The war in Iran uncovers a serious problem in the United States military industry

WashingtonBefore bombing Tehran on February 28, the White House already knew that the Pentagon's dwindling ammunition stock was a decisive element in the war. With three months of the campaign in Iran about to be completed, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is trying to convince Congress of the need to approve a new military budget of 1.5 trillion dollars. Although the Pentagon officially denies it, this 40% increase in spending aims to replenish the army's reduced arsenal. But money cannot buy time, and it certainly cannot make a Tomahawk missile be manufactured overnight in less than two years. Iran is forcing the US to confront for the first time the problem that has existed in the Department of Defense for years.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). And this does not include all the ammunition that was already spent last year in the Twelve-Day War.

The underlying problem, however, is the imbalance between the speed at which ammunition is consumed and the slowness with which it is manufactured. This divergence is a consequence of the drift of the US arms industry over the past decades. As early as the early 2000s, George Bush's Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, warned that the weapons that formed the central pillar of US military supremacy took years to build and, consequently, he called for investment in a new generation of weapons that would represent "75% of the solutions" but could be made faster and at a lower cost.

The gap that Gates pointed out in the early 2000s has intensified in recent years due to the emergence of cheap drones: the Iranians have tired of sending swarms of Shahed drones –cheap and quick to produce– against THAADs, which are expensive and slower to replenish. The ceasefire has given a slight respite to the US military's defense and attack systems, but it by no means resolves the minimum two or three years it will need to restock part of the arsenal. If we rely on recent production history, the prospect of being able to return ammunition stocks to pre-war levels appears very distant. Last year, the navy bought only 55 Tomahawks. And this year, the Pentagon wants to buy 785, an increase of more than 1000% according tothe Cato Institute.

In March, Trump met with the chief executives of the major US arms companies to agree on quadrupling arms production. The companies that committed to the new targets were BAE Systems, Boeing, Honeywell, L3Harris, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. Under condition of anonymity, a Lockheed employee explained to ARA around that time that the entire department where she was working had been redirected to the area dedicated to the production of Tomahawk Tactical Weapons Control Systems (TTWCS). Despite the White House's haste, the woman saw it difficult for a radical change in production rates to occur because it would imply a structural change.

Car factories making missiles

A fact that Trump probably already knew, as he has also approached car manufacturers and other manufacturing companies to help accelerate arms production. A headline that seems typical of World War II, but which was echoed by the Wall Street Journal last April. Even before the war, senior Defense officials had already spoken with executives from various companies, such as General Motors and Ford, according to sources familiar with the matter.

Another element that had also been lurking in the background during these years was an explosion that in 2021 blew up the Pentagon's only domestic source of black powder. It was a factory located in Minden, Louisiana, and was criticized for producing mortar rounds, artillery ammunition, and Tomahawk missiles.

Black powder, which is the original gunpowder, is a highly combustible material for which there is no substitute. This type of powder is used in small quantities to ignite more powerful explosives. Although it was rebuilt, production from that factory was completely halted for more than three years. Furthermore, it once again underscored the fragility of the network of small suppliers who are key to providing the material that large companies need to assemble weaponry.

The latest analysis prepared by the Department of Defense in 2025 on the Pentagon's supplier landscape underscored the following: "The DIB [Defense Industrial Base] has consolidated, shrinking from 51 suppliers after the Cold War to just five major contractors who today develop the most critical weapon systems. The DIB is stagnant: it builds the world's best weapon systems in small quantities, while continuing to rely on obsolete parts, outdated manufacturing processes, and stalled innovation".