Strong but divided: the European far right faces a decisive electoral year

BrusselsThe European far-right is enjoying a sweet moment. The overwhelming victory of Alternative for Germany in the Saxony-Anhalt regional elections is just the latest in a chain of warnings: the far-right has become normalized. But at the same time that it gains strength, it also highlights its internal divisions. "It has become a normal party that wins and loses for the same reasons as the rest of the parties: because of the economy, corruption, the campaign, or the ability to set the agenda," asserts Javier Carbonell, an analyst at the European Policy Center. "That it is a consolidated force is a fact, but the relationship with the rest of the parties is not yet normal; it is not easy to form coalitions with them," qualifies László Andor, former European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, and now an analyst, in statements to ARA.

More than 23% of Europeans voted for far-right parties in the last national elections held in their country. Over the last few years, they have been the leading force in countries such as France (National Rally), Italy (Brothers of Italy), and Austria (Freedom Party of Austria), and have governed, alone or in coalition, in Italy, the Netherlands, and Finland. This base gives ultra forces great security to face an academic year that is particularly decisive electorally. The Swedish elections this weekend will be key to determining if the far-right gains access to government for the first time; in the German regional elections, the strength of the AfD is being recalibrated, and in the spring of 2027, the far-right aspires to obtain good results in Italy, Spain, and, above all, in France.

If Marine Le Pen—who is not yet certain to be able to run—wins the French presidential elections, it will be the first time that the far-right governs at the Élysée. A victory for the National Rally (RN) would be, in Andor's words, "an end point for the European Union." "France has an enormous weight within the EU. It could be extremely destructive," he adds. Apart from the country's historical weight in community institutions, France is a semi-presidential regime in which whoever governs "has a brutal capacity for maneuver." "Europe can withstand six Orbáns much more than one Le Pen," summarizes Carbonell.

But in the same way that the German elections have breathed a breath of optimism into the ultra ranks, they have also highlighted the deep differences between the various far-right parties on the continent. While various referents of the reactionary international were congratulating Alice Weidel's party for the results in Saxony-Anhalt, the Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, and the leader of the RN remained silent.

Who are they and what do they think?

If the entire European far-right were to vote together in the European Parliament, it would be the largest group in the chamber. But it does not. It is divided into three parliamentary groups. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) are led de facto by Meloni, and include parties such as the Polish Law and Justice. It is the Atlanticist bloc, favorable to NATO and military aid to Ukraine, and the one that appears most "moderate" to the rest of the European political families.

If you want to investigate the chart in more detail, open the high-resolution version in another tabOn the other hand, there are the Patriots for Europe, the project promoted by Viktor Orbán to bring together the radical right on the continent. With 86 MEPs, it is the third-largest group in the European Parliament and is chaired by RN MEP Jordan Bardella. In addition to the French RN, it includes Matteo Salvini's League, the Freedom Party of Austria, Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom (Netherlands), the populist party Action of Dissatisfied Citizens of former Prime Minister Andrej Babis (Czech Republic), Chega (Portugal), Vlaams Belang (Belgium), and Vox (Spain), which left Giorgia Meloni's group to join it.

And finally, we find the most radical and smallest group in the European Parliament, the Europe of Sovereign Nations. It was created following the expulsion of the AfD from the Identity and Democracy group in 2024 and is clearly dominated by the German party—which provides more than half of the seats. It brings together other hard-line ultra-nationalist parties such as the Polish Confederation of Liberty and Independence or the French Reconquest. It is the most openly pro-Russian bloc in the European Parliament—it opposes sending weapons to Ukraine and sanctioning the Kremlin—and is highly critical of the community project. This earns it isolation, not only from traditional forces but also from Le Pen's or Meloni's parties.

The division of the European far-right does not respond only to ideological differences. It is also "a question of strategy." It determines how far they are willing to approach European institutions, traditional parties, and international alliances to reach power, explains Sophia Russack, a researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies, to ARA. Thus, while leaders like Meloni have taken advantage of European institutions to project an image of moderation and present themselves as a reliable partner for the European People's Party, formations like the AfD have used this distance from other ultra groups to appear more anti-establishment. Carbonell gives the example of the RN, which has distanced itself from Reconquest, Éric Zemmour's party, to occupy a more central space and project itself as a government alternative. "It is a virtuous competition that benefits both parties," he says.

Where does it govern?

Italy is the clearest example of a state where the extreme right has prevailed. Giorgia Meloni has governed there since 2022 and has turned her executive into the longest-lasting in the history of the Italian Republic. Her formula –moderating the tone in the relationship with Brussels and maintaining good harmony with Ursula von der Leyen– has allowed her to become an interlocutor accepted by conservatives like the German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, and by social democrats like the Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen. The international press has renamed the alliance she has maintained with Merz since the beginning of the year as Merzoni. Meloni is, in Andor's words, the clearest proof that the cordon sanitaire "no longer holds".

In other countries, the cordon sanitaire has blocked the path of ultra formations to the executive, but this has not diminished their popular support nor prevented them from continuing to set the agenda. In Austria, for example, the Freedom Party of Austria won the European elections of June 2024, but remains out of government thanks to a coalition of the Austrian People's Party, social democrats, and liberals to keep it isolated. Today, it is the leading force in the polls.

France and Germany show the other side of the phenomenon. Neither the National Rally nor the AfD governs, but both have managed to place immigration and security at the center of the political debate and have pushed traditional parties to harden their discourse and policies.

The Hungarian case offers, on the other hand, a counterpoint. There are also countries where the far right has lost power. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán, the main promoter of Patriots for Europe and, until recently, the most consolidated ultra ruler on the continent, lost power in April after sixteen years, defeated by Péter Magyar –who emerged from the same national-conservative space, but is favorable to the European Union.

The cordon sanitaire

Where, then, does the cordon sanitaire stand when the far-right has ceased to be marginal? Does it make sense to maintain it? Carbonell points out that this mechanism is basically "defensive" and that in no case "is it the way to deal with the far-right". Traditional right-wing parties, having realized that the far-right is eating into their votes, have applied a contradictory policy: they have validated ultra ideas (against immigration, in favor of working more, more security, etc.) and at the same time have invalidated far-right politicians (by applying the cordon sanitaire), he explains. "This creates a lot of anti-politics".

Russack emphasizes that this strategy has become useless because ultra ideas have imposed themselves through traditional parties, especially regarding immigration, security, or identity. "There is no longer any need to vote for the far-right for their proposals to govern," he ironizes.