The intense immigration process that Spain has been experiencing since the beginning of the 21st century is defining three clearly differentiated territorial realities:
—Madrid, with a very clear specificity, as in so many other cases.
—High immigration Spain, defined as the rest of the autonomous communities where the population is growing faster than the Spanish average: Catalonia, the Valencian Community, the Balearic Islands, Murcia and the Canary Islands.
—Spain with low immigration, where the population is growing more slowly than the Spanish average, to the point of not growing (Galicia and Extremadura) or even decreasing (Asturias).
In the year 2000, the level of GDP per capita – the simplest and clearest measure of material prosperity – had no relation to the division we have just defined, since both in the second and third groups there coexisted rich territories (Catalonia and the Balearic Islands on one side, the Basque Country and Navarre on the other, Castile and León on the other).
However, since 2000, a close relationship has emerged between demographic trends and GDP per capita growth. The process is clear: in Spain with low immigration, GDP per capita is growing faster than the average, while in Spain with high immigration, it is growing slower; that is, it is losing ground. This means that, for example, Aragon, which in 2000 lagged far behind Catalonia and the Balearic Islands, is now on the verge of overtaking them, and that the Basque Country, which in 2000 was at the same level as Catalonia, is now 9 points ahead. As for the Valencian Community, 25 years ago it clearly outperformed Asturias, Galicia, and Castile and León, but now it falls behind. Gradually, the Mediterranean coast, which was once synonymous with prosperity within Spain, is losing that association. Only in the case of Madrid do high immigration and high GDP per capita growth coincide.
The new reality that is being defined is this: an enriched Spain with low immigration, an impoverished Spain with high immigration, and Madrid.
If we look at the provincial level, the correlation remains, so the four Catalan provinces, the three Valencian provinces, and the two Canary Island provinces, along with Murcia and the Balearic Islands, make up the group characterized by high immigration and low GDP per capita growth. Only two provinces in Castilla-La Mancha join this group, undoubtedly due to high immigration reflecting their proximity to Madrid: Guadalajara and Toledo, whose capital cities are now, thanks to the AVE high-speed train, satellite cities of the capital.
This reality contrasts with what we observe at the European level, where the relationship between immigration and prosperity is not observed: the 22% growth of Spanish GDP per capita coincides with that of Portugal, Germany or Finland, countries that have experienced very moderate demographic growth, and is lower than that of the Netherlands or Belgium, countries with an immigration process.
Every situation presents its own specific problems, but there is no doubt that the combination of high immigration and low productivity is especially worrying. On the one hand, demographic pressure puts a strain on the housing market, driving up prices and impoverishing the working and middle classes in an environment where the economy is not offering rising wages. On the other hand, demographic pressure puts a strain on social services—education, healthcare, and long-term care—without generating tax revenue at the same rate.
This reality justifies the growing dissonance between the perception of the population – increasingly inclined to think that immigration should be limited – and the messages of so many economists and opinion leaders, who maintain that immigration makes a net contribution to public finances and that it is thanks to immigration that the pension system can be sustained.
On Thursday, data was published that clearly demonstrates the unfounded nature of the view held by those who equate immigration with a clean source of tax revenue. The Living Conditions Survey, published by the Statistical Institute of Catalonia, revealed that while 17.2% of Catalans with Spanish nationality are poor (defined using the AROPE rate, which encompasses several indicators), this proportion rises to 48.6% among those with foreign nationality. Given that the Spanish welfare state is based on the poorest 60% of households being net recipients of public resources, the next 20% having a balanced income, and only 20% of households making a net contribution, it is clear that the immigration we receive cannot help finance public services; rather, everyone must contribute.
