Zaki Laïdi: "The war in Iran is a spectacular fiasco for the United States"

BarcelonaZaki Laïdi (Constantina, Algeria, 1957) a political scientist and professor of political science, was a special advisor to Josep Borrell, when he was the High Representative of European Diplomacy, for five years in Brussels. He has visited Barcelona invited by Cidob to present the book The hedgers (Cambridge University Press).

Where are we in the war of the United States and Israel against Iran?

— We are in a frozen situation. The United States got involved and is finding it hard to get out, because Trump rushed into war lightly, thinking Iran would be Venezuela. Now he needs a symbolic victory and, for the moment, the Iranians are not willing to give it to him, because they have also discovered that they have an enormous means of pressure: the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has created a problem that did not exist and that has now become the priority of negotiations. It is a colossal strategic failure, which began with an error of judgment, an underestimation of the adversary, and an alignment with Netanyahu's positions, who clearly wants to destroy Iran. It is a spectacular fiasco for the United States, but that does not mean that Americans are lost. We must be prudent. For forty years we have been saying that the United States is finished; it was said after Vietnam, after all the wars that ended in disaster, and in the end they have always managed to recover.

Iran's regime has only won because it has survived. That's what happens with asymmetric wars.

— Yes, asymmetry plays in favor of the weaker party: Iran has not won, but since it has not lost either, it has turned it into a victory. Now we have a kind of race against time, in which the Iranians think that the cost will eventually be too high for the United States and will force them to back down, while the Americans... In fact, it is very difficult to know what they think, because there are probably people who have a fairly accurate idea of the situation, but there is only one person who decides. It is not a rational, bureaucratic system, organized with arbitrations between different agencies, and finally an arbitration made by the president. The State Department and the National Security Council are decapitated and the war is decided by a president who seems to play at the casino. But it is difficult to imagine what the United States can gain by returning to war.

Trump criticizes Europe for being cowardly.

— When the United States realizes they have taken a catastrophic action, they tell us: "We take risks for you." But they are the ones who make mistakes, they don't consult us about anything, and when they have gotten themselves into a complicated situation, they ask us to act. But there is no European leader who responds. Two months ago they told us that Europeans were nothing, that we were useless, that NATO was useless, and now they tell us: "But what is NATO doing?" And this shows the extraordinary weakness in which Europe finds itself in front of the United States, because it does not even have the capacity to express itself with a single voice. The relationship is extraordinarily chaotic and very degraded, also in economic, commercial, and technological matters. If we add to this, moreover, the pressure from China on the other side, the situation is even more complicated. And Europe does not know how to react as an autonomous power, but this is not achieved overnight. And even less so when you are not a state: there is no European state, each one acts according to their own interests.

Ursula von der Leyen has taken measures against the Russian invasion of Ukraine because it is illegal, but says that Israel, accused of genocide in international courts, has the right to defend itself.

— Everyone has double standards, including Arab countries. Von der Leyen talks a lot, but she has no competence in foreign policy, which is the responsibility of the states. And I have never heard Pedro Sánchez publicly questioning the President of the Commission for exceeding her powers. European governments must assume their responsibility, but as they expect other things from the Commission, they do not dare to confront it directly. There is a lot of hypocrisy from the states, which in private say that there are unacceptable things, but in public they remain silent.

What has the war in Ukraine taught us about Europe?

— It has shown that Europeans can be supportive of a European state threatened by an expansionist power that questions the sovereignty of an independent state. Without Europe, Ukraine would have already collapsed. It shows that, when there is consensus, Europeans can move forward.

But is Europe more or less dependent on the United States now?

— Much more, but not only because of the war in Ukraine. The United States is energetically autonomous and we are not; they have an integrated market that we do not have. Thirty years ago our standard of living was higher than that of the USA, and now it is much lower. Our correlation of forces has degraded. Not to mention military dependence, economic and commercial pressure, and technological dependence. That is why we have no other option but to persevere in the attempt to build a common European trajectory. We do not know what NATO will be like in five years. We do not know if Russia will try to attack an EU country, we do not know who will be at the head of the United States. We have been forced to sign a trade agreement with the USA contrary to the interests of Europe. Because the differences between Europeans make us weak. Look at the Franco-German project for the new combat fighter: it is the most important military project in Europe and it will probably not happen because France and Germany, that is, Dassault and Airbus, do not agree. And the Spanish Indra has little to say. And when Sánchez returned from China with the project to build a huge factory, for him it would be a good result, but it would probably be a catastrophe for Europe. But he is voted for by Spaniards, not by French or Germans, and he has to seek his political survival.

Europe is caught between the United States and China.

— Exactly. As the North American market closes to the Chinese, they pour their surplus over Europe and Southeast Asia. Therefore, we are the collateral victim of the Sino-American conflict. They have means to dissuade each other because they have enormous instruments of pressure on each other. We have very few, both with regard to the Americans and the Chinese. The result is that the great policy of risk reduction with China –derisking–, developed by Von der Leyen, translates today into an exacerbation of our trade deficit. It is a very difficult situation for us.

Does China see Europe simply as a prosperous and divided market with which it can do business?

— For them, Europe is very important from an economic point of view, because we have purchasing power, we consume, and as long as China does not modify its economic policy – which is a completely crazy policy – they will continue to produce and export. With an undervalued currency and massive subsidies. As I said yesterday, it is not normal for a country that represents 18% of the world's GDP to represent at the same time 31% of the world's manufacturing production. But Xi Jinping believes that the Chinese should not consume more, because if they consume more, they will demand more and will become a kind of lazy capitalists when what they should do is work even harder. But China is a great danger to Europe. It is destroying our automotive industry. I don't know if we are aware of it, but what is happening is very serious. International politics is a very tough game. There is no room for feelings. Either you are strong and have the means to exert pressure on the other, or the other crushes you. But Europeans have lost the habit of thinking about the world in terms of power relations. The world has changed.

And in polarization, there are states that do what they can without committing to anyone. It is what he calls in his book hedger states. Is that what Pedro Sánchez is trying to do?

— They are states that, in a bipolar competition system, try to increase their autonomy. We have tried to define the power of each one: their economic resources, GDP growth, financial resources, sovereign funds, participation in value chains, and in manufacturing production. Look at the spectacular rise of Vietnam, it is fascinating. China twenty years ago had an insignificant role in Brazil and today it is its main trading partner. This means that these states have more options than before, but they are states that are not protected by security alliances, such as NATO. And this is a very risky game. This is not the case for Spain, and I do not think Europe should choose between the United States and China. However, the excessive trust placed in the United States has reached its limit.