62,000 small solar energy investors: "They're forcing us out of the market. Many have had to sell at a loss."

BarcelonaDespite their dedication to producing solar energy, it's a tough sell in the world of small photovoltaic investors. In addition to the retroactive cuts in remuneration—first approved by the Socialist governments in 2010 and subsequently consolidated and aggravated by the PP governments starting in 2012, with changes to the rules and turning the "Official State Gazette" into a dead letter—are the effects of regulation, which reduces the current amount many producers are currently experiencing. This is a positive situation for consumers thanks to the influence of renewables and the contributions these pioneers made, but it is now penalizing them, while large investors are not suffering because they have greater financial strength and can take advantage of economies of scale. "They're forcing us out of the market. Many have had to sell off," complain the small investors, who number around 62,000 families, some 8,500 in Catalonia, especially in rural areas, and are demanding solutions from the Ministry of Ecological Transition.

And all this at a time when the Spanish government has decided to pay $32 million in compensation as a result of an award from the World Bank's arbitration center (ICSID). But this compensation will not go to small investors; the beneficiary is the Blasket Fund, a litigation specialist, which purchased these rights from JGC Holdings. Until now, the State had refused to pay, but has finally opted to do so. ICSID records 38 renewable energy claims affecting Spain, including resolved and pending cases—mainly from the PP era—and these equal the figures for awards for breaches of the Energy Charter in Argentina and Venezuela, according to the National Association of Energy Producers.

Meanwhile, small Spanish investors who risked their savings to widespread use of this energy source, encouraged by the Spanish government, have been left without compensation after losing their lawsuit filed with the Supreme Court. Unlike foreign investors, they are forced to resort to the Spanish courts. "Do Spanish families deserve worse justice than large international funds?" asks Anpier. That's why its president, Miguel Ángel Martínez-Aroca, has stated that the ecological transition in Spain, which has made energy cheaper than in neighboring countries and increased business competitiveness, hides a "fiasco" and is "neither social nor fair."

Àlex Valls, who, along with his three siblings, used the money he obtained from the sale of the family SME in 2008 to invest in a solar plant in Santa María de Miralles (Anoia), on land they acquired from Elèctrica Pintó, recalls that they entered the business following the Spanish government's recommendations aimed at promoting it. At the time, the technology was immature and expensive, and they invested a million, approximately 30% of the money; it was a bank loan, based on a 30-year premium payment that changed overnight after two years. And the courts, he recalls, considered that, although the regulations were in the Official State Gazette (BOE), they should "have assumed the risk of regulatory changes."

Diversify the activity and retain young people

Today, thanks to the commitment of these pioneers who followed the state's recommendations aimed at encouraging investment in small installations of up to 100 kilowatts (kW), panels and costs have fallen by up to 90%. "Many self-employed workers and farmers heeded this, thinking of diversifying their activity, retaining young people who wanted to leave the countryside, and contributing to the energy transition," says Albert Mases, Anpier's representative in Catalonia, who with his family invested in Les Borges Blanques (Les Garrigues), on their rural land.

Financial institutions saw the business as secure, with the guarantee of the Official State Gazette (BOE)—like public debt—and with a ten-year amortization period and thirty years of guaranteed returns. But the Socialist government, as a result of the crisis, cut their remuneration in 2010. In other words, it changed the rules of the game in the middle of the game. It compensated them by extending the bonus remuneration period by five years, but "the problem of legal uncertainty had begun," says Valls. In fact, in 2014, the PP radically changed the system based on the estimated value of theoretical installations instead of a price per kilowatt (kW), which meant a 30%, 40%, and even 50% cut in financing investments, a high percentage of which. "They came to say: if you paid more, it's your problem," says Mases.

Many small investors had to refinance their debt and extend their terms from 10 to 15, 17, or almost 20 years, which also meant higher interest rates. Others had to sell off their facilities. "There were producers who had money coming in one way and money going out the other" to pay off the debt, he adds. Mases denounces the unfair situation suffered by those who, following the government's advice, opted for solar energy and, with their efforts, contributed to the widespread and cheaper use of solar panels and the country's more competitive energy prices. It was a formula that encouraged the diversification of activities in rural areas, and "the money stayed in the region," they add. After their bad experience, they now refuse to even hear about making new investments: "We've learned our lesson," says Mases.

And that's leading to a shift from a decentralized model to the same formula as the fossil fuel-based energy system: large wind and solar farms owned by large companies, which, as a result, many have had to sell off to get rid of their debts. According to Anpier, small installations have gone from 62% of installed capacity in 2007 and 2008 to just 0.5% of new ones today.