A high-voltage electricity pylon on the border between Portugal (Lindoso) and Spain (Cartel), on April 28.
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At the time of writing, the hypothesis that the power outage on the Iberian Peninsula was caused by a cyberattack does not seem the most plausible. Red Eléctrica has ruled him outFor reasons of state security, the public may never fully understand the causes of the disaster, even if those responsible eventually unravel them. This isn't a question of giving potential attackers ideas. However, what we've experienced could be useful as a simulation of what could happen in the event of a cyberattack or, worse still, a military attack, such as a bombing of energy infrastructure.

Some lessons we can draw are the following. It would be advisable for companies, administrations, and especially individuals to become more self-sufficient in terms of both energy and survival without electricity. Perhaps in the short term, self-sufficient bunkers for everyone, like those in Switzerland or Sweden, cannot be built, but the usefulness of the kits Personal survival kits that have been recommended to governments for a war scenario. Another good idea is to invest more in generators and solar installations with batteries. Likewise, priority should be given to devices that do not depend exclusively on electricity, but can also be activated mechanically; for example, shop and parking lot doors should be able to be lowered manually, as was the case years ago. Similarly, plug-in hybrid vehicles are more resilient than those that run solely on electricity or fossil fuels.

Regarding the design of the electricity grid, greater compartmentalization into more autonomous regional subsystems would surely provide greater resilience. Just as the islands were able to maintain their electricity supply thanks to having an autonomous generation subsystem, or Andorra was able to disconnect from Spain and connect to France, compartmentalization would have made it possible to isolate the area of the Peninsula where the initial problem occurred, allowing the remaining areas to maintain normal service or at least recover service more quickly.

More generally, the security of critical infrastructure, not only physical but also cybersecurity, is a key aspect, especially in these times. This blackout may have been accidental, but the next catastrophe could be intentional. This is especially true for the healthcare system, transportation, financial services, telecommunications, emergency services, food supply, and government services. The lack of skilled labor to secure infrastructure and the need to harmonize cybersecurity regulations internationally. ransomware against health services (Hospital Clínic, for example), as well as denial of service attacks against several administrations.

Once the power supply is restored, the most important thing is to continue as if nothing had happened. If what happened on a very ordinary spring day happened, imagine what might have happened in the event of a natural disaster (a heat wave or cold wave, an earthquake, or a storm) or, even more seriously, a cyberattack or even a bombing. What would be the point of a superbly equipped army if the country it is meant to defend loses power? In this regard, we must learn from Ukraine's experience in maintaining energy supplies under adverse conditions, following Zelensky's offer. Investing in defense is not just about buying weapons, but ensuring that critical infrastructure is resilient and that citizens are self-sufficient and less dependent on centralized supplies.

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