András Bíró-Nagy: "Hungary will not act as a puppet of Russia"

BarcelonaHungary's legislative elections have marked a turning point both in the country and across Europe, with the end of sixteen years of Viktor Orbán's government. We analyze this with Hungarian political scientist András Bíró-Nagy, director of the think tank Policy Solutions and researcher at the Centre for Social Sciences in Budapest.

Some polls had predicted a very broad result for Tisza, but it seemed that everyone in the country resisted thinking it could be true. Has it surprised you too?

— The magnitude of Tisza's victory has been a surprise to everyone. Polls showed a paradox: Tisza was ahead, but the same polls showed that people believed Fidesz would win. It was the effect of sixteen years of Orbán's regime: for many people it seemed impossible to win against this regime. One of Péter Magyar's main tasks was to convince that change was possible, and in the final stretch of the campaign he achieved it.

All political scientists warned that the electoral system was almost tailor-made to benefit Fidesz. And yet, it lost. How is this explained?

— It is true that there was an inbuilt structural advantage in the electoral system, giving Fidesz an advantage of about five points. But, at the same time, it was clear that if Tisza won strongly, there was no element of the system that could prevent Orbán from losing. There was no level playing field, the electoral system favoured Orbán, but not even these advantages could save him if the difference was big enough.

What would you say are the most important factors behind Tisza's success?

— They have focused the campaign on the aspects that concern Hungarians the most: the lack of economic growth and the terrible state of public services. Also the corruption of the Fidesz regime, which has been a key issue for many years, but in this campaign it has really gained strength. Furthermore, Tisza has managed to mobilize young people, who were the most passive voters in Hungarian society. On Sunday, they went to vote en masse and undoubtedly contributed to the record turnout in Hungary, of 80%. I would also highlight that Fidesz's strategy, which was based on recreating the psychosis that Hungary would be dragged into war and which worked for them four years ago, has spectacularly failed in this case.

Péter Magyar has also made an effort to be very visible throughout the country.

— The campaign strategy of reaching out to rural Hungary and going to places where opposition politicians had rarely campaigned before has been absolutely vital. The last week of the campaign illustrates this very well: Viktor Orbán only campaigned in four places, only in big cities, while Péter Magyar held 29 rallies.

How has Tisza been financed? Has it received external funding?

— They do not accept external financing and, furthermore, it is prohibited. What they argue is that the majority of the budget they have for campaigns comes from small donations from sympathizers. Even so, it should be noted that Fidesz's campaign surpassed Tisza's by a proportion of 100 to 1, or even more.

There are people, I think mainly outside of Hungary, who see Magyar as a new version of Orbán, saying there isn't much difference between one project and the other. Do you agree?

— Hungarian is a product of a conservative environment. But it has also evolved a lot over the last two years, especially from the experiences it has had in rural Hungary, during which it has come to know the main problems and concerns of Hungarians much better. And its program, in fact, mixes culturally conservative elements with center-left economic and social elements. For example, there is a great emphasis on better funding for public services. And it even promotes the introduction of a wealth tax for the rich and tax reductions for the poorest segments of society.

One of Magyar's main promises has been to dismantle Orbán's corrupt and clientelist system. Does he believe he can do it?

— This is one of its main objectives, and it will undoubtedly try to do so. One of its main promises is to establish an authority for the recovery of national assets. A new authority with the purpose of recovering funds that have either been privatized or have been given to foundations linked to Fidesz and which each year receive billions in dividends from state-owned companies. Now that it has a two-thirds majority, it can introduce laws to reverse this.

There are certain doubts about what Magyar's foreign policy will be like. Some warn that he may have too lukewarm a stance with Russia, for example.

— Compared to how Orbán's regime has behaved, it will be a big change. Russia is close, geographically speaking. What I expect from Péter Magyar is a pragmatic relationship with Russia, but he will not act as a puppet of Russia.

How do you foresee EU relations? Magyar has made it very clear that what he wants is to defend national interests.

— Undoubtedly, it will be much more constructive. But it is true that there are limits to its openness to certain conventional European policies. I foresee, for example, a continuation of Orbán's strict immigration policies. This is what the majority of Hungarian society wants, so politically the room for maneuver is not very large.

And regarding Ukraine?

— Orbán's government has transformed Hungarian public opinion against Ukraine. The vast majority are against Ukraine's membership in the EU and against giving it financial support. Therefore, I don't see Magyar contributing financially to a loan scheme for Ukraine [the EU has a blocked loan of 90 billion euros], but I do expect him to allow the rest of the countries to help Kyiv if they want to. That would already be a big change in position, because Orbán is blocking the others. In general terms, I believe he will have debates with European leaders on issues where Hungarian national interests are particularly strong. But he will not have a strategy of vetoing for the sake of vetoing, as Orbán has done.

Orbán was, in his early days, a politician very critical of Russia. At what point did he change and why?

— We know when it happened, but no one knows exactly what happened. What we do know is that 2009 was a turning point, when Orbán met with Putin in St. Petersburg. Until then, Orbán had been characterized by anti-Russian policies and statements. And since that meeting, he has never spoken negatively of Russia again. Since then, the million-dollar question has been what happened, but there are only speculations and rumors. But when Orbán came to power in 2010, from then on, the so-called Eastern Opening strategy became his official foreign policy strategy. And it also included the close link with Russia.

Do you think that in the next elections it will be possible to return to a more normal political scenario, recovering the left-right ideological axis?

— The Hungarian institutional left is dead after these elections. I don't see it being easy to give new life to the Hungarian left, it will require several years. But the room for manoeuvre of the progressive side depends on how Tisza governs. Will they fulfill their promises to invest more in public services? Will they address the cost of living crisis? Will they address the housing crisis in Hungary? If they can fulfill the more social promises, I think the room for manoeuvre for any possible progressive party is limited.

Do you think Orbán's defeat will have an effect on the global far-right populist movement?

— Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party have been global symbols of this far-right patriotic nationalist movement, and it has not only influenced through ideology, but has also become influential through how it provided infrastructure to the global patriotic movement. And the best example of this is that Fidesz-related banks helped finance Vox's campaign in Spain. And this is something that may be lacking in the future.