The technician who validated the DANA alert states that it had been discussed for an hour and a half beforehand.

ValenciaThe emergency technician who validated the Es-Alert message sent on October 29th confirmed this Thursday before the judge investigating the consequences of the DANA storm in the Valencian Community that he received the first communication regarding the alert's dissemination at 6:36 p.m. At that time, the Poio ravine was beginning to overflow in the l'Horta Sud region, and towns further inland, such as Chiva, Requena, and Utiel, had already been flooded. The employee, Miguel M., appeared in his capacity as head of the technological service for the 112 emergency telephone number and of the communications section of the Valencian Agency for Security and Emergency Response. According to sources present at the deposition, the technician stated that he received a call at 6:36 p.m. from the Deputy Director General of Emergencies, Jorge Suárez, who explained that they were considering issuing an alert regarding the situation at the Forata reservoir—which regulates the Barata River and is responsible for most of the deaths. Twenty minutes later, at 6:57 p.m., the head of the 112 analysis unit, Juan Ramón Cuevas, confirmed that they had decided to send the alert, but the decision was ultimately postponed at 7:08 p.m. The reason for this change was that, starting at 7:00 p.m., the Cecopio's attention began to focus on the situation in the Poio ravine. It was then decided that the alert should be sent to all towns in the province of Valencia, not just those municipalities affected by a potential breach of the Forata reservoir. This has been confirmed by several witnesses present at the emergency committee meeting, including the Spanish government delegate, Pilar Bernabé. In her statement a few weeks ago, the Socialist leader explained that at 7:00 p.m. she notified the then-regional minister, Salomé Pradas, that flooding was already occurring in l'Horta Sud, and that the PP leader replied that she was already aware of the situation. However, the alert did not reach the public until 8:11 p.m.

The last key element of the technician's statement—who worked remotely on the day of the disaster—was the confirmation that a fault, possibly due to weather conditions, disabled 30 of the 120 lines of the 112 emergency telephone service. However, the Generalitat (Catalan government) received nearly [number missing] calls at the start of the emergency committee meeting and well before sending the alert. The volume would have been much higher if it included all the phone calls from citizens who were unable to get through due to the lines being overloaded.

Miguel M.'s statement adds to that of Rodrigo E., the second Emergency Services technician involved in drafting the message, who gave it on May 6. During his testimony, which ARA accessed, the worker acknowledged that he did not forward the email sent by the Júcar River Basin Authority (CHX) at 6:43 p.m., alerting them to the overflowing of the Poio ravine, to any senior official. It was simply "noted" into the computer system without any communication. According to the transcript of his testimony, the technician did not inform his superiors because he lacked knowledge of the hydraulic capacity of rivers and ravines. Therefore, he was not qualified to assess the severity of the figures presented in the CHX email. He also noted that there is no protocol for interrupting the operation of the Emergency Coordination Center (Cecopio). For all these reasons, he simply registered the alert and moved on to the next task. "We had a very high volume" of work, he added.

Rodrigo E. also confirmed that approximately one hour elapsed between the decision to send the message to the entire province and the dissemination of the alert. Initially, an alert was drafted warning of the possible collapse of the Forata dam, but later, "Salomé Pradas and Jorge Suárez said to discard the Forata draft and send a message to the entire province." Regarding when he learned of the first deaths, Rodrigo E. explained that he doesn't remember, but that around midnight he received orders to call the director of the Institute of Legal Medicine to activate the mass casualty protocol. The final death toll reached 228.