Saudi Arabia seeks its place in the new Middle East: what role does it play in the war?

BarcelonaOf all the Persian Gulf monarchies that have suffered attacks from Iran since Washington initiated the war, Saudi Arabia is in the most confusing position, immersed in a genuine strategic dilemma. Among other reasons, because it is the largest and most powerful country in the region, the one with the oldest and closest ties to the United States, but the one which, along with Oman, has suffered least from the wrath of the ayatollah regime. At least, until now. Therefore, contradictory news has been published about how and when Riyadh would like the war to end, and what its future security strategy might be, given the failure of the current one.

In its public statements, the Saudi government has condemned Iran's attacks on its neighbors in a rather measured tone. Although it has warned that it reserves the right "to take all necessary measures to safeguard its sovereignty," analysts have interpreted that it was not planning to counterattack Tehran for fear of provoking an escalation in the conflict. Riyadh, like the other Gulf petromonarchies, would like the war to end as soon as possible to minimize damage to its oil facilities and its economic model.

For this reason, an article this week in the New York Times caused surprise, claiming that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had urged President Donald Trump to continue the war in several recent phone calls. According to the US newspaper, Bin Salman had defined the war as "a historic opportunity to reshape the Middle East," which would involve provoking a regime change in Iran.

The nature of the article is quite exceptional, as the Saudi government is not prone to leaks. Based on the information, some analysts have argued that, despite having positioned itself against the war before the outbreak of hostilities, Bin Salman must be concerned about the scenario that a precipitate US withdrawal would outline, and consequently, an emboldened Iran ready to continuously blackmail its neighbors. Others have suggested that the information could be an inaccurate leak from a White House that has felt isolated when asking its allies for help to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

allies to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

Contradictions

The contradiction in the messages coming from Riyadh is the result of the stupefaction generated by the failure of its dual strategy to guarantee its security. The Saud dynasty perceived the founding of the Islamic Republic as a threat from its inception in 1979, both because of its revolutionary discourse and its demographic and military potential. Therefore, their first instinct was to reinforce their security pact with the USA, signed in 1945.

However, after disagreements with Washington during Barack Obama's term over his support for the Arab Spring revolts and his inability to defeat the Houthis, the pro-Iranian militia from Yemen, Bin Salman opted to add a new insurance policy: to de-escalate tensions with Iran. The Saudi shift has a date, September 2019, when a Houthi attack caused serious damage to the world's largest oil refinery. Faced with Washington's inaction, Riyadh turned to China's mediation. In 2023, to the surprise of many, the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was announcedthe restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran thanks to Beijing's mediation.

Faced with the failure of this dual national security strategy, the Saudi government is considering alternatives. Firstly, the ayatollah regime has suggested to its Arab neighbors that if they break their association with Washington and close down American bases, they will no longer be attacked. This choice would require approaching China as a guarantor. However, in the current climate of mutual distrust, this scenario seems a pipe dream. Moreover, it presents a serious problem: almost all of the Saudi army's weaponry is American.

Secondly, an option that goes in a completely opposite direction is to sign a mutual defense pact with Washington with a clause similar to Article 5 of NATO that would force the US to help Riyadh in case of an attack. This is a long-standing Saudi aspiration that currently faces a significant obstacle: Washington, in return, is asking Riyadh to normalize relations with Israel, a condition difficult to digest after the war in Gaza.

A third alternative would consist of diversifying its partners in the military field. In fact, last week Riyadh held a meeting with three other powers in the region, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan to coordinate their positions on the war, a meeting that some analysts have interpreted as the embryo of a possible military alliance for the future.