The DANA judge sees "overwhelming evidence" of negligence by Pradas

ValenciaA new and forceful ruling has been issued by the judge investigating the handling of the DANA storm, who considers that the case now contains "overwhelming evidence of negligent conduct" on the part of the former Valencian Minister of Justice and the Interior, Salomé Pradas. This is stated in a ruling made public this Friday, in which she rejects the dismissal of the proceedings requested by the former PP leader, who had argued that the recent testimony of the president of the Júcar River Basin Authority, Miguel Polo, demonstrated that the Valencian government did not have sufficient information to alert the public.

Judge Nuria Ruiz Tobarra justifies her refusal by considering Pradas responsible for "gross negligence," not only for the extremely serious fatal outcome, but also for the sluggishness in adopting measures and their flawed nature. The judge highlights "the convening of the Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center) with a clear delay," the lack of "control of the ravines," and the "unbearable delay in alerting the population." In her written statement, the judge dismantles, one by one, the exculpatory arguments put forward so far by the former councilor. First, she points out that the state's authority in managing the emergency has proven "absolutely uncertain." According to the judge, the "non-existent" Information blackout from the Júcar River Basin Authority (CHX) and the Spanish Meteorological Agency (Aemet) repeatedly denounced by the PP, which the Provincial Court of Valencia also dismissed. In this regard, she recalls that the Aemet warnings "were issued in various areas and with sufficient advance notice."

To complete her explanation, the judge dedicates a large part of her ruling to listing the tools available to the Generalitat to understand the danger of the situation and, consequently, its obligation to warn the public. Thus, she emphasizes that, according to the Special Flood Plan for the Valencian Community, the Emergency Department was responsible for coordinating the participation of other agencies. These included the Civil Guard, the forest fire service and the Generalitat police, environmental agents, resources from the Preventive Surveillance Service, brigades from the Provincial Council of Valencia, and the integrated water cycle services and irrigation communities that inform the municipalities. In this same vein, he emphasizes that it was the responsibility of the Generalitat (Valencian regional government) to "contact the various affected towns, to heed the information provided by the media, and to analyze the thousands of calls to the 112 emergency number." "The forest firefighters were deployed and then withdrawn. It is difficult to attribute the withdrawal of the firefighters, the failure to control the overflow [of the Poio ravine], and the resulting overwhelming number of deaths to the CHX (Aragon Hydrographic Confederation) or its president," Ruiz Tobarra argues.

A senior official proposed sending the ES-Alert three hours earlier

Alongside the judge's written statement, it also emerged this Friday that a video of the October 29th emergency committee meeting, recorded by a production company contracted by the Generalitat (Valencian regional government), reveals that at the start of the Cecopio (the regional emergency coordination center) – at 5:00 PM – the Deputy Director General of Emergencies, Jorge Suárez, raised the possibility of a lockdown, given the critical situation at that time in towns like Utiel and Requena, affected by the overflowing of the Magro River. This testimony would confirm that the regional government was aware of the danger of the situation well before the public alert was issued – which was broadcast at 8:11 PM. This was also suggested by other previous revelations, especially the fact that between 5:00 PM and 6:00 PM alone, the 112 emergency line received 2,438 calls from citizens experiencing problems or who were in danger. Initially, all attention was focused on the potential breach of the Forata reservoir, which regulates the Magro River. The first thought was to confine the population. Then, during the evacuation. At 5:45 p.m., the decision was made to send the ES-Alert, but the Generalitat (Catalan government) was unsure what message to broadcast. The concern over the reservoir led to the overlooking of the Poio ravine and the dry riverbeds that flow into it, which were already...They were overflowing from 6 pm onwards. In L'Horta Sud, overwhelmed by a large workload, the technicians failed to notify their superiors, who were meeting in an adjacent room. At the Cecopio (Emergency Coordination Center), senior officials were unaware of the situation until after 7 p.m. when the first images and phone calls from mayors began arriving. This forced the postponement of sending the alert—which was still being debated by the Emergency Services—because its radius needed to be expanded. Later came the selection of the text, the implementation of the procedure, and so on.

The last significant testimony today was the statement of a forestry technician from the Provincial Fire Consortium of Valencia who was at the Cecopio and explained that Salomé Pradas was leading the emergency committee meeting and that the head of the Council, Carlos Mazón, was not summoned until he arrived at the committee. He also said that from that moment on, he had the "feeling" that Mazón was taking charge.