The problem of access to housing is gaining such public prominence that it demands more data, more reflection, and more analysis so as not to strike in the dark. I recall a few facts that can be quantified.
Catalonia, with its six million inhabitants, was a demographic reality from 1980 to 2000. This coincided with stable populations, without significant immigration or emigration, and a falling birth rate that led to a historically exceptional demographic stability. Access to the European Economic Community gave a strong boost to economic growth—improving GDP per capita—without the addition of immigration. It was a golden age, and people probably didn't sufficiently realize how unrepeatable it was. Access to housing was not a public issue.
Immigration grew significantly from the moment the country joined the euro, giving rise to a cycle of population growth, with a strong demand for housing, which was met by a supply generously financed by financial institutions, mainly savings banks. But the 2008 financial crisis swept everything away like a great flood and impoverished Catalonia for about eight years. Eight more have passed, and many parameters have not recovered. Of course, during the years 2008-2016, and beyond, there was no talk of a housing crisis. But a new wave of immigration, simultaneous with a sharp wage devaluation facilitated by the PP's 2012 labor reform, upset the balance of the housing market.
In the latest edition for the year 2023 of the valuable Report on the housing sector in Catalonia, prepared by the Housing Secretariat of the Generalitat of Catalonia, contains, as in all previous editions, a formidable history of what has happened with all the elements that affect housing. I would like to highlight a few, which will be particularly striking to anyone who consults this report.
The first is spectacularly summarized by the following data. In the Catalonia of six million, between thirty thousand and sixty thousand homes were built and completed annually (p. 35, G.1.1). During the speculative frenzy of the years 2002-2006, one hundred and twenty thousand homes were started annually, but never more than eighty thousand were completed in a year. The crisis collapsed initiatives to build new homes. In 2013, only 3,036 were started. By 2023, only 14,418 will have been started (p. 35, Q.1.1), a far cry from the thirty thousand, forty thousand, fifty thousand, or sixty thousand that were started between 1990 and 2008. strong.
The report itself devotes considerable attention to the rental market. We discover, as expected, that the number of homes rented each year has behaved inversely to the construction of new homes (p. 79, G.3.2.4). Rental housing rose sharply during the real estate and financial crisis (from 30,000 in 2000 to 150,000 in 2013) and has remained at similar levels ever since.
And how much are they renting for? The Report measures this from 1984 for the city of Barcelona. It compiles a series of average rents per square meter per month (p. 79, I Q.3.2.3), in current euros, which accurately reflects the current situation, reflecting the crises of the last 40 years: the post-Olympic crisis, the real estate and financial crisis, and the major lockdown during COVID. With admirable rigor, they take care to transform—deflate—current euros into constant euros. What emerges (p. 80, G.3.2.5) is spectacular: since the peak in 1992, the new peaks that can be detected are practically identical. In other words, average rents in Barcelona have changed very little in real terms for more than thirty years.
I was able to confirm this by looking at how the housing cost (rent) index within the cost of living index (CLI) has behaved in Catalonia: between December 2008 and December 2024, both rose by 38%. Even if we look at how the housing price index (new and used sales) and the CLI compare, we find that between the same dates, when the CLI rose by 38%, the housing price index only rose by 14%. It doesn't seem that the housing problem is due to its price.
Another spectacular graph (p. 101, G.4.2.1) clearly shows how minuscule the promotion of public housing has been since the real estate and financial crisis, that is, since 2010.
In short: from the data we can solve what we are attacking. The solution does not seem to come from more controls and restrictions on private initiative, both in construction and rental, but from more incentives, and also from greater public initiative.
