Iran is protecting its regime and preparing for a US attack

BeirutIn Tehran, newspaper front pages have moved beyond hypothetical scenarios. Missiles in the foreground, headlines about naval maneuvers, and warnings from Washington now occupy the center of public debate. This is not just rhetoric. It is the stage set for a country preparing for a scenario that no longer seems remote. A direct confrontation with the United States is being seriously discussed in power circles.

In the Strait of Hormuz, the Revolutionary Guard yesterday tested the new Sayyad-3G naval air defense missile. According to authorities, it can create a protective perimeter of up to 150 kilometers around the ships that carry it and intercept aircraft, high-altitude drones, and cruise missiles. The launch is part of a series of exercises that have recently increased in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, including joint drills with Russia. The frequency and nature of these operations suggest more than just routine military activity. Iran's move coincides with the US military buildup in the regionFollowing the latest round of talks held this week in Geneva, both sides have offered differing accounts of the extent of progress. Iran insists its nuclear program is for civilian purposes and rejects demands to abandon uranium enrichment or limit its ballistic missile program, while Washington warns that these points are red lines.

Faced with the possibility that the diplomatic route might fail, the Islamic Republic is not only training its forces. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei recently issued internal directives establishing four levels of succession for each of the military and government positions he appoints. He also instructed senior officials to nominate up to four potential replacements and delegated responsibilities to a small inner circle so that decisions can be made if communication with him is severed or if he is assassinated. It is a design intended to ensure continuity under fire. Following these directives, Ali Larijani, the top national security official, assumed a central role in political and strategic management. Khamenei should also have designated three possible successors. Their names have not been made public, but Larijani is almost certainly not among them, as he is not a high-ranking Shiite cleric, a prerequisite for the supreme leadership. The message is unequivocal: the system must survive even the disappearance of its central figure.

Signs of rearmament extend beyond naval exercises. Satellite images released by US media show reconstruction work at missile bases and new fortification works around nuclear facilities. In Khorramabad, some of the infrastructure damaged in previous attacks has been restored. In Shahrud, the main solid-fuel missile production plant must have quickly resumed operations. Near the Natanz complex, structures that could reinforce protection against airstrikes are visible.

The risk of miscalculation

Furthermore, President Masoud Pezeshkian has reinforced his narrative of resistance. He maintains that Iran will not yield to international pressure and that the major powers are seeking to impose unacceptable conditions. Khamenei, for his part, has downplayed the impact of the US naval deployment, suggesting that any platform can be vulnerable if the right weapon is available.

The risk lies in miscalculation, analysts warn. As Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group think tank explains, there is a perception in Tehran that Washington uses diplomacy as a cover to increase pressure before possible military action. In Washington, some believe Iran's firmness stems from an overestimation of its own deterrent capabilities. "In an environment saturated with ships, drones, and missile systems, an incident in the Strait of Hormuz could trigger a chain reaction," Vaez insists. The paradox is evident. Diplomatic channels remain open, but the dominant language is that of war preparedness. Iran is reinforcing its air defenses, reorganizing its chain of command, and defining succession plans. The United States is building naval power and maintaining its ultimatum. Both claim to prefer an agreement but act as if war were a tangible possibility. The scope for de-escalation exists, but it narrows with each new maneuver in the Gulf.