Iran redraws its alliances after emerging victorious from Trump's war

BeirutThe memorandum of understanding with the United States has been presented in Tehran as a political victory. And this new position of strength is leading the Islamic Republic to rethink its regional relations and the system of alliances that has sustained its influence in the Middle East for the last four decades. "The enemy that launched the aggression failed in all its malicious objectives and the Islamic Republic achieved great victories," assured a few days ago the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kazem Gharibabadi, summarizing the regime's interpretation of the agreement reached with Washington.

In the Iranian capital, the memorandum is not perceived as a concession extorted by force, but as proof that the Islamic Republic has resisted military pressure and has forced its adversaries to negotiate. This feeling of victory has opened a broader debate in Tehran about who were the allies that really responded, which have shown their limits, and what new partnerships Iran needs to consolidate its influence in the region.

The first lesson comes from Iran's major international partners. Russia condemned the attacks and defended Tehran's right to respond, but avoided direct involvement in the confrontation. China, the main buyer of Iranian oil and the economic lifeline of the Islamic Republic, maintained an equally cautious position. Beijing opted for the diplomatic route and regional stability, but was also unwilling to risk its interests for its Iranian partner.

Partners but not military allies

For Tehran, the message has been clear: Moscow and Beijing are important partners, even indispensable in some areas, but not allies willing to go to war for Iran. At the same time, other actors have gained weight. Pakistan, which has played a mediating role between Tehran and Washington, is emerging as an increasingly relevant interlocutor. A nuclear power, a neighbor of the Islamic Republic, and a close ally of Saudi Arabia, Islamabad offers Iran something few countries can provide: a communication channel with various capitals in the region and a gateway to new formulas for understanding.

However, the biggest change has occurred much closer to Iran's borders. For decades, the so-called Axis of Resistance was Tehran's main instrument of influence in the Middle East. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi militias, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in Gaza served a very specific function by keeping the confrontation away from Iranian territory and increasing the cost of any attack against the Islamic Republic. The logic was simple: if Iran were attacked, its allies could open multiple fronts and act as a deterrent force.

But the war and subsequent negotiations have altered this equation. For the first time, Iran has been forced to come to the defense of one of the main pillars of this axis: Hezbollah. For years, the Lebanese movement was the most successful example of Iran's strategy, an ally capable of protecting Tehran's interests and projecting its influence far beyond Iran's borders. Today, weakened after months of confrontations with Israel and subjected to enormous political and military pressure, it is Hezbollah that has needed the support of its main sponsor.

The Axis of Resistance no longer functions solely as a shield for Iran; in some cases, it has become a structure that Tehran must sustain and protect. This does not mean that the network of Iranian allies has ceased to be useful. But the conflict has shown that maintaining this framework will require ever more resources and that some of its members have emerged weakened.

Coexistence with the Gulf neighbors

The memorandum has also opened another opportunity for Tehran to redefine its relationship with the Arab monarchies of the Gulf. Before the conflict, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates considered the Islamic Republic the main threat to regional stability. Today they continue to distrust Iran deeply, but they have also reached a conclusion that is difficult to ignore: the Iranian regime has survived and will be a central player in the Middle East. The disruption of maritime traffic in Hormuz, the threat to energy infrastructure, and the fear of a new escalation have convinced the Gulf monarchies that regional stability, to some extent, depends on finding formulas for coexistence with their great rival. In recent weeks, discreet contacts, proposals for non-aggression pacts, and attempts to create de-escalation mechanisms have multiplied.

Iran and the Arab monarchies will continue to be neighbors and, however uncomfortable this reality may be, they will have to find a way to coexist. But this coexistence will not be without rivalries. The war has exposed the differences between the Gulf monarchies themselves. While Saudi Arabia and Qatar seem to favor a more pragmatic relationship with Tehran, the United Arab Emirates maintains a more ambivalent position.

Abu Dhabi has strengthened its political and economic ties with the Islamic Republic in recent years, but it continues to view Iran's regional weight and the activity of its armed allies with concern. The Islamic Republic emerges from this crisis with a sense of victory and with the conviction that it has resisted its enemies. But it also faces a regional landscape very different from that of just a few months ago.

Its major partners have shown the limits of their support, some of its allies are going through a fragile moment, and its Arab neighbors are seeking new forms of understanding. The memorandum of understanding has not only changed the relationship between Iran and the United States. It has also opened a new chapter for Iranian foreign policy. After surviving, Tehran is trying to answer a much more complex question: how to preserve its influence in a region where the alliances that gave it power for forty years no longer work exactly the same?