The Arab regimes' balance against Israel's attack on Iran

BeirutAfter several days of crossfire, Israeli bombardments of Iranian territory, and missile launches from Tehran, the Middle East is entering a new phase of tension, leaving behind years of threats and indirect confrontations. The Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, opened a new, unpredictable dynamic. Until now, we have seen the destruction of Gaza, the weakening of Hezbollah, and the fall of the Syrian regime. Everything seemed to be pushing toward a direct clash between Israel and Iran, with a shock wave shaking the entire region.

The response of Arab countries has oscillated between diplomatic caution and quiet fear. Many, especially the Gulf monarchies, as well as Egypt and Jordan, find themselves in an awkward position. They are Sunni-majority states that share Israel's concern about Iranian expansion, but they also face a public opinion that, although increasingly pragmatic, remains sensitive to the Palestinian cause. Despite the Abraham Accords and diplomatic normalization with several Arab countries, political support for Israel in the war with Iran, in the shadow of the Gaza massacre, is not guaranteed.

The Gulf Monarchies

Saudi Arabia, which resumed relations with Iran in 2023 after years of sectarian rivalry, has opted for caution. It shares concerns with Israel and the United States about Iran's nuclear program, but fears that open war could lead to attacks on its own territory or a new global energy crisis. Riyadh wants to play the role of mediator rather than belligerent. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar are taking a similar stance, aware that their economic stability depends on a minimally predictable region. Dubai, with its close commercial ties with Iran, cannot afford a complete rupture.

Egypt and Jordan, which signed peace agreements with Israel decades ago, are moving cautiously. Although they maintain security cooperation with Tel Aviv, they know that a prolonged escalation could ignite their own societies. In both countries, significant sectors of the population continue to view Iran as a rival, but they also reject Israel, which is intensifying attacks in Gaza and the West Bank, where settlers continue to advance and put more pressure on holy sites in Jerusalem.

Bahrain, more aligned with Saudi Arabia, has expressed concern about the escalation, aware that a significant portion of its population is Shiite and could react with hostility if the conflict is interpreted as a Sunni-Israeli attack on Iran. Oman has tried to maintain its traditional role as a diplomatic bridge, but its ability to influence the current dynamic is limited.

The great fear shared by Arab governments is a prolonged war that revives sectarian tensions and spills over borders. Oil prices have risen, air routes have been suspended, and the risk to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea has increased. The United States, although officially on the sidelines, has evacuated some of its diplomatic personnel in Iraq, and its bases in the region are on high alert. Although localized, the war is already having economic and political effects that are difficult to contain.

The voice of the street

Public reactions, so far contained, could become more radical if the conflict expands or if Israel attacks symbolic targets inside Iran. The demonstrations in support of Palestine that have begun in Amman, Cairo, and Tripoli could become more hostile if the regimes are perceived as passive or complicit. The Arab street remains a source of pressure, especially in contexts of economic crisis.

In this uncertain scenario, the so-called Axis of Resistance appears weakened. After the recent war with Israel, Hezbollah has lost operational capacity and some of its military leadership. Its political leadership now seeks to regain influence in Lebanon and integrate into a broader national framework, even exploring options for partial disarmament. In Syria, after the fall of al-Assad and the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa, the country has no real capacity to project influence beyond its borders. The Shiite militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen could act, but today their ability to alter the conflict is diminished.

The Iranian regime, besieged by sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and internal discontent, faces its greatest challenge since 1979. The war with Israel not only puts its regional influence at stake, but its very stability. While radars track the missiles, the regime tries to shield itself with another strategy based on fear. Internet shutdowns, staged demonstrations, censorship, and repression are part of a response more oriented toward protecting power than combating the enemy.

The Middle East is facing a new storm. The traditional players are still there, but their movements are more limited. And while missiles want to attack, governments are calculating how to survive a conflict that threatens to change the political landscape of the region.