Latin America: a wave of far-right and Trumpist, very heterogeneous forces

The terrible earthquake in Colombia comes just as Abelardo de la Espriella, an ally of Trump and many far-right governments in the region, was taking office in Colombia. While awaiting to see how the new leader and his team manage the catastrophe, we will, with all solidarity, focus solely on political analysis. And, I believe, it is advisable not to overstate the easy headline about a regional right-wing and Trumpist wave. Political and electoral phenomena in Latin America, as everywhere, reflect change and continuity. In 2026 we will witness five presidential and two local elections, which are added to various presidential and legislative elections during 2025. I will present a triple thesis on the region: 1) there are four crucial features to consider; 2) there is no right-wing wave that can be analyzed homogeneously in the region; 3) the Trump factor exists, but has uncertain final results.Let's consider the four key features. First, the persistence of the protest vote against incumbents, which coexists with the ratification of certain leaderships: in Honduras, where 80% voted for opposition candidates; in Chile, where Kast won by almost 20 points, but also with support for governments in Mexico, El Salvador, and Argentina. Second, the loss of relevance and institutional power of centrist parties (excepting the case of Bolivia, where a center-right candidate won): votes have gone towards the extreme right or left, which has increased fragmentation and polarization. Third, a Trump factor is observed, due to the emergence of Trumpist candidates (Honduras, Chile, or Colombia) or their weight in elections such as the Argentine ones, with the support of the loan from Washington, or their relevance in the final stretch of the campaign in Honduras. The fourth feature is the regional relevance of the increase in the cost of living, low economic growth, and insecurity, causal factors that explain many results.

As I said, this right-wing and Trumpist wave cannot be analyzed homogeneously. Undoubtedly, officialisms have lost ground, especially those on the left, probably for similar reasons to those mentioned before, not to mention the fragmentation and the usual Cainite struggles of the left. But we find differences: Laura Fernández in Costa Rica has promised continuity; or, in Peru, Keiko Fujimori has decades of presence in the establishment, something very different from De la Espriella's "miracle homeland" and "never" mandate. Certainly, with the exception of Bukele in El Salvador, most ultraconservative governments share the difficulty of governing without clear majorities in their Parliaments, which will force them to seek alliances of variable geometries. They also share the strong role of religion in its most conservative version, as this wave of extreme right-wing Latin America has not opted as much for ethno-nationalism as for authoritarianism and religious conservatism, as shown by the fact that, except in Chile, migration has been less important in campaigns than issues such as criticism of ideology, gender equality, diversity, environmentalism, or abortion. The candidates have had strong support from conservative foundations and from Trump, but they will have costs in central points of the foreign policy of many countries, such as alliances with China, Israel, and even Morocco. Therefore, the context of emergence and some causes of the wave may be shared, but the results in the coming years will differ greatly.Two final considerations on the Trump factor. First, Trump is remaking Latin America and boasts about it, as at the G-7 in June: when journalists asked him to assess the negotiations with Iran, he insisted on the importance of Maduro's capture in 48 minutes in January of this year and how this was changing the relationship with Venezuela. The Trump administration has dedicated more attention and material resources to the region than any other American administration in the last four decades, including the reference to the 2025 national security strategy in the Monroe doctrine.In the short term, it seems to give him results: victories for his candidates and the creation of a group of like-minded countries that even cheer his coercion of Cuba. But there are doubts about what could happen in the long term, due to the uncertainty of what could happen with Cuba and with Sheinbaum's Mexico, and due to social struggles in the countries where his candidates have won. And, as we said at the beginning, due to how situations like the earthquake in Colombia are handled. Everything is uncertain. With Trump, and with the regional far-right, nothing is set in stone: one and the other tend to justify themselves by saying, as in the song, “the fault was the cha-cha-cha”.