It's not macroeconomics, stupid!
For years, the explanation for almost everything in economics was the cycle. We were doing badly because the cycle was bad. We were doing well because the cycle was helping. 2025 has served to dismantle that excuse. The Spanish economy is no longer trapped in a temporary downturn. On the contrary. It is growing above the European average, has managed to reduce inflation without destroying jobs, and has normalized the financial environment without major disruptions. And yet, the public perception is one of stagnation, not to mention hardship and hardship.
It is a symptom of a change in the problem.
The main source of friction is structural: housing. This isn't a problem that arose in a single year or under a single administration. It's a bottleneck that has accumulated over decades. A lack of supply, bureaucratic delays, regulatory uncertainty, and growing demand have transformed access to housing into a vital obstacle. It doesn't matter if GDP grows or inflation falls: if people can't afford a roof over their heads, economic progress ceases to be felt.
On the other hand, the labor market presents a similar paradox. Jobs are being created, but the quality of those jobs doesn't always allow for stable life plans. This duality persists because fixed-term contracts are essentially disguised temporary work, and low productivity and limited mobility remain. There's a lot of low-quality employment, and it's poorly paid. It's not a problem of job destruction, but rather the type of jobs being created and their potential for growth.
The same pattern is repeated in the fiscal sphere. The deficit has been reduced and the debt has stabilized, but the room for maneuver is limited. The state has gained ground as a buffer against crises, but it has not resolved how to sustainably finance future needs: aging, healthcare, pensions, housing, and the energy transition. The debate remains focused on stopgap measures, not on a comprehensive solution.
All of this explains why macroeconomic data is improving while discontent persists. Because the problem is no longer the cycle. It's the structure. It's no longer about waiting for the storm to pass, but about reinforcing the foundations.
The year 2025 perfectly illustrates that a macroeconomy can produce positive figures and yet still fail to offer clear prospects for progress to a significant portion of the population. When this happens, insisting that "the data is good" solves nothing. On the contrary, it exacerbates the disconnect.
Spain has shown it knows how to manage crises. Now it must show it knows how to build a future. And that no longer depends on the economic cycle, but on structural decisions that have been postponed for far too long.
I doubt we know how to do it. We're great improvisers but terrible planners. Politics survives in the short term, and economics in the long term. And that's a serious problem.