of the bloc's wealth but contributes 65% of the Alliance's total military spending. They pay more than their fair share.
From that perspective, Donald Trump is right. However, the United States controls the main command and communication systems, hosts bases, sets priorities, and sells a substantial portion of the weaponry purchased by its allies. They profit from this.
What would happen if Europe left NATO? Europe could defend itself against Russia, but it would need two or three years to unify disparate doctrines and fragmented chains of command. And this connects to a fundamental political issue. Either Europe truly moves forward with fiscal and governance union, or it resigns itself to irrelevance. With twenty-seven member states, slow decision-making processes, and decentralized key powers, the current architecture is inadequate for this new global order.
Trump's message should be read as a warning. Not because he's entirely right, but because the context has changed. Either Europe starts to seriously resemble the United States of Europe, including in defense, or in ten years it will have no voice, no vote, and no security of its own. This time it's not rhetoric. This time he means business.
Either that, or we reach an agreement for Greenland. Which might not be so bad either.
