Not only is Pedro Sánchez a prisoner of Morocco

MadridPedro Sánchez stood alone this week in Congress defending Morocco, although for the first time he introduced nuances into his speech. Previously, the Moncloa's position was argumentatively unsustainable, since if Morocco is characterized by anything, it is by having its territory under control (can one really argue that they did not notice that thousands of people were heading to the border?). Furthermore, it is not the first time that Morocco has used migrants to challenge Spain (let us remember, recently, Ceuta in 2021).

However, Sánchez's margin regarding the Alawite regime is very narrow. He is tied hand and foot before the neighboring country (and I am not referring to Pegasus), both from a conjunctural and a structural point of view. But not only him: the PP would also be in this position if it were in government (no matter how tough a discourse it makes) and so is the European Union. Whether or not Morocco was the arsonist in this crisis, it is the firefighter that the Spanish government needs to achieve its goals in Ceuta. Its will is the return of the people who crossed irregularly (according to Moncloa, the majority would be economic immigrants without the right to asylum), among whom are more than 1,500 minors. For this objective to be achieved, it is necessary that Morocco facilitates the return of those who turn back voluntarily and that it cooperates in the family reunification of the minors (otherwise it will be the State or regional administration that will have to take charge). That is to say, the fear that the Spanish government may have is not only that the Alawite regime may once again allow a massive entry of migrants, but that the lack of collaboration perpetuates the already unsustainable situation in Ceuta.

Essential collaboration

But there are also structural reasons. Morocco collaborates with Spain to contain migration (that is to say, the State externalizes border control to it to reduce migratory flows, even though the Alawite regime uses repression to do so), but at the same time, experts in the field highlight above all the cooperation in the containment of jihadist terrorism and drug trafficking. Two key elements for Spanish and European security. For this reason, angering Morocco can be costly for Spain and also for the community institutions, which have preferred to leave Pedro Sánchez alone, referring to Ceuta as an internal affair. Perhaps it is also a revenge, by the way, for the regularization of irregular immigrants that Spain has carried out, which was not desired by Brussels.

Europe remains silent because the Alawite regime is an essential ally for the deployment of the new Migration and Asylum Pact. Taking Ceuta into account, then, it is possible to ask oneself whether this policy of externalizing borders is the most appropriate for approaching the security objective that community institutions preach, or if it rather leads to a strategic vulnerability (one more) for an increasingly weak Europe. Especially because it strengthens non-democratic regimes that can use this empowerment that the EU grants them against European interests. And, if not, let them ask Pedro Sánchez about it.

The details of the week