Zaki Laïdi: "The war in Iran is a spectacular fiasco for the United States"

BarcelonaZaki Laïdi (Constantine, Algeria, 1957) political scientist and professor of political science, was special advisor to Josep Borrell, when he was the high representative of European diplomacy, for five years in Brussels. He has visited Barcelona at the invitation of Cidob to present the book The hedgers (Cambridge University Press).

Where are we in the war of the United States and Israel against Iran?

— We are in a frozen situation. The United States has gotten itself into it and is finding it difficult to get out, because Trump launched into war lightly, thinking that Iran would be Venezuela. Now he needs a symbolic victory and, for the moment, the Iranians are not willing to give it to him, because they have also discovered that they have an enormous means of pressure: the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has created a problem that did not exist and that has now become the priority of negotiations. It is a colossal strategic failure, which began with a misjudgment, an underestimation of the adversary, and an alignment with Netanyahu's positions, who clearly wants to destroy Iran. It is a spectacular fiasco for the United States, but that does not mean that Americans are lost. We must be prudent. For forty years we have been saying that the United States is finished; it was said after Vietnam, after all the wars that ended in disasters, and in the end they have always managed to recover.

Iran's regime has only won because it has survived. That's what happens with asymmetric wars.

— Yes, asymmetry plays in favor of the weaker party: Iran has not won, but since it has not lost either, it has turned it into a victory. Now we have a kind of race against time, in which the Iranians think that the cost will end up being too high for the United States and will force them to retreat, while the Americans... In fact, it is very difficult to know what they think, because there are probably people who have a fairly accurate idea of the situation, but there is only one person who decides. It is not a rational, bureaucratic system, organized with arbitration between different agencies, and finally an arbitration made by the president. The State Department and the National Security Council are decapitated and the war is decided by a president who seems to play the casino. But it is difficult to imagine what the United States can gain by returning to war.

Trump criticizes Europe for being cowardly.

— When the United States realizes they have taken a catastrophic action, they tell us: "We are taking risks for you." But they are the ones who make mistakes, they don't consult us about anything, and when they have put themselves in a complicated situation, they ask us to act. But there is no European leader who responds. Two months ago they were telling us that Europeans were nothing, that we were useless, that NATO was useless, and now they tell us: "But what is NATO doing?" And this shows the extraordinary weakness in which Europe finds itself in relation to the United States, because it doesn't even have the ability to express itself with a single voice. The relationship is extraordinarily chaotic and very degraded, also in economic, commercial, and technological matters. If we also add the pressure from China on the other side, the situation is even more complicated. And Europe doesn't know how to react as an autonomous power, but this is not achieved overnight. And even less so when you are not a state: there is no European state, each one acts according to its own interests.

Ursula von der Leyen has taken measures against the Russian invasion of Ukraine because it is illegal, but says that Israel, accused of genocide in international courts, has the right to defend itself.

— Everyone has double standards, including Arab countries. Von der Leyen talks a lot, but she has no competence in foreign policy, which is a responsibility of the states. And I have never heard Pedro Sánchez publicly question the President of the Commission for exceeding her powers. It is necessary for European governments to assume their responsibility, but as they expect other things from the Commission, they do not dare to confront it directly. There is a lot of hypocrisy from the states, who privately say that there are unacceptable things, but in public they remain silent.

What has the war in Ukraine taught us about Europe?

— It has shown that Europeans could be supportive of a European state threatened by an expansionist power that questions the sovereignty of an independent state. Without Europe, Ukraine would have already collapsed. It shows that, when there is consensus, Europeans can move forward.

But is Europe more or less dependent on the United States now?

— Much more, but not just because of the war in Ukraine. The United States is energetically autonomous and we are not; they have an integrated market that we do not have. Thirty years ago our standard of living was higher than that of the USA, and now it is much lower. Our correlation of forces has degraded. Not to mention military dependence, economic and commercial pressure, and technological dependence. That is why we have no other option but to persevere in the attempt to build a common European trajectory. We do not know what NATO will look like in five years. We do not know if Russia will try to attack an EU country, we do not know who will be at the head of the United States. We have been forced to sign a trade agreement with the USA contrary to the interests of Europe. Because the differences between Europeans make us weak. Look at the Franco-German project for the new fighter jet: it is the most important military project in Europe and it will probably not happen because France and Germany, that is, Dassault and Airbus, do not agree. And the Spanish Indra has little to say. And when Sánchez returned from China with the project to build a huge factory, for him it would be a good result, but it would probably be a catastrophe for Europe. But Spaniards vote for him, not the French or the Germans, and he has to seek his political survival.

Europe is caught between the United States and China.

— Exactly. As the North American market closes to the Chinese, they dump their surplus onto Europe and Southeast Asia. Therefore, we are the collateral victim of the Sino-North American conflict. They have means to deter each other because they have enormous instruments of pressure on one another. We have very few, both with respect to the North Americans and the Chinese. The result is that the great policy of risk reduction with China –derisking–, developed by Von der Leyen, translates today into an worsening of our trade deficit. It is a very difficult situation for us.

Does China see Europe simply as a prosperous and divided market with which it can do business?

— For them, Europe is very important from an economic point of view, because we have purchasing power, we consume, and as long as China does not modify its economic policy – which is a completely crazy policy – they will continue to produce and export. With an undervalued currency and massive subsidies. As I said yesterday, it is not normal for a country that represents 18% of global GDP to simultaneously represent 31% of global manufacturing production. But Xi Jinping believes that the Chinese should not consume more, because if they consume more, they will demand more and will become a kind of lazy capitalists when what they should do is work even more. But China is a great danger to Europe. It is destroying our automotive industry. I don't know if we are aware, but what is happening is very serious. International politics is a very tough game. There is no room for feelings. Either you are strong and have the means to exert pressure on the other, or the other crushes you. But Europeans have lost the habit of thinking about the world in terms of power relations. The world has changed.

And in polarization, there are states that do what they can without committing to anyone. It is what he calls in his book hedger states. Is that what Pedro Sánchez is trying to do?

— They are states that, in a bipolar competition system, try to increase their autonomy. We have tried to define the power of each one: their economic resources, GDP growth, financial resources, sovereign funds, participation in value chains and manufacturing production. Look at the spectacular rise of Vietnam, it is fascinating. China twenty years ago had an insignificant role in Brazil and today it is the main trading partner. This gives these states more options than before, but they are states that are not protected by security alliances, such as NATO. And this is a very risky game. This is not the case for Spain, and I don't think Europe should choose between the United States and China. However, the excessive trust placed in the United States has reached its limit.