The Iberian Peninsula as seen from the International Space Station
05/12/2025
Catedràtic d'Història i Institucions Econòmiques del Departament d'Economia i Empresa de la Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Director d'ESCI-UPF
3 min

Round numbers, like birthdays, captivate us with their certainty. The 50th anniversary of the dictator's death—Franco—holds a mirror up to us, reflecting both successes and failures. The mirror that generates the most unanimity among economists is GDP per capita, seen as a measure of prosperity. We have reliable data to compare the GDP per capita of each of Spain's current autonomous communities in 1975 (they didn't yet exist, but their boundaries were statistically well-defined) and today (2024). In 1975, Catalonia's GDP per capita was 28% above the national average. This was the lowest figure achieved in the entire previous century. The decline was particularly rapid between 1920 and 1930 and between 1960 and 1975. In both cases, in addition to the similar political regime—military dictatorship—there was a very strong wave of immigration. In fact, these were the two largest waves of immigration of the entire 20th century.

In 2024, Catalonia had lost thirteen percentage points compared to 1975. It is now 15% above the average. Madrid has improved by three points. We are making progress in converging towards the average. Who has improved the most in these last forty-nine years? First, Extremadura. Despite remaining the second poorest, it improved by nineteen percentage points. We might think this is small given the intensity of the budgetary support it has received, but it is the region that has converged the most towards the average, from 58% to 77%. Although the figure is lower, Galicia, historically the poorest region, has improved by sixteen percentage points, from 76% to 92% of the average. The eleven-point improvements in Aragon and Castile and León are also noteworthy. Aragon's improvement is particularly significant because it has grown beyond the average, rising from 101% to 112%. Catalonia is among the regions that have lost the most ground. The Balearic Islands have suffered the greatest decline, dropping twenty-four points, followed by the Valencian Community. In 1975, Catalonia was at the national average, but now it is fifteen points below. Third is Catalonia, with a thirteen-point drop. The Catalan Countries share much more than language and history. Now they share economic decline. Not the economic "pie"—GDP—but economic well-being—GDP per capita. Cantabria (down eleven points), Asturias (down eight), and the Basque Country (down seven) continue their decline. In other words, the Cantabrian region, which was once highly industrialized, has suffered deindustrialization.

It is noteworthy that Madrid has only risen three points, and Andalusia two. Both regions are highly populated but have experienced small increases in GDP per capita compared to the average, suggesting that they have enjoyed strong population growth, which is true: immigration in Madrid, and both natural increase and immigration in Andalusia.

Overall, the economy of the entire country has suffered from "stumbled" growth: ten years of industrial crisis since 1975, followed by a brief but intense cycle—seven years, from 1985 to 1992—of stronger growth than that of the countries of what was the European Economic Community; A period of relative unemployment for five years until 1997, followed by a new growth cycle stronger than the European average until 2009. Between 2009 and 2013, a collapse—the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis—and a subsequent recovery, prematurely cut short in 2020 by the pandemic. After 2021, another recovery.

The overall picture, however, is poor in relation to the European Union. The crises have done us considerable damage, and the periods of growth have been, as has been discussed and debated, smaller than those of stagnation or decline. In the case of Catalonia, so dependent on tourism, this has been particularly serious. After being able to boast that Catalonia, initially (1975) poorer than the EU average, had comfortably surpassed it since the 1990s, it can no longer say so since 2020. We are five percentage points poorer than the EU average. We've made up ground in GDP, but not at all in GDP per capita. Our specialization in tourism is proving to be a hindrance.

In short, poor productive specialization, a flood of immigration to perform low-paying jobs, and sustained tax abuse have resulted in a progressive impoverishment relative to those countries we thought we were becoming more like. The poorest autonomous communities have progressed significantly, and some of the richest have as well. Catalonia is no longer part of the Spain that, in terms of well-being, resembles the prosperous core of the European Union. We used to be "very European," and now we are less so. Of course, the production model and the constant tax drain—from that suffered by individuals to that suffered by businesses and public administrations—are decisive causes. We must also add some of our own mistakes.

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