Lost years for Ukraine, Europe, and Russia
I haven't waited until February 23rd. I've decided against timing my reflections to coincide with the fourth anniversary of Putin's attack. I prefer to write about the origins of this European tragedy. I will, of course, talk about Ukraine, and about the Russian and European perspectives on it, but not The Abu Dhabi peace plans are a never-ending storyI decide to backtrack and begin with a quote from the late Alexei Navalny. Words that say almost everything: "Once the war is over, Ukraine will have to be compensated for the harm caused by Putin's invasion." Terrible figures: a contraction of more than 50% of GDP; mourning for tens of thousands of dead, more than 100,000; how to repair the damage done to 6.7 million refugees. And how to achieve the return of the more than 20,000 Ukrainian boys and girls kidnapped by Russian units and treated as a weapon of war.
I agree with the South Korean economist Ha-Joon Xang when he says that Europe's response to Trump's threats—and Putin's as well—has been pathetic. Where does this patheticness come from?Why is an economic, cultural, and humanist power like the European Union finding it so difficult to rid itself of the burden of fear, indignity, and apathy that it carries? Difficult to answer. Perhaps it's less complex to look at the facts. Identify and reanalyze the EU's first major stumble in the face of Putin's first major threat: on November 29, 2013, just hours before the signing of the association agreement—not the accession agreement—between Kyiv and Brussels, then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanuko—disguising it as a veiled attempt to conceal his true intentions—rejected the treaty, which for him represented Ukraine's distancing from Russia. The EU would eventually emerge from this paralysis by accepting, in September 2014, a treaty that was stillborn because, complying with Putin's demands, it would not enter into force until December 2015. This postponement was a massive obstacle, especially considering that Russia had already annexed Crimea and occupied other regions.
We must continue to remember. It should not be overlooked that Ukraine's independence—achieved via referendum on September 1, 1991, which would trigger the collapse of the USSR eight days later—represents the election of Leonid Kravchuk, perhaps the president with the greatest popular support in Ukrainian history. Brussels' shortsightedness would contribute both to Kravchuk's decline and to the rise to power of Leonid Kuchma, a figure of the nomenklatura Soviet that would strengthen, let's say. deep state who felt orphaned. Those who denounce him pay with their lives, like the journalist Georgi Gongadze. The authoritarian drift seems to have reached its nadir in November 2004 with the so-called Orange Revolution, which receives applause from Brussels, but fails to consolidate: it does not prevent the 2014 coup against Crimea and Donbas. Putin wins the first round of the war.
Insufficient progress
According to recent data from the CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies - 325,000 Russian soldiers are believed to have died in the warSince World War II, no power with imperial ambitions has suffered so many deaths on the battlefield. Putin dismisses the CSIS data, but in Moscow, some are questioning how, after four years, territorial gains, as the CSIS indicates, can fall far short of the Russian military objectives announced in 2022. And at this point, it's inevitable to wonder how much time Putin has left to produce even minimally acceptable results? Or how many conspiracies have begun to brew around him, both inside and outside the Kremlin?
