Germany has also joined the Europe of fragile coalitions. Friedrich Merz has arrived wounded at the chancellery. The Christian Democrat, perennial contender to succeed Angela Merkel, wanted to make his rise to power a show of force for Germany's return to European leadership, but instead he lands as the most obvious symbol of the weakness of the coalition he leads, between the CDU-CSU and a declining social democracy. With a fragmented Bundestag and the far-right Alternative for Germany becoming the leading opposition force, Merz launched an unprecedented parliamentary revolt that points to an unpredictable Germany. The EU's leading power, in the midst of an existential crisis and with urgent political, economic, and security issues pending, sees how the logic of consensus that until now had made Germany one of the pillars of European stability has also been called into question.
German exceptionalism is now earthly. It has long ceased to be the hegemonic power in an EU with a strengthened and influential far-right. It is divided over the advisability and ability of renouncing understanding with Washington, and internal tensions are growing over Ukraine and Israel, as well as over the accelerated construction of a European defense. Merz's Germany is beginning to resemble Macron's France, where a far-right party, Marine Le Pen's National Rally, has become the country's leading political force and Parliament is divided into three antagonistic blocs made up of rival factions. The Franco-German axis represents the heart of the European Union of the past, under the weight of the political reality of the new majorities that are transforming an EU that is not only redefining policies and alliances, but even its very identity as a supranational power.
In this context, Merz's promises of European leadership go hand in hand with a migratory retreat. The first consequence of this new political arithmetic and the debates surrounding an election dominated by the immigration issue has been the order to immediately expel immigrants at the border, with exceptions for children, pregnant women, and other vulnerable groups, and to strengthen police controls at entry points. The measure was announced precisely in the midst of the chancellor's visit to Paris and Warsaw to reactivate the so-called Weimar Triangle Alliance. In a joint press conference, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned, "without wanting to spoil the good atmosphere," that he was not prepared to pretend "that everything is fine" in the face of a border tightening measure that could again provoke tensions between Germany and its neighbors.
This episode foreshadows a complicated mandate for Merz, who will have to balance his rhetoric of "more Europe" with the policies of retreat that attempt to occupy the political terrain of the far right. We will soon see the limits of the promises of leadership made by a victorious Merz, now that he is aware of his internal political fragility in Germany.
When it comes down to it, in this European Union, Merz's strength and capacity for influence may depend much more on the practically absolute power (with some exceptions, such as the presidency of the Council, held by the Portuguese socialist António Costa) that the European People's Party currently holds in the community institutions.
On the night of his election victory, February 23rd, Merz asserted that his "absolute priority" would be to "strengthen Europe as quickly as possible." But beyond words, Merz's agenda seems destined to reactivate, above all, the Union that Germany needs to relaunch its battered economy and competitiveness. Today, it is Berlin that is renouncing the defense of fiscal orthodoxy and calling for a review of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, reformed less than a year ago. The paradox is that Germany, Finland, and Denmark have now decided that debt and deficit are less urgent than putting European defense in order, while France, Italy, and Spain find themselves in the same camp as the Netherlands, acting as neofrugal and resisting debt. In this unpredictable Germany, Merz managed, even before coming to power, to have the outgoing Parliament approve a constitutional reform designed to unlock the capacity for public borrowing to rearm the country.
But, beyond Merz's geopolitical alignment with Macron in Ukraine and the shared discourse of geostrategic ambition for Europe, the new chancellor's vision for the EU remains to be seen. Merz's will not be a German Europe, as it was with Merkel during the years of financial collapse, but the new chancellor seeks and needs a Europe that serves a Germany in crisis.
