Camp Nou: chronicle of announced overruns

BarcelonaThat summer of 2010 when Sandro Rosell said that the Camp Nou needed "paint and plaster" seems very far away. During the electoral campaign, he rejected the Foster project and considered it an excessive investment. But a few days after winning the elections, a small group of stadium workers took him aside, him and vice-president Josep Maria Bartomeu, to show them the deficiencies of a coliseum that was already more than half a century old. They were convinced that an integral reform was necessary. That visit was the embryo of Espai Barça, which four years later resulted in a project approved by the members in a referendum. But in 2014 it had a budget of 600 million euros. Today, with the works underway, the credit of 1.5 billion has already been exhausted and another one of between 350 and 450 million will be needed to finish the stadium completely.

The history of this renovation is linked to cost overruns from the very beginning. The winning project for Camp Nou was presented in 2016, but while then-president Bartomeu, coach Luis Enrique, and captain Andrés Iniesta toasted with cava, William T. Mannarelli shook his head. The American architect, then responsible for Espai Barça, knew that the 600 million was insufficient to pay for everything – stadium, new Miniestadi, and new Palau – so he began to make a series of discreet cuts to reduce the execution cost. It was impossible. Only what was later named the Johan Cruyff stadium cost 19 million when the initial budget was only four.

After many tweaks and very tough negotiations with Barcelona City Council, in 2020 Bartomeu's board agreed on financing with Goldman Sachs for 815 million. It had to be approved by referendum, but everything went up in smoke due to the pandemic and the subsequent mass resignation of the board. With Joan Laporta already in charge, some internal reports emerged that showed that that money would have been completely insufficient, among other things because there were items, such as all the electrical equipment – lighting or scoreboards – that amounted to 100 million, which were not contemplated. As explained by ARA, from sources of the outgoing board, they calculated that the final cost would have reached 1,200 million.

Laporta's Copernican turn with the Camp Nou project

To the surprise of many, Laporta's board made a Copernican turn in the Camp Nou project, maintaining the essence of the winning model from the Catalan firm Pascual i Ausió, but making substantial changes to the renovation: the most notable, demolishing the third tier that had been built in 1982 and creating a new one that would include a double ring of VIP boxes. With these changes, the total cost of Espai Barça was to be 1.5 billion, of which 990 corresponded to the Camp Nou. The renovation was commissioned to Limak, who unexpectedly won the tender because they guaranteed to meet the budget and do so in record time: the first phase was to be completed in eighteen months. Over the years, it has been proven that neither has happened.

Limak also committed to paying one million in compensation for each day of delay in the delivery of the keys, but Barça has already admitted that it will not be able to collect it because nothing that has happened is attributable to the Turkish construction company, starting with the serious deficiencies in the old Camp Nou: there were five times more than expected. This alone already caused a delay, in addition to an overcost that the club has had to assume.

The current Espai Barça working team excuses itself with situations like this to explain how it is that, with the work already underway, the final price has skyrocketed. Another major battle, the constant tug-of-war with the firefighters to adapt the 1957 stadium to current regulations, which led to having to redo plans and modify already built corridors because they did not comply with what was required. Or the post-contracting of two teams of interior designers to redesign the premium areas of the stadium, which have also led to a delay.

It is obvious to think that, combining the renovation with football, the works also drag on: salaries will have to be paid for longer and this will mean an additional cost. Or that with the years the material gets more expensive. But in this reform also there are strange situations, like finding an underground high-voltage line that wasn't on any plans. Some are unpredictable, like the steel supplier going bankrupt and requiring a new one to be found. And others are the result of poor planning, like when the visiting locker rooms were assembled without waterproofing the stands, and due to rain, they were damaged twice.

Limak's preventive task to contain the price has not been enough

Limak, aware that it would be difficult to balance the numbers, already carried out a preventive task to reduce the cost of materials as much as possible, which led to numerous conflicts with companies. Also, as ARA has already explained, it has been agreed that some non-essential things will be left for later. But everything has a limit. Deep down, what has happened in the Camp Nou renovation is not strange compared to most public works, which end late and cost more than initially stated. The difference is that Barça is a private club and these budget deviations, which condemn it to refinance the works, put its viability at risk.