President Trump uses political confrontation not only as a tool for negotiating strategy.
This is accompanied by a threatening stance, often intellectually insubstantial—due to fundamental errors in his approach. Trump is blunt, but not solid in his proposals. Threatening Pedro Sánchez with tariffs if he doesn't accept the 5% defense spending, ignoring the fact that these tariffs are being discussed between the EU and the US, not between the US and Spain... For Trump, making a fool of himself is not a problem: he creates a new reality and immediately forgets the pass. If he needs to lie to prove his point, there's no problem. For example, no one knows if the Iranian nuclear program has been destroyed or moderately affected (there seem to be classified military reports that cast doubt on the effectiveness of the US and Israeli bombing), but it doesn't matter; he claims the problem has disappeared, and for those who believe him, that's enough. It's not about knowing the truth, but about stating what suits him and reaching a conclusion that it doesn't matter whether it's true or false. "It's true because I say so, and whoever doesn't believe me has my contempt and enmity."
There are two possible ways to manage this reality. The Rutte mode: flatter him by telling him that he is the greatest statesman you have ever seen and get him to do what you ask of him. transactional mode: "I'll give you this if you give me that"... and also flatter him by saying that "you earn more than me" (not using it as a reason, but as a complement).
How do one system and the other translate in the case of Ukraine?
He Rutte system To flatter without any compensation carries the risk that the flattery will not be appreciated by Trump (it has not cost him much to get it, it is easy to forget and he considers it one more success in his rosary ofpolitical achievements). Trump wants to satisfy Putin, for whom he feels a special veneration because he is what he would like to be but is not: the savior of the homeland. The principle that guides both leaders, bridging the cultural gaps between the US and Russia, is the same: in one case, they want to achieve political and military empire, and in the other, commercial and military empire.
He transactional system It leads to a concrete milestone: not forgetting Ukraine. Do you want us to increase the percentage of military spending within NATO? Okay, but today the danger is Russia, and therefore this must serve to stop Russia and protect Eastern Europe, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, etc. It's logical. It could even be proposed that the military equipment supplied to Ukraine be of American origin, financed by the alliance's member states. The European defense industry has insufficient production capacity for the needs of war. Even for a mind as far removed from rationality as President Trump's, this could be understood.
The obvious conclusion is that it is better to transactional system.
Let's move on to another topic: there is a current of opinion in favor of bringing the EU closer to Russia. All economic and political factors are in its favor. Russia and Europe are complementary, based on a common culture: Christianity. Russia is a major producer of raw materials that the EU lacks and needs: oil, gas, metals, agricultural products. Russia has 17.1 million km² and 140 million inhabitants; the EU, 4.2 million km² and 448 million people. Russia has obsolete and poorly digitalized technology; the EU, advanced technology. Russia is a society of oligarchs without a middle class; the EU is based on social democracy. The EU is a consolidated democracy, despite exceptions—Hungary—and its values are linked to democracy. Russia is a solid, police-based autarchy, where dissent is not tolerated—the army and military values are the backbone of the state.
The difference (and complementarity) is evident, but it's impossible for the two powers to come closer in the short term. Russia wants to regain its empire and persecute its dissidents. We find ourselves facing the same strategic duality as with President Trump. We can be complacent with Russia, accept that part of Ukraine becomes part of Russia and the loss of democracy in Ukraine, despite the will of the Ukrainian people, who have been waging war for four years over this issue. Will this lead to a precarious peace or a stable and lasting peace? Precarious. There is only one possible path: support Ukraine in the war with Russia and achieve a stable peace that allows it to join the EU. To achieve this, Ukraine must not lose; in other words, the confrontation must continue.
The conclusion is stark: to achieve peace, war must be waged, because a loss against certain political and military powers will lead to more war. The 1938 Munich Pact represented a concession by democracies to achieve peace and led to a more devastating war. Who did more for freedom, Lord Halifax, who advocated "appeasement," or Churchill, who argued that Hitler should be confronted? Today, the answer is obvious; then, not so much. The same is true of Ukraine.
Dreaming is free and even enjoyable, but it always leads to futility. Do we want to advance peace or say beautiful words and make a good impression?
